dissenting:

Because I believe that, in asserting jurisdiction over this appeal from a non-final order denying summary judgment, the ma *1113 jority impermissibly expands the collateral order doctrine, I respectfully dissent. Our holding today carves out a special and unwarranted exception with indeterminate boundaries, with the result that any time Congress enacts a statute of repose, defendants within the covered industry wield the added advantage in litigation of piecemeal review.

The majority expands the collateral order doctrine by erroneously interpreting the General Aviation Revitalization Act (“GARA”), 1 to confer an explicit right not to stand trial, thereby equating the purpose behind the GARA statute of repose with the policies underlying doctrines like qualified immunity and double jeopardy for which we have identified explicit grants of immunity from trial. The analogy to qualified immunity is inappropriate, however, because the social costs that justify conferring immunity from suit for qualified immunity and double jeopardy claims are not present in a GARA defense. Because general aviation manufacturers may obtain full review on appeal after final judgment, we should not resort to the collateral order doctrine to entertain an appeal from a summary judgment order denying a GARA statute of repose defense.

I.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , the right to appeal is restricted to “final decisions of the district courts.” The Supreme Court has limited collateral appeals to “a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must ... nonetheless be treated as ‘final.’ ” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (internal citations omitted). In defining the scope of the collateral order doctrine, the Court identified a “strong bias of § 1291 against piecemeal appeals,” id. at 872, 114 S.Ct. 1992 , and has “described the conditions for collateral order appeal as stringent,” id. at 868 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 . See also id. at 883 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 (courts must “preserve! ] the strict limitations on review as of right under § 1291”). As the majority notes, the Court has “repeatedly stressed that the ‘narrow’ exception should stay that way and never be allowed to swallow the general rule ... that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated.” Id. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (internal citation omitted).

Despite the Court’s admonition, the majority concludes that Bell Helicopter has overcome the heavy presumption that GARA’s statute of repose defense, like most other legal defenses, is a defense to liability rather than an entitlement not to stand trial. In doing so, the majority holds that “an essential aspect” of the GARA defense “is the right to be free of the burdens of a trial” and that the defense would be “irretrievably lost absent an immediate appeal.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524-25 , 108 S.Ct. 1945 , 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Section 1291 “requires courts of appeals to view claims of a ‘right not to be tried’ with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye.” Digital Equipment, 511 U.S. at 873 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 . I see no indication that an essential aspect of the GARA defense is the right to be free from the burdens of trial or that the defense would be irretrievably lost absent an immediate appeal. In my judgment, the summary judgment order denying Bell Helicopter’s statute of repose defense does not satisfy the third Digital Equipment condition, the requirement that the appealed-from order must be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.” Id. at 867 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 .

*1114 II.

A government official’s claim of qualified immunity is the defining example of a right that can be vindicated adequately only if pre-judgment appeal is available. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 , 115 S.Ct. 1203 , 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). In Mitchell , the Supreme Court reasoned that qualified immunity is not a “mere defense to liability” but rather is an “immunity from suit” and an “entitlement not to stand trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 . Such an entitlement “is effectively lost” if pre-judgment appeal is not permitted and a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 .

The majority analogizes the importance of the GARA statute of repose defense to a government official’s claim of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity, however, is fundamentally distinct from the GARA statute of repose. Its protections are rooted in preventing the social costs resulting “from the broad-ranging discovery that can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). These social costs include “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office [and] the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (alterations in original; internal quotations and citations omitted).

A valid double jeopardy claim under the Fifth Amendment confers immunity from suit because of similar social costs. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment “assures an individual that, among other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same offense.” Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 , 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). Thus, double jeopardy “protects interests wholly unrelated to the propriety of any subsequent conviction.” Id. These social costs are conspicuously absent from the GARA statute of repose defense. GARA’s purpose is not to relieve general aviation manufacturers from social costs, but rather, solely from the economic costs of product liability claims- — the same type of economic costs faced by any defendant in an action alleging tortious conduct.

III.

Not only is there lacking any special justification for inferring an immunity from suit, but the GARA statute of repose is indistinguishable from other circumstances in which we have declined to confer such immunity. The majority relies heavily on the text of GARA to distinguish it from statutes of limitations, which the courts uniformly have held do not confer immunity from suit. 2 Emphasizing that *1115 GARA provides that “no civil action ... may be brought” if the limitations period has run, the majority concludes that this is a clear textual indication that Congress intended not only to free general aviation manufacturers from liability, but also to confer an entitlement to be free from trial. GARA § 2 (emphasis added).

Although this argument has a superficial appeal, the majority reads too much into the quoted text. The GARA text closely parallels the text of many statutes of limitations. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 , which establishes the default statute of limitations period for all federal statutory causes of action, provides that “a civil action arising under an Act of Congress ... may not be commenced” later than four years after the cause of action accrues. (Emphasis added). Notwithstanding that this, or similar text, is standard fare in statutes of limitations, 3 as I note above, no federal court of which I am aware has held that in using such words Congress intended to confer a guarantee against trial as well as a defense to liability. And, if courts were to hold that such text demonstrates an intent to confer a guarantee against trial, adverse rulings on statute of limitations defenses routinely would be appealable prior to trial, contrary to the Supreme Court’s warning that the collateral order doctrine creates a “narrow” exception to the rule of post-judgment appeal. In my view, however, there is another, readily-available explanation for the text in question — in employing traditional text for statutes of limitations, Congress intended only to confer a defense to liability, not immunity from suit and a collateral appeal right.

Indeed, the legislative history reveals that Congress did not intend, by enacting GARA, to make inroads into the rule of finality that it established in § 1291. The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which set forth the version of the bill that the Senate ultimately accepted, states that “the legislation may be viewed as a narrow and considered response to the ‘perceived’ liability crisis in the general aviation industry.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(11) (1994) (emphasis added).

To the extent Congress’ intent is evident, it appears that its principal objective in enacting GARA was to cut the “infinite- liability tail” for general aviation manufacturers. Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A, 252 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir.2001) cert. denied, — U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 809 , 151 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) (emphasis added). The Committee Report clarifies that the statute limits liability by governing the materiality or admissibility of evidence within a civil action. The report states: “The bill thus makes clear that ... the possibility of any act or omission on the part of [the] manufacturer ... ceases to be material or admissible in any civil action....” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(11). Moreover, the statute of repose effects the congressional purpose of limiting liability' — without collateral review— through its chilling effect on the filing of such suits, dismissal prior to trial or, in the rare circumstance when the trial court’s *1116 erroneous rejection of the defense is raised on appeal, the creation of precedent that will deter future suits. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 43 , 115 S.Ct. 1203 (stating that “an erroneous ruling on liability may be reviewed effectively on appeal from final judgment”).

The majority’s reliance on statements in Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1089 , about the injustice of allowing suits to proceed after the statutory time period has passed, does not distinguish statutes of repose from any other substantive defense. As a defense that, in effect, defines the contours of actionable conduct or events, the statute of repose defense is no different from a garden-variety defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendant or has failed to offer evidence sufficient to support a cause of action against the defendant. For example, the statute of repose defense is no different from a defendant’s claim in a negligence action that the allegations or evidence cannot establish that the defendant was negligent — lack of negligence would prevent a cause of action from existing at all without regard to loss or injury. Indeed, it is no different from Bell Helicopter’s other defense, that Bell Helicopter was not a “manufacturer” of the helicopter in question and that it therefore cannot be subject to “manufacturer” liability under the Revised Code of Washington section 7.72.030.

The Supreme Court has warned against precisely the analytical pitfall that the majority makes in failing to distinguish the GARA statute of repose from other defenses. Swi nt, 514 U.S. at 43 , 115 S.Ct. 1203 (“virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as conferring a ‘right not to stand trial.’ ”) quoting Digital Equipment, 511 U.S. at 873 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 . “Substantive” defenses such as statutes of repose, which define the contours of actionable conduct or events, ordinarily are understood to be defenses to liability, not guarantees that trial will not occur. Accordingly, it is clear that a district court’s denial of a pretrial motion asserting such a defense can be effectively reviewed on post-judgment appeal. See Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir.1999) (dismissing a pre-judgment appeal from denial of a public employer’s defense that termination of court commissioners for political reasons never could be actionable, because the defense did not give rise to a “right not to stand trial”); Figueroa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir.1993) (denial of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not a reviewable final order).

If there is a purpose to be served by collateral appeal in this instance, there is an alternative to undermining § 1291’s rule of finality. The Supreme Court has recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) acts as a safety valve for “serious legal questions taking the case out of the ordinary run.” Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 883 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 . In instances when a GARA defense “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” or when immediate appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” the discretionary appeal provision of § 1292 provides a better avenue to vindicate such claims than “the blunt, categorical instrument of § 1291 collateral order appeal.” Id.

Section 1291 embodies a congressional directive to restrict the right of appeal to “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . The Supreme Court has instructed the courts of appeal to confine the collateral order doctrine to its narrowest limits. These limits are “in accordance with the sensible policy of avoiding] the obstruction to just claims that would come *1117 from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment.” Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203-04 , 119 S.Ct. 1915 , 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999). Absent a legislative declaration of intent, or the kind of policy considerations underlying the qualified immunity and double jeopardy exceptions, we should decline to expand the collateral order doctrine to encompass an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial ruling in the application of GARA’s statute of repose defense. In the event of an erroneous ruling, a general aviation manufacturer can vindicate its rights in an appeal from a final judgment. Accordingly, I would dismiss Bell Helicopter’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

. Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (1997)).

. In United States v. Rossman, 940 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1991), a criminal defendant sought pre-judgment review of a denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment as untimely. We concluded that the order was not appealable, holding that statutes of limitations do not create an entitlement not to stand trial and can be vindicated adequately on appeal from a final judgment. Id. at 536 . Other circuits that have addressed the issue uniformly have reached the same conclusion, rejecting a right to prejudgment appeal to vindicate statute of limitations defenses. See United States v. Garib-Bazain, 222 F.3d 17, 18 (1st Cir.2000) ("the statute of limitations is an ordinary de *1115 fense and it can fully and fairly be vindicated by appeal after a final judgment”); United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088, 1090 (2d Cir.1993) (same); Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Pi, 174 F.3d 745, 750 (6th Cir.1999) (same).

. In Rossman , the particular statute of limitations at issue was the federal criminal statute of limitations for non-capital offenses. That statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1991), provided then, as it does now, that “no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished” for an offense committed outside the limitations period. For purposes of determining whether a right to immediate appeal is necessary to vindicate the defenses at issue, I see no relevant distinction between the text of GARA’s statute of repose and the text at issue in Rossman .