United States v. Errol D., Jr., a Juvenile

Errol D., a juvenile and a member of the Fort Peck Tribe, appeals his delinquency adjudication and sentence for burglarizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) facili *1161 ties management building on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. We hold that the criminal statute under which he was charged-the Indian Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 )-does not give jurisdiction to the federal government to prosecute him, nor does it accord the district court jurisdiction to adjudge him delinquent. Accordingly, we vacate Errol D.’s delinquency adjudication and dismiss the information against him.

I.BACKGROUND

On June 29, 1999, the facilities manager for the BIA buddings on the Fort Peck Indian reservation discovered that his office had been broken into and that a brown 1994 pickup truck, a cell phone, and a radio had been taken. A Fort Peck tribal investigator subsequently interrogated Errol, who was then sixteen years old, about the crime. Errol confessed that he was involved with two other boys in committing the burglary.

On May 16, 2000, Errol was charged with committing an act of juvenile delinquency-specifically, that he “did knowingly and unlawfully enter an…

Dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s reading of the word “person” under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 , the Major Crimes Act. Contrary to the majority, I believe that, for the fourteen crimes enumerated under the Major Crimes Act, Congress intended that they be charged under the MCA rather than the General Crimes Act regardless of the identity of the victim. Therefore, by excluding a government agency from the list of possible victims of burglary, the majority creates a loophole in the statutes governing federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country.

Congress enacted the MCA in response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 , 3 S.Ct. 396 , 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), which held that a murder of an Indian by an Indian could not be prosecuted by the federal government under the General Crimes Act and that this crime was only punishable via the limited remedies of the tribe. The outcome in Crow Dog was compelled by the limited scope of jurisdiction over crimes in Indian country at that time, under the General Crimes Act (“GCA”). The GCA provided for jurisdiction over general federal enclave crimes in Indian country. 1 However, it contained…

292 F.3d 1159 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERROL D., JR., a Juvenile, Defendant-Appellant. No. 00-30337. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted June 12, 2001. Filed June 21, 2002. Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defender, and Michael Donahoe, Assistant Federal Defender, Helena, MT, for the defendant-appellant. Sherry Scheel Matteucci, United States Attorney, Klaus P. Richter, Assistant United States Attorney, Billings, MT, for the plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana; Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-00-00040-JDS. Before: B. FLETCHER, BRUNETTI, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge. 1 Errol D., a juvenile and a member of the Fort Peck Tribe, appeals his delinquency adjudication and sentence for burglarizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") facilities management building on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. We hold that the criminal statute under which he was charged — the Indian Major Crimes Act ("MCA") (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 ) — does not give jurisdiction to the federal government to prosecute him, nor…