Lin Guo Xi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, Opinion

Just a year ago the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention” to a reasonable time period and “does not permit indefinite detention” by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). *834 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 , 121 S.Ct. 2491 , 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). We are now presented with the question of whether this statute bears the same meaning for an individual deemed inadmissible to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 . The answer is yes. Our analysis of § 1231(a)(6) begins and ends with Zad-vydas. Because the Supreme Court construed the statute, we are bound by that framework and thus are not called upon to address the scope of any constitutional claims of an inadmissible alien. Indeed, like the Supreme Court, we recognize that the result might be different were this a constitutional question. The petitioner here, Lin Guo Xi, falls squarely within the ambit of § 1231(a)(6) and, consequently, within the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas . We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Lin’s habeas petition. This result does not, however, mean that Lin will be released automatically.…

concurring.

I join noting that the basis for relief here is solely statutory, what Congress has ordained, and that we have no occasion in this case to address whether aliens in the position of Lin have any assertable constitutional protections.

dissenting.

Sensible though it may sound to construe the same statute the same way for all purposes, inadmissible aliens are different from admitted aliens. For this reason, I disagree that we must interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6)’s provision for post-removal-period detention of inadmissible aliens as having the same “reasonable time” limitation that applies to admitted aliens. Instead, I take the Supreme Court at its word: while indefinite detention raises serious constitutional questions in the case of aliens who have been admitted to the United States, “[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 , 121 S.Ct. 2491 , 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). This is because aliens who have entered the country have constitutional rights that aliens who have not entered do not. As the Court explained:

Id. at 693 , 121 S.Ct. 2491 (citations omitted).

In Zadvydas , the Court chose to avoid constitutional concerns for admitted aliens by construing the statute to contain a “reasonable time” limitation. Here, we are dealing with inadmissible aliens, for whom the same constitutional questions do not…

298 F.3d 832 Lin Guo XI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Opinion, Respondent-Appellee. No. 01-35867. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted May 8, 2002. Filed August 1, 2002. Jay W. Stansell, Assistant Public Defender and Michelle Sweet, Staff Attorney, Federal Public Defender's Office, Seattle, WA, for the petitioner. Brian G. Slocum, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding. Before RYMER, McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges. OPINION McKEOWN, Circuit Judge. 1 Just a year ago the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) "limits an alien's post-removal-period detention" to a reasonable time period and "does not permit indefinite detention" by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 , 121 S.Ct. 2491 , 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). We are now presented with the question of whether this statute bears the same meaning for an individual deemed inadmissible to the…