with whom SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, FERNANDEZ, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from Judge Fletcher’s plurality opinion and Judge Pre-gerson’s opinion concurring in the result, but expressing a different rationale for the result. The basis for Judge Fletcher’s opinion is that harassment of a person in the workplace in the form of severe unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature is sufficient to establish a cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, regardless of whether that harassment constitutes discrimination because of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. I disagree because this completely eliminates an essential element of that statute, that the harassment be because of discrimination against one of the five specified categories of persons named in the statute. Judge Pregerson’s opinion is based upon gender stereotyping harassment, which was never asserted by Rene in the district court and was not supported by evidence presented to the district court. In my opinion this is manufacturing a claim for *1071 Rene on appeal that was never advanced by him or supported by evidence in the district court.

I.

The basis of Judge Fletcher’s opinion is well expressed in the following statement from the first paragraph:

This is a mischaracterization of the pertinent section of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that section.

The pertinent section of Title VII provides:

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that the term “sex” in that section refers to “gender.” The terms “sex” and “gender” have been used interchangeably to mean “gender.” Thus, it is discrimination based on “gender” that is prohibited. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 , 114 S.Ct. 367 , 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989).

II.

I believe the following is a proper application of the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

III.

It is by now clear that sexual harassment can be a form of discrimination based on sex. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 , 106 S.Ct. 2399 . The Supreme Court stated: “Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.” Id. (emphasis added). In that case the evidence that a male supervisor made unwelcome sexual advances to a woman subordinate was sufficient to constitute discrimination based on sex.

Rene alleged that he was discriminated against because he was gay. Alleging a hostile work environment theory of sexual harassment, Rene alleged that he was sexually harassed by his male co-workers and a supervisor. To succeed on that theory, Rene must first prove that he was forced to endure a subjectively and objectively abusive working environment. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 , 118 S.Ct. 998 ; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 , 114 S.Ct. 367 ; Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2000). In this case, the parties do not dispute the existence of a hostile work environment, for there is no doubt that the harassment that Rene alleged was so objectively offensive that it created a hostile work environment. The dispute is whether he was discriminated against because of his gender.

Rene relies on Oncale to make his case, contending that the Supreme Court impliedly held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII. This is a misreading of Oncale. That case did involve harassment of the male plaintiff by his male co-workers, some of which was similar to the harassment in this case. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap *1073 peals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer on the ground that “Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . The sole issue before the Supreme Court on certiorari was whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. The Court held that it was. However, the Supreme Court explained, “Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminatfion] ... because of ... sex.’ ” Id. at 80 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . Never has it been held “that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.” Id. Rather, under Title VII, the plaintiff “must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted ‘discriminaftion] ... because of ... sex.’ ” Id. at 81 , 118 S.Ct. 998 .

Justice Thomas added a concurring opinion specifically to emphasize that the discrimination had to be “because of sex.” The concurring opinion states:

Id. at 82 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . Thus, the Supreme Court in Oncale did not hold that the harassment alleged by the plaintiff in that case was actionable under Title VII. The Court, rather, simply rejected the Fifth Circuit’s holding that same-sex harassment could never be actionable under Title VII. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 , 118 S.Ct. 998 (“Because we conclude that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title' VII, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed ....”); id. at 79 , 118 S.Ct. 998 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s view that “same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII”).

After clarifying that same-sex sexual harassment could be actionable under Title VII, the Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to address the question of whether the harassment was “because of sex,” that is, whether the harassment was because of Oncale’s gender. That issue had not been addressed by the district court or the circuit court because of the holdings of those courts that same-sex harassment could never be actionable under Title VII. The Court gave illustrations of how same-sex harassment could be “because of sex” and thus actionable under Title VII. Oncale had alleged both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment in the district court. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 , 119 (5th Cir.1996). 1 On remand, the lower courts were to address the question of whether this sexual harassment was because of his gender. There was no implication in the Supreme Court’s opinion that the alleged sexual harassment was “because of sex.” That determination, which had not been *1074 previously considered, was to be addressed by the lower courts on remand.

Judge Fletcher’s opinion in effect interprets Oncale to mean that if the defendant’s conduct was “sexual in nature” the statutory requirements of Title VII are met. The opinion then reasons that because the touching in this case was sexual in nature and was discriminatory, Rene has stated a claim under Title VII. This misinterprets Oncale. The Oncale Court did say that “[w]e see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.” 523 U.S. at 79 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . However, the Court qualified that by stating “Title VII prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex’ in the ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80 , 118 S.Ct. 998 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court stressed that the harassment type of discrimination must meet the statutory requirement of “because of sex.” Justice Thomas’ concurrence emphasized that point. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . Differential treatment of an individual based only on conduct that is “sexual in nature” does not meet the statutory requirement. 2 The alleged harassment in this case was not on account of the plaintiffs sex, i.e., this plaintiff was not treated differently from all the other male butlers because he was male. Rene contended that he was treated differently because he was homosexual.

Title VII is not an anti-harassment statute; it is an anti-discrimination statute against persons in five specific classifications: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Harassment can be a type of discrimination against persons in one of those five specific classifications. However, in order for harassment to be actionable it has to be a type of discrimination “because of’ race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. There are many types of harassment in the workplace that are very offensive but are not actionable under the federal Title VII law.

While the Court held in Oncale that same-sex harassment can be actionable under Title VII, it did not hold that same-sex harassment because of sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII. The Court gave three examples of ways a plaintiff can prove that members of one sex can discriminate against members of the same sex because of gender. Id. at 80-81, 118 S.Ct. 998 . These examples are not the exclusive ways, but rather are illustrative of same-sex harassment because of gender that could be actionable under Title VII.

First, the plaintiff could show that the harasser was motivated by sexual desire; this route, the Court stated, requires that there be “credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.” Id. at 80 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . Rene has presented no evidence that *1075 any of Ms harassers were homosexual, nor that they were in any way motivated by sexual desire. On the contrary, evidence presented by Rene suggests not that they desired him sexually, but rather that they sought to humiliate him because of his sexual orientation.

The second route identified by the Court for proving same-sex sexual harassment requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that he was “harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another [man] as to make it clear that the harasser [was] motivated by general hostility to the presence of [men] in the workplace.” Id. Rene presented no evidence of this form of harassment. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how he could have; all of his coworkers on the 29th floor were male, and it would thus be strange indeed to conclude that their harassment of Rene was motivated by a “general hostility to the presence of [men] in the workplace.” Id.

Third, the Court stated that a plaintiff may “offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id. at 80-81 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . Rene cannot avail himself of this route because he worked on the 29th floor of the MGM Grand Hotel, where only men were employed.

In each of these illustrations the harassment type of discrimination is directed at a person because of that person’s gender. Given the facts of the Oncale case itself, it is significant that the Supreme Court did not indicate that one of the ways a plaintiff can prove same-sex discrimination is harassment because of sexual orientation. In Rene’s case he clearly stated in his deposition that the reason for the harassment was that he was gay. No other reason was offered to the district court.

In determining the motivation for harassment, courts must be mindful of the fact that Title VII protects against discrimination only on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Discrimination based on a victim’s other characteristics, no matter how unfortunate and distasteful that discrimination may be, simply does not fall within the purview of Title VII. The Court in Price Waterhouse specifically made that point in quoting from an interpretive memorandum entered in the Congressional Record by the co-managers in the Senate of the bill that became Title VII. The Court quoted the portion of the memorandum that stated:

490 U.S. at 244 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 (emphasis added).

This court recognized that fact more than twenty years ago in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir.1979), when we held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation does not subject an employer to liability under Title VII. While societal attitudes toward homosexuality have undergone some changes since DeSantis was decided, Title VII has not been amended to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation; this aspect of DeSantis remains good law and has been followed in other circuits. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir.1996); Williamson v. AG. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam).

*1076 More recently the Third Circuit in Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.2001), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1126 , 151 L.Ed.2d 1018 (2002), held that harassment based on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title VII. The allegations of harassment in that case, as in this one, were solely based on harassment because of sexual orientation. The court stated:

Id. at 264 (some emphasis added).

If sexual orientation is to be a separate category of protection under Title VII, this is a matter for Congress to enact. Over the years since the passage of Title VII, numerous bills have been introduced to include sexual orientation as a protected classification. 3 None has passed.

IV.

In Price Waterhouse , the Supreme Court held that discrimination based on sex stereotyping was a type of gender discrimination that is actionable under Title VII. The Court held that a woman, who was denied partnership in an accounting firm in part because she did not conform to what some of the partners thought was the appropriate way a woman should act, had an actionable claim under Title VII.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 (internal citations to record *1077 omitted). The Court noted that the district judge had concluded “that the reactions of at least some of the partners were reactions to her as a woman manager.” Id. at 258 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . Thus, in Price Waterhouse , there was substantial evidence that part of the reason the plaintiff was denied a partnership was that her actions on the job did not conform to those expected of a woman manager. Yet the same actions would have been tolerated, or perhaps encouraged, in a male manager.

Recently, we held in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.2001), that harassment of a male waiter by male workers and a supervisor amounted to harassment because of sex stereotyping and thus was discrimination because of gender. In that case the plaintiff presented evidence that the harassment was because he acted too feminine on the job. He was taunted for walking and carrying his serving tray like a woman and for having feminine mannerisms. He was harassed because he did not act on the job as his co-workers perceived he should act as a man, not just because of his sexual orientation. 256 F.3d at 874-75 . This corresponds to the sex stereotyping described in Price Waterhouse .

In Rene’s case there was no contention before the district court that the harassment Rene experienced was because he acted effeminately on the job, or for any reason other than his sexual orientation. The first line of the legal argument presented to the district court in opposition to the motion for summary judgment erystal-izes this point in stating:

Rene made no claim of sexual stereotyping and there was virtually no evidentiary basis upon which Rene could have supported such a claim had it been made. In fact, at one point in his deposition in referring to another worker who had harassed him, he stated: “He’s skinny. He is not masculine like I am.” 4

Rene himself repeatedly stated that his co-workers harassed him because of his sexual orientation. On no fewer than nine occasions during his deposition, Rene affirmed that his co-workers harassed him only because he was gay. At least some of these statements bear mentioning:

Moreover, as I explained earlier, Rene did nothing to show the district court that the harassment was because of his gender. Instead, he stated quite plainly in his written presentation to the court that the question presented was whether the conduct he alleged “is prohibited by Title VII even though it was directed at [him] because of his sexual onentation.” (Emphasis added.)

V.

The degrading and humiliating treatment Rene describes is appalling and deeply disturbing. I agree with the eloquent words of the First Circuit:

Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259 .

Rene’s lawsuit was brought solely on the basis that he was harassed in the workplace because of his sexual orientation, which is not actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; therefore the summary judgment was properly entered. I would affirm the district court.

. There is an implication in Judge Fletcher's opinion that because sexual touching was involved in Oncale’s case the remand was a holding that this was sufficient. In the district court Oncale alleged both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment, Oncale, 83 F.3d at 119, thus the remand was to consider both types of alleged harassment in light of the statutory requirement that it be because of his gender. Quid pro quo harassment is generally understood to be a supervisor seeking or insisting on sexual favors from an employee in order to maintain his or her job or to obtain advancement. This may have been involved in On-cale, but was never alleged by Rene.

. One of the cases relied upon in Judge Fletcher's opinion is Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir.1997). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court, in describing the treatments given this subject by various circuits, characterized that case as follows: "Still others suggest that work-place harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or motivations.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 , 118 S.Ct. 998 . This is essentially the same argument being made by Judge Fletcher's opinion. Had the Supreme Court in Doe agreed with this proposition it would seem that it would have summarily affirmed. Instead, it vacated and remanded the case, 523 U.S. 1001 , 118 S.Ct. 1183 , 140 L.Ed.2d 313 (1998). This is a strong indication that workplace harassment, which is simply "sexual in content,” is not always actionable; the "because of sex” statutory requirement must be met before the harassment is actionable.

. Among those introduced and failed to be passed are the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994); the Employment Non Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); the Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S.2056, 104th Cong. (1996); and the Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2001, S.19, 107th. Cong. (2001). The stated purposes of this last act were to provide a comprehensive federal prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and to provide meaningful and effective remedies for employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

. Judge Pregerson’s opinion contends that the discrimination against Rene was a form of sexual stereotyping. The only evidence that was discovered to support this contention in the entire record is one line in Rene's deposition of over 100 pages. The question refers to a note that Rene made concerning harassment he had experienced from Elisio, one of the butlers, toward the end of Rene's employment. The relevant questions and answers in the deposition are: