Edwin F. David, on Behalf of Himself and a Class of All Persons Similarly Situated v. City of Los Angeles

Opinion by Judge FERNANDEZ; Dissent by Judge KOZINSKI.

OPINION

Edwin David brought this action on the basis that the procedures used by the City of Los Angeles after a car has been towed and stored for an alleged parking violation do not comport with the demands of due process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The district court granted summary judgment against David and in favor of the City. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND

On August 13, 1998, David had a doctor’s appointment at an office on Olympic Blvd. in the City of Los Angeles. He found a parking place on that street and parked his car there at approximately 2:30 p.m. He expected to get back fairly quickly, but, as it turned out, he did not return to the place where he expected to find his car until 3:15 p.m. Alas, his car was not there; he had parked it in an area where parking was not permitted between 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., and an officer of the City’s Department of Transportation had ordered it towed.

While there were signs posted which gave notice of the restriction and warned that vehicles in violation of the restriction could be towed, David says he did not see the signs, one of…

dissenting.

The majority relies on Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.1977), and Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.1982), *1149 which are cases involving cars. But this isn’t a car case; David paid the impound fees and recovered his car the day it was towed. David wanted a hearing to get back his cash. The question before us is whether the city must provide a hearing within 48 hours to contest a $134.50 fine. Looking to the familiar balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the clear answer is no.

Mathews explains that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). To make that determination, we look to the “governmental and private interests that are affected.” Id. Here, David’s interest is only in money. Unlike some deprivations, where the passage of even a day or two can cause substantial and irreparable harm, money is fungible; a loss of money can normally be made up with more money. 1 And, being out $134.50 isn’t much of a burden if you can pay…

307 F.3d 1143 Edwin F. DAVID, on behalf of himself and a class of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant-Appellee. No. 00-57091. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted July 8, 2002. Filed October 9, 2002. William A. Kent, Irvine, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant. Renée J. Laurents, Office of the City Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding. Before KOZINSKI and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, and KING, * District Judge. Opinion by Judge FERNANDEZ; Dissent by Judge KOZINSKI. OPINION FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge. 1 Edwin David brought this action on the basis that the procedures used by the City of Los Angeles after a car has been towed and stored for an alleged parking violation do not comport with the demands of due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The district court granted summary judgment against David and in favor of the City. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. BACKGROUND 2 On August 13, 1998, David had a doctor's appointment at an office…