Charles Frost v. Jo Anne Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security

314 F.3d 359 Charles FROST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, * Defendant-Appellee. No. 01-35580. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted September 12, 2002. Filed December 19, 2002. Eitan Kassel Yanich, Olympia, WA, for the plaintiff-appellant. Victoria Blais Chhagen, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Seattle, WA, for the defendant-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Franklin D. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-05145-FDB. Before: BEEZER, GOULD, and BERZON, Circuit Judges. OPINION ** GOULD, Circuit Judge: 1 Charles Frost ("Frost") applied for supplemental security income benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). An administrative law judge ("ALJ") concluded that Frost was disabled between May 16, 1997 and October 31, 1997 but was not disabled thereafter and could perform simple, unskilled work tasks. 2 1. Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, the ALJ determined that simple, unskilled work suitable for Frost is widely available in the national…

*361 OPINION **

Charles Frost (“Frost”) applied for supplemental security income benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Frost was disabled between May 16, 1997 and October 31, 1997 but was not disabled thereafter and could perform simple, unskilled work tasks.

1. Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, the ALJ determined that simple, unskilled work suitable for Frost is widely available in the national economy and that, accordingly, Frost’s disability does not entitle him to benefits under the Act after October 31, 1997. Frost argues that the decision of the Commissioner to deny him benefits for the period after October 31, 1997 was not supported by substantial evidence, as is required for affirmance. See Pagter v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.2001).

Frost sought to be classified as disabled on the ground that he is impaired by paranoid schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Frost’s psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Price (“Price”), diagnosed him with both disorders in July 1996, but, according to Price’s notes, Frost’s condition had improved…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Charles Frost appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The decision denies an award of Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) disability benefits to Frost after October 31, 1997 because Frost was no longer disabled after that date. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .

I would affirm the Commissioner’s decision that Frost did not meet the requirements under Listing 12.06 after October 1997. I would also reverse and remand for further proceedings which would ascertain whether Frost met the requirements under Listing 12.03. I write separately because the correct standard of law to be applied on remand is the standard that was in effect at the time of Frost’s original hearing.

*365 I

In October 1996, Frost filed an application for SSI disability benefits asserting that he had been unable to work since May 1996. This application was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. Frost then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

A hearing before an ALJ was held in December 1997. Frost, his sister, and a vocational…