Raul Gonzalez, Jr. v. Chandra Spencer Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, a Professional Corporation Los Angeles County

336 F.3d 832 Raul GONZALEZ, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandra SPENCER; Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, a Professional Corporation; Los Angeles County, Defendants-Appellees. No. 00-55935. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted November 6, 2001. Filed May 13, 2003. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Robert Mann, Los Angeles, CA, argued for the plaintiff-appellant. Donald W. Cook, Los Angeles, CA, joined him on the briefs. Cindy S. Lee, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, Pasadena, CA, argued for defendants-appellees Chandra Spencer and Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence. Jennifer E. Gysler, Monroy, Averbuck & Gysler, Westlake Village, CA, argued for defendant-appellee County of Los Angeles. Clayton C. Averbuck, Monroy, Averbuck & Gysler, Westlake Village, California, joined her on the brief. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; William J. Rea, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-00-01944-WJR. Before HALL, KOZINSKI and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM Opinion; Dissent by WILLIAM A. FLETCHER. OPINION PER CURIAM. 1 While defending Los Angeles County in a civil…

MEMORANDUM **

“A case is moot only if interim events have ‘completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of an allegedly improper ruling.” In re Pintlar Corp., 124 F.3d 1310 , 1312 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Wong v. Dep’t of State, 789 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir.1986)). In light of the settlement, Gonzalez no longer faces a significant prospect of illegal inspection or disclosure. The settlement does not, however, affect Gonzalez’s claims for damages based on past conduct.

Spencer acted under color of state law. She was retained to represent state entities and their employees in litigation. She inspected Gonzalez’s file in the course of that representation, and used her status to gain access to the file. Her role was analogous to that of a state prosecutor rather than a public defender, because she acted on behalf of the state rather than as its adversary. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 , 323 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).

Spencer was not “[c]ourt personnel” for purposes of California Welfare & Institutions Code § 827(a)(1)(A). She was not a court employee and did not perform functions routinely performed by court employees. Rather, she was an outside…

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

Gonzalez filed a § 1983 action against attorney Spencer, her law firm, and the County of Los Angeles alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional right to privacy when Spencer gained access to his juvenile court case file and used it in two depositions without first petitioning the juvenile court. At the time of the alleged constitutional violation, Gonzalez had a pending § 1983 suit in which Spencer and her firm represented the juvenile court. The two depositions in question were taken during pretrial proceedings in that earlier suit. Gonzalez contends that California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 and California Rule of Court 1423 required Spencer to petition the juvenile court in order to obtain access to his file.

Section 827(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, “[A] [juvenile] case file may be inspected only by the following: (A) Court personnel.” I read this section to include attorneys representing the court in the category of “court personnel” who may “inspect” juvenile court case files without first filing a petition with a judge of that court. Section 827(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, “[J]uvenile case files ...…