Opinion by Judge WILLIAM A. FLETCHER; Concurrence by Judge REINHARDT; Dissent by Judge GOULD.

OPINION

On February 21, 1999, Officer Rochelle Brosseau of the Puyallup, Washington, Police Department shot Kenneth Haugen in the back as he tried to flee from police in his vehicle. Haugen filed a § 1983 suit in district court alleging a violation of his *860 constitutional rights, and the court granted summary judgment to Brosseau. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Haugen, we inquire whether Bros-seau’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment and, if it did, whether she is entitled to qualified immunity. We conclude that the evidence, so construed, shows that Brosseau’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, and, further, that her conduct violated clearly established law governing the use of deadly force as set forth in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I. Background

Kenneth Haugen and Glen Tamburello were in business together selling drugs and occasionally fixing cars. At some point, their relationship soured, and Hau-gen decided to dissolve the partnership. On February 20, 1999, he took some of his tools from Tamburello’s shop. Tamburello wanted the tools back and wanted retribution. He went to the police station, and, in an interview with Officer Rochelle Bros-seau, reported that Haugen had burglarized his shop. Tamburello also contacted the Riddles, neighbors of Haugen’s mother, and requested that they call him should they see Haugen at his mother’s house.

Haugen, his girlfriend Deanna Nocera, and Nocera’s daughter went to Haugen’s mother’s residence the night of February 20, where they did some laundry and spent the night. The next morning, Haugen began to spray-paint his 1984 Jeep Cherokee in his mother’s driveway. He had a warrant out for his arrest and apparently thought he might evade detection driving a yellow rather than a white Jeep. It was a windy morning, and the Riddles complained to Haugen that the spray paint was blowing into their yard. When Hau-gen refused to stop, the Riddles called Tamburello. Tamburello drove with Matt Atwood to Haugen’s mother’s house where they accosted Haugen. Haugen began to run away, but Tamburello caught him, threw him to the ground, and began to beat him up. Haugen and Nocera begged Tamburello to stop, and, after being persuaded by several punches, Haugen agreed to give the tools back. Tamburello and Atwood then forcibly led Haugen into the pickup and planned to drive to a storage facility where Haugen had stashed the tools, but Irene Riddle, having seen the brouhaha outside, had already dialed 911.

After her interview with Tamburello on February 20th, Officer Brosseau had learned that there was a felony no-bail warrant out for Haugen’s arrest based on drug and other offenses. The next morning, while in the midst of a traffic stop nearby, Brosseau heard the report of the ruckus at Haugen’s mother’s house. She responded quickly, and when she arrived Tamburello and Atwood were in the process of getting Haugen into the pickup. Haugen took advantage of the distraction caused by Brosseau’s arrival and broke away from his would-be captors. He ran up the driveway, past his mother’s house, and into the backyard. Brosseau gave chase for only a few steps and then called for back-up, including a K-9 unit to help locate Haugen. Over the next half hour or so, Brosseau and other officers interviewed the witnesses still at the scene and set up a containment perimeter for the search. To avoid interfering with the K-9’s efforts to locate Haugen by scent, the officers instructed Tamburello and Atwood to remain in Tamburello’s pickup and instructed Nocera and her daughter to remain in her Honda. The pickup was parked in the street in front of the driveway. The Honda was parked in the driveway in front of the Jeep. The Jeep was in the driveway *861 facing the Honda and the street and was angled somewhat to the left.

Haugen, meanwhile, hid in various bushes and other locations around the neighborhood as he tried to watch what was happening at his mother’s house. Apparently seeking help, Haugen knocked on the back door of Margaret Rounds, a neighbor who lived down the street. No one answered, so Haugen left. Rounds was at home and was aware of the situation outside because she had been listening to a police scanner, but she had no inclination to help Haugen. Instead, she called police and said that there was a man in her backyard. Brosseau and the two other officers on foot, Officers Subido and Pa-shon (with the K 9), ran to Rounds’s backyard. Subido told Brosseau to circle around the front, and as Brosseau rounded the house, she saw Haugen about fifty feet ahead of her running toward his Jeep.

Haugen got into the Jeep and tried to start it. Brosseau ran to the Jeep with her handgun drawn and ordered him to stop. As Haugen fumbled with his keys, Brosseau hit the driver’s side window several times with her handgun, and, on the third or fourth try, she broke the window. Brosseau had mace and a baton but did not use them. Instead, she tried to reach in the ear to grab the keys, but just after she broke through the window, Haugen succeeded in starting the Jeep. Either before Haugen pulled away, or just after he started to do so (the evidence is conflicting on this point), Brosseau shot him in the back. From Brosseau’s position when she shot, Haugen was in front of her, and beyond Haugen were Nocera, Nocera’s daughter, Tamburello, and Atwood. Bros-seau said that she was “aware of the background exposure,” but she nonetheless believed she had a safe shot because she thought the bullet would be stopped by the Jeep’s engine block before reaching the bystanders. Because Haugen did not stop, Brosseau believed she had missed him, but Brosseau did not take a second shot because she thought the risk became too great as he began to drive away.

The bullet entered Haugen’s back near the left shoulder blade and lodged in his chest. Despite the wound, Haugen managed, in his words, to “stand on the gas” and to drive out of the driveway, across the neighbor’s yard, and onto the street. Photographs in the record show tire tracks on the driveway due to displacement of gravel. After Haugen escaped, some of the officers gave chase. Haugen’s injury made it difficult for him to drive. Once he realized he had been shot, he used one hand to hold the wound and the other to drive. According to Haugen, he never got the Jeep past third gear and never drove faster than forty-five miles per hour. Before long, Haugen had difficulty breathing and pulled over to the side of the road, where he passed out. He was apprehended and taken to the hospital.

The precise circumstances of the shooting are disputed. In his deposition, Hau-gen testified that he believed the gun may have discharged accidentally while Bros-seau was reaching through the driver’s window grappling with him. Brosseau, on the other hand, says she shot Haugen intentionally. According to Brosseau, she stepped back and away from the driver’s window once the Jeep started moving and fired one shot through the rear side window on the driver’s side.

When parties dispute the facts, we typically accept the non-moving party’s version when ruling on a summary judgment motion. In this case, however, we accept Brosseau’s statement that she shot Hau-gen intentionally. No gun shot residue was found on Haugen’s clothes, and the forensic scientist determined that the bullet hit another object before it struck Hau- *862 gen. Most tellingly, photos of Haugen’s Jeep show a bullet hole in the rear side window. When asked about the bullet hole in the window, Haugen responded: “That’s something I can’t explain.” The parties do not dispute that only one shot was fired. Because the evidence unmistakably indicates that Brosseau shot Hau-gen through the rear side window, we accept Brosseau’s statement that she intentionally shot Haugen through that window rather than Haugen’s speculation that the gun discharged accidentally inside the Jeep.

Haugen recovered from the gunshot and filed suit in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Brosseau, the Puyall-up Police Department, and the City of Puyallup deprived him of his Fourth Amendment rights. He also alleged causes of action based on Washington tort law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motion. It held that, even if the shooting constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, Brosseau had not violated a clearly established right and was therefore protected by qualified immunity. The district court also held that Haugen had not pointed to any official practice that led to a constitutional violation, and so he could not pursue a suit against the police department or the City of Puyallup. Finally, the court held that Haugen could not pursue state tort claims because his injury occurred during the commission of a felony.

Haugen appealed. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 628, 626 (9th Cir.2002).

II. Discussion

A. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Brosseau

Officer Brosseau argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity from Haugen’s Fourth Amendment claim. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), we undertake a two-step analysis when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment. We first face “this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . If we determine that a constitutional right has been violated, we then move to the second step and “ask whether the right was clearly established” such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that [her] conduct was unlawful in the situation [she] confronted.” Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151 .

1. Fourth Amendment Right

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force by police in the course of apprehending suspected criminals. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Supreme Court set forth the specific constitutional rule governing when police officers may use deadly force:

Id. at 11-12 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . Under Garner , deadly force cannot be justified based merely on a slight threat. An officer may not use deadly force “unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Id. at 3 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 .

The application of Gamer is clear in many cases. Where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon such as a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in using deadly force. See, e.g., Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that deadly force was justified where a suspect violently resisted arrest, physically attacked the officer, and grabbed the officer’s gun); Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162 , 1168 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where a suspect, who had been behaving erratically, swung a knife at an officer); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir.1994) (suggesting that the use of deadly force is reasonable where a suspect points a gun at officers); Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where the decedent attacked an officer with a rock and stick).

On the other hand, the mere fact that a suspect possesses a weapon does not justify deadly force. See, e.g., Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1202 (9th Cir.1997) (holding, in the Ruby Ridge civil case, that the FBI’s directive to kill any armed adult male was constitutionally unreasonable even though a United States Marshal had already been shot and killed by one of the males); Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 324-25 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the- officers when they shot); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1508-11 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that deadly force was unreasonable where a suspect had dropped his gun).

In some circumstances, deadly force may be justified based on the nature of the crime committed by the fleeing suspect. See, e.g., Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416, 420 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where a fleeing suspect had shot a victim in the course of a burglary). But the prior commission of even a violent crime does not always justify deadly force. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1203 (“The fact that [the suspect] had committed a violent crime in the immediate past is an important factor but it is not, without more, a justification for killing him on sight.”); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 887 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that an officer’s second use of deadly force was unreasonable even though the suspect had violently assaulted the officer a few min *864 utes before; by the time of the second use of deadly force, the suspect was advancing toward the officer but was wounded and unarmed).

The parties dispute whether, under Garner , Officer Brosseau’s use of deadly force was reasonable in the circumstances of this case. In a five-page type-written statement and in a lengthy tape-recorded police department interview, Brosseau described the episode and gave her reasons for using deadly force. First, Brosseau stated that, at the time she shot Haugen, she knew that he had a felony no-bail warrant outstanding for drug-related charges, and she had probable cause to believe that he had committed a burglary. Second, Brosseau stated that she saw Haugen reach below the seat of the Jeep, and that she thought he might be reaching for a weapon. Third, Brosseau stated that she believed Haugen would injure officers or other people in the area by fleeing in the Jeep. She said that he “was driving in an erratic manner,” and that she shot him to prevent possible injury to others. We analyze Brosseau’s stated reasons in turn.

a. Haugen’s Prior Crimes

Brosseau stated that she knew of the warrant for Haugen’s arrest and that she believed he had committed a burglary. Under Gamer, the fact that Brosseau believed Haugen had committed drug crimes and a burglary is not sufficient to justify deadly force. In many deadly force cases, the plaintiff will have committed one or more crimes, but Gamer and our circuit cases make clear that the mere commission of prior crimes does not justify the use of deadly force. In Garner itself, the fleeing suspect was a burglar. See 471 U.S. at 3-4 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . In Ting , the suspect was part of a major narcotics organization. See 927 F.2d at 1507-08 . In Curnow , officers believed that the suspect had assaulted a woman. See 952 F.2d at 323 . In Andaya , the suspect had just violently assaulted the officer. See 958 F.2d at 883-84 . In Harris , the suspect had fired shots into the woods and may even have been the man who killed a United States Marshal. See 126 F.3d at 1193 . In none of these cases, including Gamer, did the suspect’s crime justify the use of deadly force.

Here, Brosseau had reason to believe that Haugen had committed drug crimes and burglary. Drug crimes and burglary are serious offenses, but under Gamer the critical question is whether the officer has “probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” 471 U.S. at 11 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . Brosseau had no such probable cause.

b. Haugen’s Potential Weapon

Officer Brosseau said she believed that Haugen might have a weapon in the car. When Haugen was running toward the Jeep, Brosseau said that she thought he might be running for a weapon since he would not be running simply to hide there. When she first approached the Jeep, she said that he “reached down to an area on the floorboard in the middle of the front seat” and that she “thought he was reaching for a weapon.” Once she broke the window, however, Brosseau saw that he had only keys in his hands. But moments later, just as he started the car, Brosseau said Haugen “dived forward as if to grab something on the floorboard again.” Bros-seau stated that she feared again that he might have a weapon, and that she therefore stepped back and away from the driver’s window.

Brosseau admitted that at the time she shot Haugen, she was not worried that he would use any weapon against her. She *865 had stepped back and away from him, and had positioned herself behind him, so that even if Haugen had had a gun he would not have had a clear shot. She said, however, that she feared if Haugen had a gun he might use it on some officers who might have approached the front of his car, or that he might use it against Tamburello or Atwood, “who he had cause to be unhappy with.”

The factual predicate of Brosseau’s stated reason is that Haugen dove forward as he started the car. But several other witnesses gave statements about what Haugen was doing in the car. None of these witnesses mentioned that Haugen dove forward, and none has offered any support for Brosseau’s assertion that Haugen looked as if he might have been reaching for a weapon. Nor has Brosseau offered any other evidence to support her belief that Haugen might have had a gun. She did not see a gun in the car, and she had not received any reports that he might have one, or indeed that he had ever had one. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the mere presence of a weapon does not justify the use of deadly force, see Harris, 126 F.3d at 1202 ; Curnow, 952 F.2d at 324-25 ; Ting, 927 F.2d at 1508-11 , let alone the potential presence of a weapon.

“[A] simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of others is not enough; there must be objective factors to justify such a concern.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir.2001). Movements by a suspect are not enough to justify deadly force if, in light of the relevant circumstances, those movements would not cause a reasonable officer to believe that the suspect was reaching for a weapon. In support of her stated fear that Haugen was reaching for a weapon, Brosseau has cited no objective factors other than her stated observation that he dove forward and appeared to be reaching for something. Construing all of the relevant facts and circumstances and drawing all reasonable inferences in Haugen’s favor, as we must on a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that Brosseau has not demonstrated an objectively reasonable fear about a potential weapon that would justify her use of deadly force.

c. Impending Escape in a Vehicle

Finally, Brosseau asserted that she feared Haugen would injure officers or others when he tried to get away in his Jeep. In her type-written report, Brosseau described her perception of the threat presented by Haugen’s escape. In relevant part, her report states:

*866 In her tape-recorded police department interview, Brosseau further described her decision to use deadly force based on what she perceived as the threat posed by Hau-gen’s imminent escape. The relevant portions of her interview are as follows:

Brosseau thus indicated in her written statement and interview that she was concerned that Haugen’s driving would endanger her “fellow officers,” the four people in the Honda and the pickup, and others. She variously characterized these people as “any other citizens who might be in the area,” those who were “all around him,” “the community,” and “residents in the area.”

To the extent that Brosseau said she shot Haugen because he “was driving in an erratic manner,” her statement is not supported by the evidence regarding the timing of the shooting. Haugen says that Brosseau shot him before the Jeep even moved. According to Haugen, not only was he not driving “in an erratic manner,” he was not driving at all. Others stated that, at most, Haugen’s Jeep had just begun to move. Nocera said that Brosseau shot Haugen after he started the Jeep, just as he was “getting ready to pull out,” and that it “was barely starting to roll.” Aaron Riddle said he heard the shot “pretty much at the same time” that the Jeep started moving. Irene Riddle said she heard the shot just as Haugen first revved up the Jeep. Neighbor Florence Ledbetter across the street said she saw and heard the shot just when the Jeep “started to move.” Tamburello ' stated that the Jeep was already moving, but had gone perhaps six feet. Atwood said that Brosseau shot when the Jeep “just started pulling away,” that it “[hjadn’t moved very far,” and that it had gone “maybe” five or ten feet. Accepting the version of the disputed facts most favorable to Haugen, we do not credit Brosseau’s assertion that “he was driving in an erratic manner,” for we must assume on summary judgment that the Jeep had not even moved when Brosseau shot him.

Brosseau also stated that she thought Haugen’s driving was particularly dangerous because he could not see where he was going. Brosseau said that “the front windshield and at least part of the passenger side windows [of the Jeep] were covered with” the newspaper Haugen had used to protect the glass from the spray paint. Haugen, however, testified that there was no paper on the windshield. Atwood also stated that there was no newspaper on the windshield. Tamburello stated that he saw some paper on one side of the windshield, but that Haugen pulled it off before he got in the Jeep. Because at this stage in the proceedings we must construe the factual evidence in Haugen’s favor, we cannot say that there was objective evidence supporting Brosseau’s claim that Haugen could not see where he was going as a result of the newspaper covering the windshield.

Brosseau further , explained that, at the moment she fired, she did not believe that Haugen’s impending escape in the Jeep posed a danger to her, but that it did pose a danger to others in the area. She stated that she was worried, specifically, about Nocera, Nocera’s daughter, Tamburello, and Atwood. Nocera and her daughter *868 were inside the red Honda that was parked in the driveway between the Jeep and the street. Tamburello and Atwood were seated in the pickup that was parked in the street at the end of the driveway.

Brosseau indicated that she was worried that Haugen could not escape without hitting the Honda or the pickup. According to Brosseau, the driveway was “completely blocked” by the pickup and “almost completely block[ed]” by the Honda. But Brosseau could not say how close Haugen actually came to hitting the Honda: “I’m having some difficulty with perceptions of distances.” Brosseau nonetheless argues that she reasonably believed that Haugen’s escape was dangerous because he was likely to hit the Honda or the pickup.

Contrary to Brosseau’s statements, Haugen stated that he had an easy escape by driving off to the left around the Honda and pickup. Haugen admitted that he was in a fairly “small, tight space” which was “not like a parking lot,” but he said that the driveway was about twenty feet wide and that he had “plenty of room” to drive between the Honda and the neighbor’s house without hitting anything. The Jeep was already angled to the left, and Atwood stated that he saw Haugen turn the wheels to the left before putting the Jeep in gear. Haugen said that he had a “clear, straight shot” out of the driveway. The photographs of the scene also show that Haugen had more than enough room to drive away without striking Nocera’s Honda or Tam-burello’s pickup. Viewing the evidence in Haugen’s favor, we conclude that Brosseau has not pointed to objectively reasonable factors to support her belief that Haugen’s escape from the driveway posed a significant risk of death or serious injury to the people in the Honda and the pickup.

Brosseau also asserted that she feared for the safety of her fellow officers. She has offered no specific evidence to support this fear. She claims that she “presume[d] that they were in the immediate area, approaching to assist,” but she does not claim that she saw them or knew that they were in a dangerous place. She had left officers Subido and Pashon, the only other officers on foot, in Rounds’s backyard. Two other officers were in their patrol cars in containment positions on the street several hundred feet to the south of Haugen’s mother’s house. Brosseau had not called Subido and Pashon to assist her, and there is no indication that they were running to give her aid. Atwood, who witnessed the events while seated in Tamburello’s pickup, stated that the other two officers were still in the backyard at the time Brosseau fired. Even if they had been running to assist, Subido and Pashon would have been running from the south-east, while Haugen was escaping to the north-west. Thus, while Brosseau stated that she feared that officers on foot might be struck by Hau-gen’s Jeep as he drove away, her statement is no more than a “a simple statement” of fear unsupported by “objective factors.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281 . She has not offered any evidence to support the claim that Haugen posed a significant risk of death or serious bodily injury to fellow officers.

d. High-Speed Police Chase

The dissent contends that a need to prevent a dangerous high-speed police chase justified Brosseau’s decision to use deadly force. Brosseau stated that she was concerned about Haugen’s erratic driving, but she never stated that she shot to prevent a dangerous high-speed chase, and has not argued to us that a potential chase justified her use of deadly force. In this respect, this case to some extent resembles Gar ner, where the police officer had initially justified his use of deadly force based only on the need to prevent *869 Garner’s escape but asserted later-apparently through counsel-that deadly force was justified by Garner’s dangerousness. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 21 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . We know from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in fight of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” The relevant facts and circumstances are those known to the officer at the time she acts. “[A]n officer’s use of force must be objectively reasonable based on [her] contemporaneous knowledge of the facts.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281 . We examine the objective facts and circumstances known to Brosseau at the time she acted to determine whether she had probable cause to believe that a potential high-speed chase “pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 3 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 .

At the time Brosseau shot Haugen, it was clear that he intended to flee in his Jeep and that a number of non-lethal measures had failed to prevent him from doing so. But it is equally clear that Brosseau and her fellow officers did not need to kill Haugen in order to avoid a dangerous high-speed chase. They could either have discontinued a chase if it became too dangerous, or could have forgone a chase entirely. Haugen had already remained at large for several months while his no-bail warrant was outstanding, and there is no reason that the events of February 20 and 21 suddenly made his freedom an immediate threat to public safety. The cost to society of allowing criminals to flee is great, but the Supreme Court has held that this cost does not always justify deadly force. “It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape.” Id. at 11 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 .

Because Brosseau has made no argument based on the danger of a potential high-speed chase, there is nothing in the record to tell us whether, under the Puyallup Police Department policies or other applicable rules, it would have been appropriate for the officers to initiate or continue a high-speed chase that posed a significant danger to others. We note, however, that under Washington law, police officers in pursuit must drive with due regard for the safety of others. See Wash. Rev.Code § 46.61.035. Officers in Washington may be held liable for injuries caused during high-speed chases, and, to comport with their state law duty of care, they must recognize “that at times it would be more prudent to cease a pursuit in order to protect the public.” Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash.2d 321 , 534 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1975).

Different states and localities have different laws and policies regarding police pursuit. Many have recognized that officers have duties of care in relation to vehicular pursuits, and that officers may be unreasonable in initiating or continuing high-speed chases depending, among other things, on the nature of the suspect’s crimes. 1 “Unusual circumstances may *870 make it reasonable” for police to initiate or continue high-speed chases, but “such conduct is not justified unless the end itself is of sufficient social value.” Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn.1994). “The decision to initiate or continue pursuit may be negligent when the heightened risk of injury to third parties is unreasonable in relation to the interest in apprehending suspects.” Travis v. City of Mesquite, 880 S.W.2d 94 , 99 (Tex.1992). A ruling that allowed officers to use deadly force to prevent all vehicular escapes would have the paradoxical result that officers could reasonably shoot to kill even when, under state law, they could not reasonably initiate or continue a chase.

The dissent concludes that a justifiable means of eliminating the danger of a possible high-speed chase in this case is to shoot the suspect before he begins to drive away. The dissent relies on an article, not cited by the parties, attesting to the danger of police chases. See dissent at 10622, n. 5 (citing John Hill, High Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 14 (July 2002)). But the article reaches quite a different conclusion from the dissent. Even after a suspect has fled and a pursuit has been initiated,

Hill, supra, at 16 (endnote omitted). Thus, just as Gamer instructs that, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an officer must sometimes forgo or discontinue deadly force and allow a suspect to escape, see 471 U.S. at 11-12 , 106 S.Ct. 1694 , state tort laws and police practice experts instruct that an officer must sometimes forgo a chase and allow a suspect to escape.

It is no less true in potential high-speed chases than in other circumstances that an officer may appropriately use deadly force if “necessary to prevent an escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Id. at 3 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . But because officers can often eliminate or reduce the danger of a high-speed chase by forgoing or discontinuing a chase, we reject an approach that would allow officers to shoot a suspect simply because he is fleeing, or is about to flee, in a vehicle. Such an approach would essentially limit the Supreme Court’s holding in Gamer to cases where a suspect flees on foot. The Court’s opinion contains no such limitation, and we decline to read such a limitation into it.

To support its contention that the possibility of a dangerous high-speed chase jus *871 tified Brosseau’s use of deadly force in this case, the dissent cites general statistics of the dangers of car chases. These statistics have not been supplied by the parties, and perforce have not been relied on by Bros-seau or responded to by Haugen. Moreover, even if we could properly take judicial notice of statistics of car chases, the Supreme Court already has rejected this kind of general statistical approach to prove dangerousness in an individual case. In Gamer, Tennessee attempted to justify its use of deadly force on a fleeing burglar by noting that 3.8% of burglaries involved violent crime, accounting for literally millions of incidents of violence. See id. at 21-22 & n. 23, 105 S.Ct. 1694 . But the Supreme Court held that the general statistical probability alone cannot justify deadly force. A generalized assessment of dangerousness of burglars “could not, without regard to the other circumstances, automatically justify the use of deadly force.” Id. at 21 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 .

In some fairly extreme circumstances, our sister circuits have held that the danger presented by suspects who flee in vehicles can justify deadly force. In Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir.1992), the Sixth Circuit held that an officer was justified in using deadly force after a suspect had led police on a high-speed chase at speeds over ninety miles per hour, swerved toward police cars several times, and smashed into an officer’s car while the officer stood next to it. In Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1330-33 (8th Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit held that deadly force was justified where the suspects, driving an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer, had led police on an extended chase at speeds over ninety miles per hour through heavy traffic, forcing over 100 cars off the road, and had swerved at pursuing police several times. In that case, before using deadly force, the police had attempted roadblocks and had tried to disable the truck by shooting the tires and radiator. In Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 877-78 (6th Cir.2000), the Sixth Circuit held that deadly force was justified where the suspect had swerved off the road, narrowly missed an unmarked cruiser and a sheriff on foot, led police on a twenty-minute chase at speeds up to 100 miles per hour, and after losing control, attempted to run down an officer. In Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2002), the Eleventh Circuit held that deadly force was justified where a suspect, already pepper-sprayed after struggling with an officer, led police on an extended high-speed chase, during which he made erratic turns, drove on the wrong side of the road with his headlights off, swerved at oncoming cars, drove through a yard, nearly hit a motorist, and then accelerated toward a patrol car.

But our sister circuits have also held that police chases — even high-speed chases — do not always justify deadly force. See Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027 , 1031-34 (11th Cir.2001), vacated by 536 U.S. 953 , 122 S.Ct. 2653 , 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002), reinstated and supplemented on remand at 316 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir.2003); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 946-51 (7th Cir.1994). In Vaughan, officers pursued a vehicle that had rammed a patrol car and then accelerated to eighty or eighty-five miles per hour in an attempt to avoid capture. In' an attempt “to disable either the truck or [the driver]” one of the officers fired three rounds into the truck. One of the bullets struck the passenger in the truck, puncturing his spine. The Eleventh Circuit held, in those circumstances, that “a reasonable jury could find that [the suspects’] escape did not present an immediate threat of serious harm to [officers] or others on the road.” 264 F.3d at 1034. See also id. at 1034 n. 8 (distinguishing that case from *872 Smith, Cole, and Scott). In Donovan , the Seventh Circuit held that officers engaged in a high-speed pursuit were not justified in using deadly force- — in this case, a road block — to stop a fleeing motorcycle. The court stated that it was “very skeptical” of an approach that would allow police to use deadly force to end vehicular pursuits in all circumstances, because “not every fleeing suspect poses a grave danger.” 17 F.3d at 951 . In both Vaughan and Donovan , unlike in this case, the suspects already were driving in a dangerous manner without regard for the safety of others. But in those cases, that danger was held to be insufficient to justify deadly force.

None of the cases decided by our sister circuits and cited by the dissent even remotely supports a holding in this case that Brosseau was justified in using deadly force. Unlike the dissent, we believe that there is a manifest difference between swerving at cars while driving at ninety miles per hour and then smashing a patrol car with an officer standing next to it, see Smith, 954 F.2d at 347-48 ; driving an eighteen-wheel truck at ninety miles per hour through heavy traffic, see Cole, 993 F.2d at 1330-31 ; leading a twenty-minute chase at 100 miles per hour and attempting to run down an officer, see Scott, 205 F.3d at 877-78 ; and driving at high speeds on the wrong side of the road with headlights off and accelerating toward a patrol car, see Pace, 283 F.3d at 1281-82 , on one hand; and getting into a vehicle and fleeing, or preparing to flee, on the other.

To the extent that the dissent looks to the particular facts of this ease rather than to the general danger of police chases, it does not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Haugen, as we are required to do on summary judgment. For example, to portray Haugen as violent and therefore dangerous, the dissent asserts that he was engaged in a “violent brawl” when Brosseau arrived on the scene. Dissent at 877. By all accounts, however, Haugen was on the receiving end of the violence. Tamburello stated, “[W]hen he seen me he started to run.... And I ran over and grabbed him. Got into a little scuffle there.... I was on top of him on the ground.” Atwood, Tamburello’s companion, stated that when Tamburello caught Haugen, he “squirmed a little bit. Tried to get away. You know, he begged him, didn’t want to go[.]” Nocera, Hau-gen’s girlfriend, stated that Tamburello “ran up and tackled Ken to the ground,” and “continued to pounce on him out here by the [car].” Moreover, the “brawl” (if that is what it was) was finished before Brosseau arrived.

Further, to exaggerate the danger of Haugen’s escape, the dissent stresses that Haugen had to escape through a “narrow passageway” and a dangerous “obstacle course.” Dissent at 879. Haugen said that he was in a “small, tight space” that was “not like a parking lot,” but that the driveway was twenty feet wide, giving him “plenty of room” and a “clear, straight shot” to get to the street. The photographs of the scene show that Haugen had more than enough room to escape without hitting anything or anyone. Indeed, he was able to drive away safely even after Brosseau shot him.

Finally, the dissent characterizes Hau-gen as “deranged” and “wild,” dissent at 10623, 10629, but this characterization is not supported by the record. Brosseau stated that she held her handgun to Hau-gen’s temple, that he yelled “you’re gonna have to fuekin kill me.” But her version of the facts is contradicted by Haugen’s version of the facts and by the other witnesses, who saw and heard no such thing. The dissent also asserts that Haugen was behaving “suicidally,” dissent at 10620, but there is no indication in the record that *873 Haugen intended to harm himself. (Of course, on the dissent’s view, fleeing from police in a vehicle was itself suicidal since the police could shoot to kill.)

e. Fourth Amendment Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is insufficient objective evidence in the record to grant Brosseau’s summary judgment motion. Taken in the light most favorable to Haugen, the objective evidence, examined in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding this case and evaluated as of the time Brosseau actually fired her gun, does not support a conclusion as a matter of law that Brosseau had “probable cause to believe that [Haugen] pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 3 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . We therefore conclude a reasonable jury could conclude, based on this evidence, that Brosseau’s conduct violated Haugen’s Fourth Amendment right. See Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 .

2. Qualified Immunity

Having determined that “a violation could be made out on a favorable view of [Haugen’s] submissions,” id., we must next decide whether Brosseau is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. She is not entitled to immunity if the Fourth Amendment right at issue was clearly established. See id. For a right to be clearly established, it must be defined with sufficient specificity that a reasonable officer would have known she was violating it.

In some situations, the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against excessive force may not be sufficiently specific to put an officer on notice of what conduct is allowed and what is not:

Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In other words, if Brosseau made a reasonable mistake about what the law requires, she is immune from suit. See id. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 .

On the other hand, state officials are not entitled to qualified immunity simply because no case with materially similar facts has held their conduct unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 , 1136-37 (9th Cir.2003). The standard is one of fair warning: where the contours of the right have been defined with sufficient specificity that a state official had fair warning that her conduct deprived a victim of his rights, she is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 740 & n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 2508 .

Beyond the general proposition that excessive force is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in Gamer articulated a “special rule” governing the use of deadly force. See Monroe v. City of Phoenix, 248 F.3d 851, 860 (9th Cir.2001). Under Garner , deadly force is only permissible where “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” 471 U.S. at 11 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . *874 See, e.g., Harris, 126 F.3d at 1202 (holding that the FBI agent in the Ruby Ridge civil case was not entitled to qualified immunity); Cu rnow, 952 F.2d at 324-25 (holding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they shot a suspect who possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot).

The doctrine of qualified immunity operates “to protect officers from the sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” Katz, 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . Officers are not liable when they err in borderline eases. See Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285 . But the evidence here, when taken in the light most favorable to Haugen, does not present a borderline case. Viewing the evidence in Haugen’s favor, Brosseau shot Haugen in the back even though he had not committed any crime indicating that he posed a significant threat of serious physical harm; even though Brosseau had no objectively reasonable evidence that Haugen had a gun or other weapon; even though Haugen had not started to drive his vehicle; and even though Haugen had a clear path of escape. Viewing the evidence in Haugen’s favor, there is insufficient objective evidence to support Brosseau’s stated concern that, at the time she shot him, Haugen posed a significant risk to police officers or others in the area. We therefore conclude that Brosseau’s mistake about the requirements of the Fourth Amendment was unreasonable, and that she had “ ‘fair warning’ that [her] conduct deprived [Haugen] of a constitutional right.” Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 740 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 .

We are mindful that police officers are called upon “to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 . “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 . We must judge Officer Bros-seau’s action at the time she decided to shoot, and we must give her leeway to make reasonable mistakes.

But we are also mindful of the grave threat to constitutional rights that is present when government officials use deadly force against citizens. “[Wjhile giving due deference to difficult judgment calls made on the street, we also must insure the rights of citizens, even fleeing felons, to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Donovan, 17 F.3d at 951 . “The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched.” Garn er, 471 U.S. at 9 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . “The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion. If successful, it guarantees that that mechanism will not be set in motion.” Id. at 10 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 . It was for that reason that the Supreme Court in Gamer held that deadly force may not be used simply because a felony suspect is successfully evading arrest. Viewing the evidence in Haugen’s favor, Brosseau’s use of deadly force was a clear violation of Gamer, and consequently she is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

B. Fourth Amendment Claims Against the City and Police Department

In addition to suing Officer Brosseau, Haugen also sued the City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police Department. Municipalities are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 , 691 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipali *875 ties cannot be held liable under a traditional respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only when “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 .

Haugen’s complaint did not allege, and he has not argued to us on appeal, that Brosseau was acting pursuant to any preexisting policy when she shot him. Rather, he contends that the city and the police department are at fault because they faded to discipline Brosseau after the shooting. Haugen cannot, of course, argue that the municipality’s later action (or inaction) caused the earlier shooting. Haugen argues instead that the city and police department should be held hable 10615 because they “ratified” Brosseau’s decision to use deadly force.

The ratification doctrine, asserted as a basis for municipal liability, originated in St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 , 108 S.Ct. 915 , 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). There, a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that “[i]f the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” Id. at 127 , 108 S.Ct. 915 . But the sentence from Praprotnik must be read in context. The Court held in Praprotnik that to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must “prove[ ] the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.” Id. at 128 , 108 S.Ct. 915 . A single decision by a municipal policymaker “may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability under Monell , even though the decision is not intended to govern future situations,” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)), but the plaintiff must show that the triggering decision was the product of a “conscious, affirmative choice” to ratify the conduct in question. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347 . In the present case, Haugen has made no such showing.

Although some municipal pronouncements ratifying a subordinate’s action could be tantamount to the announcement or confirmation of a policy for purposes of Monell , here there are no facts in the record that suggest that the single failure to discipline Haugen rises to the level of such a ratification. See, e.g., Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir.1989) (refusing to hold that the “failure of a police department to discipline, in a specific instance is an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell ”). The City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police Department are therefore entitled to summary judgment.

C. State Law Claims Against Brosseau

Haugen also sued Brosseau based on state law tort claims. Under Washington law,

Wash. Rev.Code § 4.24.420 (2003). The district court dismissed Haugen’s state law claims because, in its view, Haugen was engaged in the commission of a felony when Brosseau shot him. Washington law provides that

Id. § 46.61.024.

After being shot, Haugen drove away and, for a time, refused to stop for police. He ultimately pled guilty to a felony under § 46.61.024. But, as discussed in section A.l.c., swpra, there is a disputed factual question about when Brosseau shot Haugen. Construing the facts in Haugen’s favor, it appears that Brosseau may have shot Haugen before he had begun to “drive his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others.” Id. It therefore is not clear that he “was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury” or that his felony “was a proximate cause of’ his injury. Id. § 4.24.420 (emphasis added). At this stage in the proceedings, it is not clear that Brosseau will have the benefit of the complete defense provided in § 4.24.420. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Haugen’s state law tort claims.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Haugen’s § 1983 claim against Brosseau. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Haugen’s § 1983 claims against the City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police Department. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Haugen’s state law claims against Bros-seau. We REMAND for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. Costs to Haugen on his appeal relevant to Brosseau. Costs to the City of Puyallup and the Puyallup Police Department.

. See, e.g., Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1363 (D.C.Cir.1984) (applying D.C. law); Seals v. City of Columbia, 641 So.2d 1247, 1248 (Ala.1994); Estate of Aten v. City of Tucson, 169 Ariz. 147 , 817 P.2d 951, 955 (1991); City of Caddo Valley v. George, 340 Ark. 203 , 9 S.W.3d 481, 487 (2000); Brummett v. County of Sacramento, 21 Cal.3d 880 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 582 P.2d 952, 956 (1978); Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 189 Conn. 601 , 458 A.2d 5, 8-10 (1983); City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla.1992); Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122 , 549 S.E.2d 341, 347-48 (2001); Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558 , 594 A.2d 121, 132 (1991); Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 417 Mich. 461 , 339 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1983) (overruled in part, Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 , *870 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000)); Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So.2d 816, 818 (Miss.1985); Oberkramer v. City of Ellisvilie, 650 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Mo.Ct.App.1983); Lee v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 345 , 307 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1981); Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 45 N.Y.2d 97 , 408 N.Y.S.2d 10 , 379 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (1978); Parish v. Hill, 350 N.C. 231 , 513 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1999); Jones v. Ahlberg, 489 N.W.2d 576, 580 (N.D.1992); Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, 310 Cr. 291, 797 P.2d 1027, 1030-31 (1990); Kuzmics v. Santiago, 256 Pa.Super. 35 , 389 A.2d 587, 590 (1978); Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 610-11 (Tenn.1994); Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Tex.1992); New Jersey Police Vehicular Pursuit Policy, Att'y Gen. Guidelines (Dec.2001); Los Angeles Police Dep’t Manual, ch. 555 (2003); Seattle Police Dep’t Policies & Procedures § 1.141 (2003).