Juvenile

347 F.3d 778 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE, Defendant-Appellant. No. 02-30253. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted June 3, 2003 — Seattle, Washington. Filed October 23, 2003. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED David F. Ness, Assistant Federal Defender, Great Fall, Montana, for the defendant-appellant. Marcia Hurd (argued), Marcia Good Sept, Assistant United States Attorneys, Billings, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana; Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00026-SEH. Before: DONALD P. LAY, * WARREN J. FERGUSON, and RONALD M. GOULD, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge FERGUSON; Concurrence by Judge LAY; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge GOULD. FERGUSON, Circuit Judge: 1 C.K., a juvenile, appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court as a result of his guilty plea delinquency adjudication, under which C.K. will remain confined until his twenty-first birthday. The District Court had jurisdiction under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq., and we have jurisdiction over his appeal…

Opinion by Judge FERGUSON; Concurrence by Judge LAY; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge GOULD.

C.K., a juvenile, appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court as a result of his guilty plea delinquency adjudication, under which C.K. will remain confined until his twenty-first birthday. The District Court had jurisdiction under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq., and we have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We hold that the sentence imposed was both arbitrary and in direct contravention of the rehabilitative purposes of the FJDA and therefore an abuse of discretion.

I. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

C.K. is a fourteen-year old member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. He was born in Montana and spent the first six years of his life on the Fort Belknap Indian reservation with his parents and other family members. A precocious young person, C.K. attended Head Start and could read and count to 100 by the time he was three.

In 1994, when C.K. was around six, his parents separated. C.K. and his younger brother and sister officially remained in the custody of their mother, who…

concurring:

I strongly endorse and join in Judge Ferguson’s opinion as it constitutes an outstanding exposition relating to the sentencing of juvenile offenders under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq. To sentence a young man to a long prison term as did the district court is to provide the catalyst for dehumanization, turning juvenile offenders into hardened criminals, away from youthful pursuits and toward a life of crime. The price our Nation pays in filling our prisons with young people who have committed a crime not only exacts an exorbitant economic cost, but more importantly uses the full force of the law to create a human waste that cannot be measured. Judge Ferguson’s opinion will not only become the beacon light for the sensible treatment of juvenile offenders, but also focus attention on the overall punitive sentencing procedures that are currently applied in federal court. In my judgment, this opinion serves as one of the strongest statements that a federal judge has made as it relates to the overall sentencing of human beings.

concurring in part, dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that C.K.’s detention is reviewed for abuse of discretion, United States v. Juvenile, 38 F.3d 470, 472 (9th Cir.1994), but I disagree with the majority’s application of that standard. I conclude that resentencing is necessary only because the record does not adequately show justification for confinement of C.K. so far from C.K’s home in Huron, South Dakota or in Santa Fe, New Mexico. If there were specific and valid reasons, as there may be, for the district court’s decision on place of confinement, then the specified recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons of these locations might be warranted; but absent such reasons, in my view C.K.’s detention in the places specified does not comport with 18 U.S.C. § 5039 . On the other hand,, contrary to the majority’s view, I conclude that it was well within the district-court’s customary province and sound exercise of discretion to conclude that C.K. required detention until the age of 21. Accordingly I respectfully dissent from majority’s opinion on that ground. I also regret that I cannot join the majority’s discussion of sentencing principles, because the majority has…