United States v. Brian Francis Joyce

357 F.3d 921 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian Francis JOYCE, Defendant-Appellant. No. 02-30423. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted December 1, 2003. Filed February 3, 2004. Mary C. Geddes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Anchorage, AK, for the defendant-appellant. Steven Skrocki, Assistant United States Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for the plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, James K. Singleton, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00079-a-JKS. Before: KLEINFELD, GOULD, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. TALLMAN, Circuit Judge: 1 Brian Francis Joyce seeks to challenge on First Amendment grounds the Internet access and computer use restrictions imposed as special conditions of supervised release following his conviction for possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The government argues that Joyce waived his right to appeal these conditions by signing a plea agreement that contained an express waiver of appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a). We conclude that Joyce validly waived his right to bring this appeal, and we dismiss it…

Brian Francis Joyce seeks to challenge on First Amendment grounds the Internet access and computer use restrictions imposed as special conditions of supervised release following his conviction for possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The government argues that Joyce waived his right to appeal these conditions by signing a plea agreement that contained an express waiver of appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a). We conclude that Joyce validly waived his right to bring this appeal, and we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.

I

Joyce was indicted for possessing more than 600 images of child pornography on his computer. The parties entered a plea agreement in which Joyce waived his right to appeal his conviction and “any aspect of the sentence imposed.” After Joyce’s sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a 27-month term of imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and also specified five special conditions of supervised release. Joyce challenges as unreasonable the two conditions that limit his computer use.

II

Before we can address the merits of Joyce’s challenge to these special conditions, we must first determine…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that Joyce’s waiver of rights to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement that led to his conviction for possessing child pornography prevents him from challenging the conditions of supervised release that now restrict his Internet access. I would hold, to the contrary, that the term “sentence” as used in Joyce’s plea agreement and waiver is ambiguous in meaning, and, construing the ambiguity in Joyce’s favor, the waiver of appeal does not bar him from appealing the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court. Reaching the merits, I would uphold the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court because they are designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public.

It is sensible for a district court reasonably to restrict Internet access by one convicted of possessing child pornography. The conditions imposed here as prerequisite to Joyce’s supervised release from prison protect the public, and serve Joyce as well, by making it less likely that he will further harm himself or others by recidivism on his proclivity for child pornography. In my view, we…