dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, the administrative law judge (ALJ) relied on two factors that are not supported by the record. I am not convinced that the ALJ necessarily would have reached the same conclusion under a correct analysis of the record. Accordingly, we should reverse and remand for reconsideration.

1. Watching Television

One of the factors on which the ALJ relied in finding Batson’s complaints of pain incredible was this:

(Emphasis added; exhibit references omitted.)

As the majority points out, the record does not support that reasoning. Batson never said that he was “sitting” while watching television. It is possible to watch television while lying down, reclining, or standing, as well as while sitting; and at home one can change positions at will.

Moreover, it is hard to imagine an activity less indicative of work capability than passively watching television or listening to the radio. The ALJ apparently would condemn every claimant to a world of utter silence if the claimant is expected to prove impairment.

2. Dr. Keenen’s Opinion on Disability

The ALJ rejected the disability opinion of Dr. Keenen, Batson’s treating physician, for the following reasons:

(Exhibit references omitted.)

In my view, it is not possible to understand Dr. Keenen’s opinion to rest solely on subjective complaints. Nor is it appropriate to view one of Dr. Keenen’s reports, in isolation, as a mere checklist. The Social Security regulations make clear that a treating physician’s reports are to ' be viewed in light of the entire treatment relationship. The weight accorded a treating physician’s opinion depends on the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of visits, and the nature and extent of treatment received. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2)®, (ii).

Batson began to experience pain in his neck and left upper extremity in October 1996. An MRI in 1997 revealed disc herniation, and Dr. Keenen — a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon who completed a fellowship in spinal surgery' — performed surgery on Batson on September 3, 1997. In an October 1998 examination report, Dr. Keenen discussed a later MRI showing that there “is some protrusion of disc material at the level of the arthrodesis that is potentially causing some of [Batson’s] symptoms.” On September 14, 1999, Dr. Keenen identified “cervical spondylosis” as “the vertebrogenic disorder” from which Batson suffered. He also reported “significant limitation of motion in the spine,” muscle weakness, and sensory loss — as well as pain. Dr. Keenen expressly concluded that Batson’s physical impairments were reasonably consistent with his symptoms and functional limitations and that Batson had no psychological limitations. Dr. Keenen also referred the reader to his office notes for additional information. Dr. Keenen’s office notes state that Batson continued to have neck and upper extremity pain as of January 12,1999.

It is true that, in response to a request for information regarding Batson’s work restrictions, Dr. Keenen wrote: “These restrictions are based on subjective descriptions of pain.” But it is only by taking that response entirely out of context that the ALJ could reject Dr. Keenen’s opinion as lacking a basis in objective medical findings.

To summarize, Dr. Keenen had treated and examined Batson on many occasions for more than two years, and he performed back surgery on Batson in 1997. The ALJ’s stated reasons essentially ignore that significant history when discounting Dr. Keenen’s opinion because of the isolated use of a checMist sent to him by someone else.

The ALJ’s final error is the grudging statement that a treating physician’s opinion is merely “acceptable” evidence. “A treating physician’s medical opinion as to the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment must be given controlling weight if that opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir .2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2). Even when not accorded controlling weight, a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to deference. When contradicted by the opinion of a non7treat-ing physician, the treating physician’s opinion “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported *1200 by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.1995). The ALJ’s quoted rejection of Dr. Keenen’s opinion fails to meet that standard.

In conclusion, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Keenen’s opinion are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and one of the ALJ’s reasons for disbelieving Batson is not supported by any evidence. Therefore, I would reverse and remand. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion.