facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.

Wade challenges the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i), which applies if the offense involved “the

unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce

or obtain any other means of identification.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i). Wade

contends that the enhancement does not apply because he used a means of

identification belonging to someone else to attempt to obtain a Nevada Real ID

under his own name—rather than another’s name—and Application Note 1

provides that, for § 2B1.1(b), “means of identification, shall be of an actual (i.e.,

not fictitious) individual, other than the defendant.” Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1

(emphasis added). Even though Wade attempted to obtain a Nevada Real ID in his

own name, the district court properly applied the enhancement because the Nevada

Real ID he sought to obtain would have contained a Nevada ID number—a “means

2 of identification”—that would have been unlawfully tied to the alien registration

number of another actual individual.1

Contrary to Wade’s contention, the enhancement did not constitute

impermissible double counting because the statutes under which he was convicted

can be violated by using a fraudulent means of identification not connected to

another actual individual. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).

Here, the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i) accounted for the

harm done to the other individual associated with the alien registration number that

Wade used. “There is nothing wrong with ‘double counting’ when it is necessary

to make the defendant’s sentence reflect the full extent of the wrongfulness of his

conduct.” United States v. Thornton, 511 F.3d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

1 The district court’s decision is consistent with United States v. Melendrez, 389 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2004). We note that the Government incorrectly argues on appeal that Melendrez is irrelevant because that case concerned the 2002 version of the guideline, which ostensibly did not contain the same text as Application Note 10(C)(i). However, the wording in Application Note 10(C)(i) is found in the 2002 version under Application Note 7(C)(i). See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.7(C)(i) (2002).

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