Manuel Tovar-Landin v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
Opinion
Opinion
Silverman, J.
Petitioner Manuel Tovar-Landin, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s summary affirmance of the immigration judge’s (IJ) order of removal— specifically, the IJ’s denial of petitioner’s request for the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of removal at the conclusion of the proceedings.
Prior to the conclusion of a removal proceeding, an alien is eligible for voluntary departure regardless of how long he has been physically present in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(l). However, at the conclusion of a removal proceeding, an alien may be granted voluntary departure only if he has been physically present in the United States for at least one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1229e(b)(l)(A). Petitioner argues that this regime violates the right to due process and the right to equal protection of the law. We deny the petition. Petitioner’s due process challenge cannot be sustained because there is no fundamental right to the wholly discretionary relief of voluntary departure. The equal protection challenge is likewise denied because Congress’s one-year requirement is not “wholly irrational.”