DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review Section 6320, subdivision (a), authorizes the family court to issue a restraining order to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence, including “attacking, striking, stalking, threatening,

3 2 sexually assaulting [or] battering.” After a noticed hearing the court may issue a permanent domestic violence restraining order that last for up to five years. (§ 6345, subd. (a).) The ultimate decision to grant or deny a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595 601; Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) We review the family court’s underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226; Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505.) The inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, not whether a contrary finding might have been made. (In re Alexandria P. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 331, 355.) “We accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and resolve every conflict in favor of the judgment.” (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1144.) “We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.) 2. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting the Three-year Restraining Order Unquestionably, John’s testimony that Jenifer shoved him twice during the March 1, 2020 custody exchange, which the family court found credible, constituted substantial evidence

2 Section 6211 defines “domestic violence” as abuse perpetrated against, among others, “(d) A person with whom the respondent has had a child.”

4 supporting the court’s finding of domestic violence. In addition to discounting the seriousness of the incident—an account the court found not credible—Jenifer contends this single act of abuse is insufficient to grant a domestic violence restraining order. The Domestic Violence Prevention Act is not so limited. Section 6300 authorizes the court to issue a restraining order if testimony shows “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (See In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 225 [“a court may issue a protective order . . . upon ‘“reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse”’”]; Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782 [same].) Here, the family court found reasonable proof of a past act of abuse based on the March 1, 2020 incident. In addition to John’s testimony, the court credited John’s girlfriend’s testimony that John’s daughter was crying in the car as indicating the incident was “not a civil exchange.” The single act of abuse in this case was sufficient to support granting the domestic violence restraining order. Jenifer also argues the court erred by issuing the restraining order after a material change in circumstances. She contends, because the parties started exchanging custody at the police station following issuance of the temporary restraining order, there was no longer a threat of future harm to John, and a restraining order was no longer necessary. Although a significant change in circumstances may certainly be a relevant consideration when the court is asked to renew a protective order (see Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290), the court here properly concluded the change identified by Jenifer was not a sufficient ground to deny the request for a permanent order. To be sure, there might be a reduced risk of a violent

5 confrontation during custody exchanges at the police station. But the court found Jenifer had not adequately addressed her anger, the cause of the domestic violence. According to the court, “[T]he anger management classes [were] the right call,” noting that during the March 1 incident, “[Jenifer’s] anger towards [John] got the best of her.” The court also observed, “[T]here’s something in [Jenifer] that seems to be very full of anger towards [John].” The court ordered Jenifer to complete the anger management classes she had agreed to take following her battery arrest. Because those classes had not been completed as of the time of the hearing, the court’s decision to issue the permanent order, notwithstanding the new arrangements for custody exchanges, was well within its broad discretion.

DISPOSITION

The July 28, 2020 order granting the permanent restraining order is affirmed. John G. is to recover his costs on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

*

SEGAL, J. WISE, J.

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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