Frederick L. Jackson v. George J. Giurbino, Warden California State Attorney General
Opinion
Opinion
364 F.3d 1002 Frederick L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. George J. GIURBINO, * Warden; California State Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees. No. 02-57117. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted November 4, 2003. Filed March 26, 2004. Laurack D. Bray, Ventura, CA, for the appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorney General, and Michelle J. Pirozzi, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-06984-WDK/RZ. Before BRIGHT, ** O'SCANNLAIN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge BRIGHT; Dissent by Judge O'SCANNLAIN BRIGHT, Circuit Judge. 1 A jury convicted California state prisoner Frederick L. Jackson of rape and first-degree murder with special circumstances following his trial in state superior court. Because Jackson did not personally commit the homicide in…
Lead Opinion
Bright, J.
Opinion by Judge BRIGHT; Dissent by Judge O’SCANNLAIN
A jury convicted California state prisoner Frederick L. Jackson of rape and first-degree murder with special circumstances following his trial in state superior court. Because Jackson did not personally commit the homicide in this case, his conviction depended on application of California’s felony-murder doctrine. Jackson appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Jackson made many allegations of error in the state court proceedings. First, Jackson claims that the state court unreasonably admitted evidence in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (“Miranda ”). Second, he argues that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear unre-dacted excerpts of an audiotape alluding to Jackson’s criminal history. Third, Jackson alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the state proceedings. Fourth, Jackson alleges prosecutorial misconduct in that the prosecutor commented on Jackson’s silence in…
Dissenting Opinion
O'Scannlain, J.
dissenting:
Because I believe that any error from the admission of Jackson’s inculpatory statement was harmless, I respectfully dissent.
The jury had before it ample evidence that Jackson raped and beat Genoveva Gonzalez. Jackson’s semen was incontrovertibly present in Gonzalez; the State’s medical expert testified that her injuries suggested she had been raped; and Jackson’s own medical expert conceded that Gonzalez’s vaginal injuries were almost certainly the result of rape. He also agreed that her injuries were fresh and that Gonzalez was likely raped while she lay supine. This extensive medical evidence was entirely consistent with Rollins’s testimony that he witnessed Jackson beating and then having intercourse while on top of Gonzalez a few short hours before she was murdered. 1 In view of the overwhelming forensic evidence of rape, it is difficult to see how the jury could not conclude that Rollins saw Jackson raping Gonzalez.
Such a conclusion, moreover, when viewed in light of California’s broadly conceived doctrine of felony murder, suggests that Gonzalez’s rape and murder occurred in one continuous transaction. The California Supreme Court has expressly rejected a…