MEMORANDUM

Eric Johnson (Johnson) appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deficiencies in California’s parole revocation procedures. Additionally, Johnson challenges the district court’s denial of relief from Central District of California Local Rule 23-3, which required Johnson to file a motion for class certification within ninety days.

1. Because Johnson failed to argue his dismissed claims in the opening brief, those issues are waived. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 582-83 (9th Cir.2007).

2. Because Johnson’s claims were hypothetical, with no specific date or time for occurrence of the harm and because Johnson had no representative status, the district court did not err when it dismissed Johnson’s claims for lack of standing and ripeness. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.2010).

3. “District courts have broad discretion to control the class certification process ...” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir.2009). The district court acted within its discretion when it denied 1'elief based on a lack of compliance with Local Rule 23-3 and Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir.2011).

4. Because Local Rule 23-3 requires a party to file a motion for class certification within ninety days of service of a pleading proposing a class action, Local Rule 23-3 is not inconsistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, which applies to the district courts. See Local Civ. Rule 23-3; Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(A); Vinole, 571 F.3d at 939 .

5. The district court’s findings and reasoning were permissibly based on the briefs. See Kashin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir.2006) (explaining that whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is within the discretion of the court).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.