In Re Cellular 101, Inc., Debtor, Cellular 101, Inc. v. Channel Communications, Inc. John Price

Appellant, Cellular 101, Inc. (“Cellular”), appeals from an order of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of Channel Communications, Inc. (“Channel”) and John Price’s (“Price”) administrative expense claim filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b). On appeal Cellular asserts that Channel and Price did not satisfy the basic requirements of § 503(b) and that, in the alternative, their claim must fail because they acted in their own interest. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158 (d), and we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Background

AT & T Wireless of Santa Barbara (“AT & T”) is a provider of wireless services throughout Santa Barbara County. Channel was an authorized dealer of AT & T services in the area and was completely owned by Price and his wife. Cellular was operating as an agent of Channel in the capacity of an AT & T subdealer.

Over the past few years these parties have not had the most cordial of dealings. On numerous occasions AT & T complained that Channel and Cellular engaged in business practices of which AT & T disapproved. Because of these practices, AT & T threatened to terminate the contract it had with Channel. To sever this…

concurring.

I write a separate concurrence because on the facts of this case I would go one step further and hold that a creditor’s motivation is not dispositive or even relevant in deciding whether to grant a § 503(b) claim.

When interpreting a statute, “[o]ur first step ... is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 , 117 S.Ct. 843 , 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). This court’s inquiry must end if the statutory language is unambiguous and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 , 109 S.Ct. 1026 , 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). If the text of the statute includes undefined terms — as is the situation here where Congress failed to fully define “substantial contribution” — we construe those terms to have their ordinary meanings. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 , 114 S.Ct. 996 , 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). When the plain language of the statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the court must determine the more plausible interpretation of the language Congress chose.…

377 F.3d 1092 In re CELLULAR 101, INC., Debtor, Cellular 101, Inc., Appellant, v. Channel Communications, Inc.; John Price, Appellees. No. 02-56772. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted February 13, 2004. Filed July 28, 2004. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Timothy J. Trager, Santa Barbara, CA, for the appellant. Victoria S. Kaufman, Los Angeles, CA, for the appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-00715-AHS. Before: B. FLETCHER, PREGERSON, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges. BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge: 1 Appellant, Cellular 101, Inc. ("Cellular"), appeals from an order of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's grant of Channel Communications, Inc. ("Channel") and John Price's ("Price") administrative expense claim filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b). On appeal Cellular asserts that Channel and Price did not satisfy the basic requirements of § 503(b) and that, in the alternative, their claim must fail because they acted in their own interest. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158 (d), and we affirm. FACTS…