Jacoby Lee Felix v. Deneice A. Mayle, Warden

379 F.3d 612 Jacoby Lee FELIX, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Deneice A. MAYLE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. No. 02-16614. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted November 4, 2003. Submission Withdrawn April 13, 2004. Resubmitted July 8, 2004. Filed August 9, 2004. David M. Porter, Assistant Federal Defender, Sacramento, CA, for the petitioner-appellant. Mathew Chan, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for the respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-00828-WBS. Before: CANBY, JR., W. FLETCHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. CANBY, Circuit Judge: 1 This case, in which state prisoner Jacoby Lee Felix seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus to overturn his state conviction, presents an important question of federal civil procedure that has divided other circuits. The question is this: when a habeas petitioner challenging a state conviction amends his federal petition to include a new claim, does the amendment relate back to the date of filing of his petition and thus avoid the one-year limitation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death…

This case, in which state prisoner Jaco-by Lee Felix seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus to overturn his state conviction, presents an important question of federal civil procedure that has divided other circuits. The question is this: when a habeas petitioner challenging a state conviction amends his federal petition to include a new claim, does the amendment relate back to the date of filing of his petition and thus avoid the one-year limitation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)? That question in turn depends upon the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2), which provides that an amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when “the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original pleading.” We join the Seventh Circuit in concluding that a prisoner’s new claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as his original petition because the transaction or occurrence in issue is his state trial and conviction. See Ellzey v. United States, 324 F.3d 521 (7th Cir.2003). 1 The claim thus relates back under…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I

Today the court holds that the petitioner’s newly-minted and untimely-raised coerced confession claim is saved by the “relation back” doctrine of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2) because it “arises from the same transaction' — Ms trial and conviction” as petitioner’s timely-filed Confrontation Clause claim. By defining “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” so broadly that any claim stemming from pre-trial motions, the trial, or sentencing relates back to a timely-filed habeas petition, the court obliterates AEDPA’s one year statute of limitation.

The majority of those circuits to consider the intersection of Rule 15(c) and Congress’ strict statute of limitation have more narrowly interpreted “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” to mean that in order to relate back, “the untimely claim must have arisen from the ‘same set of facts’ as the timely filed claim, not from separate conduct or a separate occurrence in ‘both time and type.’ ” Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir.2000). 1 I would follow this better reasoned rule because it pays proper respect to the limitation period established by AEDPA. *619 I thus respectfully…