Michael T. Swift v. State of California Department of Corrections Keith Tandy, and Steve Christian Maritza Rodriguez
Opinion
Opinion
Tashima, J.
Michael Swift appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against two California parole officers. Swift alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated as a result of: (1) the officers’ investigation of suspected parole violations; (2) the officers ordering Swift’s arrest pursuant to a parole hold; and (3) their recommendation for the initiation of parole revocation proceedings. The district court found the officers entitled to absolute immunity under Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.1981), and Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.1983). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conclude that the officers’ right to immunity is not controlled by these cases. Applying the functional approach to absolute immunity in accordance with Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 , 113 S.Ct. 2167 , 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993), and Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc), we hold that parole officers are not absolutely immune from suits arising from conduct distinct from the decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole. Accordingly, we reverse.