Floyd A. Mitleider appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. Mitleider claims that race motivated the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of four African-Americans from his jury in violation of the equal protection principles articulated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 . The trial court followed the three steps set forth in Batson and determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenges were race-neutral. The trial court’s determination was affirmed on appeal by the California Court of Appeal. As the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in denying Mitleider’s Batson challenge, we affirm.

In 1996, California charged Mitleider, who is not African-American, and- three African-American co-defendants with solicitation to commit murder, conspiracy, and attempted murder based on events arising out of an alleged plot to kill Mit-leider’s wife in order to collect life insurance proceeds. The defendants were tried together in San Diego Superior Court.

The venire from which Mitleider’s jury was drawn had one hundred members, but only five African-Americans. Voir dire was conducted on a model unit of eighteen prospective jurors at a time. Twelve jurors were identified to occupy the twelve juror seats, plus an additional six were placed “in the box.”

The court conducted the initial voir dire on the original group of eighteen and then counsel for the parties were allowed-to pose questions. After the court considered challenges for cause, counsel exercised peremptory challenges.

The opportunity for peremptory challenges occurred serially: first the prosecutor, then counsel for Mitleider’s three co-defendants, and finally counsel for Mitleider. Individuals in the first twelve .seats were subject to peremptory challenges. When a person was challenged, that person would depart and the seat would be filled, in order, from the additional six persons “in the box.” When seven jurors had been challenged, thereby reducing the number of jurors to eleven, another seven persons were called so that there were again eighteen potential jurors, twelve in juror seats, and six “in the box.” This system was used until twelve jurors and four alternates were sworn in.

The initial group of jurors seated in the jury box included two African-Americans, Miss W. and Mr. D. This group was passed for cause by all counsel. The prosecutor used his fourth peremptory challenge to excuse Mr. D. from the panel. Defense counsel did not object at the time. Mr. D. was the seventh prospective juror to be challenged, another seven prospective jurors were then called, and voir dire continued. In this round the prosecutor made two challenges before passing. When defense challenges dropped the remaining number of jurors to eleven, another seven jurors were called.

The prosecutor did not make any challenges for several rounds, and then used his seventh peremptory challenge to excuse Miss W. Defense counsel immediately requested a sidebar and the judge indicat ed that he would give defense counsel an opportunity to make a record. Challenges continued and another group of seven jurors were called. This group included another African-American, Miss F., who moved into a jury seat at the end of the day.

Before jury selection resumed the next day, the trial judge offered defense counsel an opportunity to make a record of their Wheeler/Batson objection to the recusal of Miss W. Defense counsel noted that only a very small percentage of minorities were on the jury venire, that the percentage of African-Americans in the community was higher than the percentage on the jury venire, and that three of the four defendants were African-American. The court asked the prosecutor if he wished to respond. He declined noting that he did not think that defendants had made a prima facie showing of a systematic pattern of exclusion. The court denied defendants’ motion, but noted “I’m putting the prosecution on notice that the next Afro-American excused will require a recitation of reasons as to why the peremptories are being handled with respect to those individuals.”

The prosecutor then indicated that he was challenging Miss F. In response to defense counsel’s Wheeler/Batson objection, the prosecutor offered the following explanation for his challenges:

The prospective jurors returned to the courtroom, and the clerk conducted a roll call. Miss B., an African-American juror, entered late. Counsel recommenced exercising their peremptory challenges and seven more jurors, including Miss B., were called to the box.

After passing several times and challenging another individual, the prosecutor used his eleventh challenge on Miss B. Defense counsel immediately requested a sidebar and, outside the jury’s presence, moved for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecution’s systematic removal of African-American jurors. In response, the prosecutor offered the following explanation:

Defense counsel responded that the removal of all African-American jurors from the jury was a clear violation of Wheeler. The prosecutor replied:

After a short recess, the court issued the following oral ruling:

After jury selection was complete, defense counsel asked for reconsideration of the Wheeler motion, noting that Juror No. 1 was a 22-year-old female and had a family member who had been convicted of a crime. The prosecutor did not respond and the trial judge denied the motion. Mitleider was found guilty on all charges.

II.

All the defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeal. On September 14, 1999, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed Mitleider’s conviction. The court rejected the defendants’ Wheeler claims, explaining:

Mitleider's petition for review with the California Supreme Court and petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court were denied.

III.

In April 2002, Mitleider filed a ha-beas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, raising several issues, including his Batson claim. The district court denied the petition. Addressing the Batsort claim, the district judge held:

Mitleider filed a timely notice of appeal. After the district court denied his request for a Certificate of Appealability, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1), (3), we granted a Certificate of Appealability limited to whether Mit-leider's rights under Batsom were violated.

~Iv.

We review de novo a district court's denial of a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . Williams, 354 F.3d at 1106; Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir.2003). Under the Arititerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), however, a federal court will grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of~ the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)-(2).

This deferential standard requires us to presume that "state courts know and follow the law." Lewis, 321 F.3d at 829 (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 , 123 S.Ct. 357 , 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)). Moreover, state court factual findings are presumed correct in the absence of clear and cbnviiicing evidence to the contrary. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).”); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793 , 121 S.Ct. 1910 , 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (“[E]ven if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable.”).

The state courts recognized that a Batson challenge is evaluated in three steps. First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge because of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 . Second, if such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the challenges. Id. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 . Here, the trial court found that the defendants made a prima facie showing and required that the prosecutor explain his reasons for the exercise of peremptory challenges to the African-American jurors. Mitleider does not contest that the trial court followed the first two steps of the Batson inquiry.

Mitleider, however, argues that the trial court did not comply with the third step of the inquiry. This step requires the trial court to determine “whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)(“Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.”).

In Collins, 365 F.3d at 679, we emphasized that a finding of discriminatory intent turns largely on the trial court’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility because “ ‘[t]he credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis,’ Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 .” In Williams, we explained:

354 F.3d at 1108. Thus, the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s proffered reasons and credibility under “the totality of the relevant facts,” using all the available tools including its own observations and the assistance of counsel. Lewis, 321 F.3d at 831 .

Here, the trial judge understood the nature of the third step of the Batson inquiry. After the prosecutor articulated his reasons for the challenges, the trial judge took a recess to evaluate the prosecutor’s reasons and, recognizing that it was a close question, ruled that the prosecutor was credible and that “there exists a valid basis for the excusal.” In other words, the trial judge appreciated defense counsel’s concerns, but determined that the prosecutor did not have a discriminatory intent in making the challenges.

Mitleider objected that “a valid basis for the excusal” was not necessarily the same as a determination that the prosecutor’s subjective reasons for the challenges were not discriminatory. Mitleider made this argument in his appeal to the California Court of Appeal. That court considered Mitleider’s argument, reviewed the record, and determined that despite the trial judge’s choice of words, “there was no racial basis for the exclusions and that the exclusions had a ‘basis in reality’ other than group bias.” Thus, the state courts properly focused on the prosecutor’s actual intent: The record does not support a conclusion that the state courts failed to apply clearly established federal law.

VI.

There remains Mitleider’s contention that the state courts’ decisions were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2). Mitleider argues that the removal of the four African-American jurors who were seated in the jury box creates an inference of discrimination. The applicable standard; however, is not an inference of discrimination. The inference of racial motivation is What a defendant must show to meet" the first step of the Batson standard. The second and third steps of the Batson standard concern whether the inference is correct — whether the recusal was based on a discriminatory motive. Although the inference remains immutable, the courts may determine that the inference does not reflect reality.

Mitleider also argues that an examination of the prosecutor’s given reasons indicates that the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual and that the challenges were really racially motivated. The state courts disagreed with Mitleider, and on this record, we cannot say that the state courts’ determinations were unreasonable.

The prosecutor articulated facially reasonable race-neutral grounds for each of the challenges. His challenge of Mr. D. was based on Mr. D.’s indication that he had a brother who had been convicted of possession of cocaine, and his ambiguous response on the juror questionnaire that “[r]ape charges were filed against a teacher’s aide and lack of evidence, the case was dismissed.” Miss W. was recused because in the prosecutor’s opinion she indicated that she did not want to serve on the jury. Miss F. was challenged because she did not candidly explain why her brother had a “probation problem,” or why he was on felony probation in the first place. Miss B. was young, had little life experience, was late to court and less than forthcoming in her admission that she had quit school and work.

Defense counsel, although given an opportunity to do so by the trial judge, of fered no rebuttal to the prosecutor’s explanations for his challenges to Mr. D., Miss W. or Miss F. Counsel did argue that although Miss B. was young and was late to court, she was legally eligible to be a juror and there may have been good reasons for her tardiness, which the prosecutor failed to explore.

The test under Batson , however, is not that the prosecutor’s reason is persuasive, but that it does not deny equal protection. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 . Accordingly, the prosecutor’s belief that Miss B.’s tardiness was a sign of immaturity is a legitimate reason for his challenge, even if mistaken, as long as the reason is not pretextual. Similarly, the perceptions that Miss W. did not want to be on the jury, that Miss F. was less than forthright about her brother’s involvement with the criminal justice system, and that Mr. D. had limited life experiences are all permissible reasons for peremptory challenges, unless Mitleider carries his burden of showing that they were pretextual. We have reviewed the record and Mitleider’s presentation and conclude that he has not demonstrated that it was unreasonable for the trial judge to find the prosecutor credible.

Mitleider argues that this court has granted relief under Batson where there was significantly less evidence of systematic group exclusion. The prosecutor’s motives, however, must be considered on the basis of the facts set forth in each particular case. The facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts presented in the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Mitleider. In United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir.1989), the prosecutor struck a Hispanic juror because of where he lived and his type of employment, and struck a Hispanic alternate juror because of his age and his appearance. On direct appeal, we reversed, holding that the prosecutor had failed to meet the second step of the Batson standard because his explanations were not sufficiently “clear and reasonably specific.” Id. at 698. Here, the prosecutor offered specific reasons for his challenges and the California Court of Appeal found that the prosecutor’s proffered reasons and actual motives for challenging the jurors were race-neutral. These factual findings by the state court are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 .

In McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1224 (9th Cir.2000), we granted relief in a habeas appeal because the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing two African-American jurors were determined to be pretex-tual. By contrast, here the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reasons appear to have been reasonably based on the jurors’ written responses, comments and actions. Mitleider has offered nothing, other than the challenges themselves, to support his allegation that the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual. As noted, the one specific juror referenced by Mitleider for comparative analysis, Juror No. 1, was factually distinguishable.

The difference between Lewis and the case at bar is instructive as the cases are procedurally similar. In Lewis , we granted relief on a habeas appeal from a state murder conviction on the ground that the trial court had failed to properly perform step three of the Batson standard. 321 F.3d at 832 . We held that the trial court’s conclusion, reached after having rejected an unspecified number of the prosecutor’s reasons, that one of the prosecutor’s reasons was “probably ... reasonable” was inadequate. Id. Here, however, we find that the state appellate court reasonably determined that the trial court properly undertook the third step in the Batson standard, and that, despite the trial court’s ineloquence, the prosecutor’s motives were not race related.

In Collins, we granted relief in a habeas appeal from a state drug conviction. We determined that the prosecutor’s stated reasons of age and demeanor for striking two African-American jurors were not supported by the record and hence were pretextual and that the state appellate court, by failing to scrutinize the record, had misapplied federal law. 365 F.3d at 686-87. In our case, the prosecutor’s challenges did not rest on speculative reasons, the State rebutted Mitleider’s comparative analysis to other jurors, and the state appellate court properly reviewed the record for compliance with Batson .

Finally, Mitleider’s reliance on United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2003), is of no avail. There the district court judge summarily denied the defendant’s Batson motion, stating that the prosecutor had offered a “plausible explanation” for his challenges. Id. at 969. On direct appeal, we held that the trial court erred “by failing to proceed to step three to evaluate meaningfully the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s gender-neutral explanations.” Id. Here, (1) the trial judge took a recess before ruling on the adequacy of the prosecutor’s reasons; (2) the trial judge, while recognizing the closeness of the issue, determined that the prosecutor was credible and had valid reasons for the recusals; and (3) the California Court of Appeal affirmed that the prosecutor was credible and his reasons were race-neutral. As noted, the findings by the state court are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 .

VII.

Despite the inference raised by the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of the four African-American jurors that were seated in the jury box, the record shows that the trial judge followed the three steps for considering a Batson challenge and found that the prosecutor had valid race-neutral reasons for challenging the jurors. The California Court of Appeal then carefully reviewed the record under the appropriate standard, rejected Mitleider’s objection that the trial court had failed to determine the prosecutor’s subjective motivation, and affirmed the trial court’s determination that the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging the jurors were race-neutral. As this is a habeas appeal subject to the AEDPA, relief is dependant upon a showing of either a violation of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)(2). Mitleider has not demonstrated that the state courts violated clearly established federal law, and has failed to overcome the presumption that the state courts’ findings are correct. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the habeas petition is

AFFIRMED.

. We grant Mitleider’s motion to supplement the record with the juror questionnaires for the four African-American jurors, the transcript of the voir dire proceedings, and the California Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion. . People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 (1978), is the "California analogue” to Batson, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 . As the aspects of the cases relevant to the case at bar are the same, and because we are reviewing Mitleider's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , we generally refer to Batson in analyzing his claims. Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667 , 674 n. 5 (9th Cir.2004), petition for cert. fled, 73 U.S.L.W. (U.S. July 7, 2004)(No. 04-52). . The court determined, however, that Mit-leider should be resentenced and granted par-lial relief to other defendants. . Our review of Mitleider's case is limited to the issues encompassed by the grant of the Certificate of Appealability. Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 345 , 160 L.Ed.2d 225 (2004). . We noted that a review of the record and a comparative analysis of a struck juror with an empaneled juror are tools " 'for exploring the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination.' " Lewis, 321 F.3d at 830 -31 (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir.1997)). . See Batson, 476-U. S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("[W]e have recognized that a black defendant alleging that members of his race have been impermissibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”'). . In Hernandez , the Supreme Court noted "[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant hád made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” 500 U.S. at 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 . . On appeal, Mitleider argues that the prosecutor’s incorrect statement that Mr. D. was reluctant to serve, and contention that Mr. D. had "limited life experience,” constitute strong evidence of an improper racial motivation. It is true that the prosecutor erred in recalling that Mr. D. had been reluctant to serve. Our review of the record, however, suggests that it was reasonable to find Mr. D.'s answers to the juror questionnaire troubling and to conceive of Mr. D. as having been somewhat sheltered. . After jury selection was complete, defense counsel asked for reconsideration of defendants' Batson motion noting that Juror No. 1 was twenty-two years old and had a family member who had been arrested. The trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration. A review of the record indicates that Juror No. 1 was very different from Miss B. Although she was only a year older than Miss B., Juror No. 1 had a son, had been employed as a collections specialist for over two years, was engaged to a deputy sheriff, and had taken the semester off from school to plan their wedding. Moreover, Juror No. 1 indicated that although she knew her older sister had been arrested when Juror No. 1 was twelve or thirteen, the incident was never discussed in the family and Juror No. 1 did not know why her sister had been arrested or the outcome. Accordingly, the prosecutor's failure to challenge Juror No. 1 did not undermine his stated reasons for challenging Miss B. . The Supreme Court explained: The prosecutor’s proffered explanation in this case — that he struck juror number 22 because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard-is race neutral and satisfies the prosecution’s step two burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. "The wearing of beards is not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race.” EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 190, n. 3 (C.A.3 1980). And neither is the growing of long, unkempt hair. Thus, the inquiry properly proceeded to step three, where the state court found that the prosecutor was not motivated by discriminatory intent. In habeas proceedings in federal courts, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct, and may be set aside, absent procedural error, only if they are “not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(8). See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 , 103 S.Ct. 843, 849 , 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983). Here the Court of Appeals did not conclude or even attempt to conclude that the state court’s finding of no racial motive was not fairly supported by the record. For its whole focus was upon the reasonableness of the asserted nonracial motive (which it thought required by step two) rather than the genuineness of the motive. It gave no proper basis for overturning the state court's finding of no racial motive, a finding which turned primarily on an assessment of credibility, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21 , 106 S.Ct., at 1724, n. 21 . Cf. Marshall, supra, at 434, 103 S.Ct., at 850 . Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 . . The court found that for the first juror, the prosecutor "first justified striking [her] from the jury by attributing to[her] beliefs that she did not hold," and then justified the strike by speculating "that because [she] was heavyset, she must have lied about being a stewardess.” McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221 . Furthermore, the prosecutor’s claim that she lacked decision-making experience was revealed to be pretex-tual through comparative analysis to another juror. Id. The court found the prosecutor's reasons for recusing the second juror to be "objectively contrary to the facts.” Id. at 1222 . . Unlike the facts in the present case, in Lewis , the presence of a racial motive was inherent in the prosecutor's statement: Additionally, because, tell you the truth, because she's African American, and I was unsure who she was, I watched her relatively closely from the moment she came in the courtroom. 321 F.3d at 828 .