Brian A. Buckley v. C.A. Terhune, Director of the CDC

C.A. Terhune, Director of the California Department of Corrections, (“State”) appeals the district court’s grant of Brian Buckley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State’s appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 . The district court did not afford *1151 the state court’s determination of facts the appropriate level of deference. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court because it resulted from a misapplication of the strict standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 (“AEDPA”).

I

On November 27, 1987, Buckley was charged in Ventura County, California with felony murder, robbery, and burglary. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187(a), 190.2(a), 211, 459. On December 15, 1987, the prosecutor, Donald C. Glynn, wrote Buckley a letter offering a plea bargain. The proposal contemplated that Buckley would testify against suspects Curtis Fau-ber and Christopher Caldwell as to three murders, but the agreement did not specify the sentence to be imposed should Buckley accept the offer. Attached to Glynn’s letter was a document entitled “Felony Disposition Statement.”

According to the Felony…

dissenting:

Were I simply to disagree with the weight to be given the evidence, or the conclusions drawn therefrom, I would not further encumber the Federal Reports by writing a dissent. It is because I see this case as being controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), whereas the majority apply section 2254(d)(2), that I respectfully dissent. When judges’ criteria pass each other without acknowledgment, like ships on a dark night, at least one should blow a horn.

Next, were the relevant legal issues whether Buckley “understood” or “knew” or “believed” he was pleading to a “15 years to life” sentence rather than a “15 years maximum” sentence, I would agree with the majority. There is sufficient evidence in the record made before the Ven-tura County Superior Court on the habeas hearing so that its finding that Buckley “well knew” he was pleading to “15 years to life” was not “unreasonable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2).

But the proper focus of enquiry is not on section 2254(d)(2), but on section 2254(d)(1). 2 At the time of the state habe-as proceeding, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, made the interpretation and construction of a plea agreement a…

397 F.3d 1149 Brian A. BUCKLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.A. TERHUNE, Director of the CDC, Respondent-Appellant. No. 03-55045. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted January 9, 2004. Filed January 25, 2005. Noah P. Hill, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent-appellant. Allen Bloom, San Diego, California, for the petitioner-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; J. Spencer Letts, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-02435-JSL. Before: TROTT, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges. TROTT, Circuit Judge: 1 C.A. Terhune, Director of the California Department of Corrections, ("State") appeals the district court's grant of Brian Buckley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State's appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 . The district court did not afford the state court's determination of facts the appropriate level of deference. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court because it resulted from a misapplication of the strict standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996…