Evelyn Jenkins v. County of Riverside Kenneth B. Cohen, in His Official Capacity

Plaintiff-Appellant Evelyn Jenkins alleges, in this § 1983 suit, that Defendants Appellee County of Riverside (“the County”) deprived her of her property right in continued public employment in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when she was summarily terminated in 1998. A prior panel of this court concluded that Jenkins would prevail on such a claim so long as she was a “regular” employee at the time of her termination. See Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 25 Fed.Appx. 607, 609 (9th Cir. Jan.7, 2002) (un published decision) (Jenkins I) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). For the second time, this court is asked to determine whether Jenkins was a “regular” or “temporary” employee of the County as defined by sections l(t) and l(v), respectively, of County Ordinance 440, the “Riverside County Salary Ordinance.”

The first panel to consider this question held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Jenkins was “qualified” for regular employment within the County and remanded to the district court for further discovery. See id. at 610 . No other deficiency in the record was identified.…