Santos L. Reyes v. Jill Brown, Warden

California state prisoner Santos L. Reyes brought this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habe-as action challenging his sentence under California’s “Three Strikes” law. Reyes was convicted of perjury for making misrepresentations on a California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) driver’s license application. The perjury conviction was Reyes’ third strike. He was sentenced to twenty-six years to life. Reyes contends that his punishment violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The district court denied Reyes’ habeas petition. Because we conclude that the facts necessary to evaluate Reyes’ petition were not sufficiently developed before the district court — and, therefore, are not sufficiently developed in the record before us — we vacate the district court’s denial of Reyes’ petition and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

On September 18, 1997, Reyes entered the DMV on Waterman Avenue in San Bernardino, California. He purportedly filled out an application for a driver’s license under the name of his cousin, Miguel Soto, who purportedly knew how to drive but not how to read. Reyes signed the application, which purportedly stated that the…

dissenting:

In Ewing and Andrade, the United States Supreme Court fotmd that California Three Strikes sentences' at issue did not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 , 123 S.Ct. 1166 , 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003), Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). In its opinions, the Court allowed for the remote possibility of finding a statutory punishment unconstitutional when it is “grossly disproportionate.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73 , 123 S.Ct. 1166 ; see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the Eighth Amendment contains a narrow “proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court did not elaborate what types of violations' this exception might encompass, but warned that “it is applicable ‘only in the exceedingly rare and extreme case.’ ” Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72-73 , 123 S.Ct. 1166 ). This is not one of them. •

After the Court’s decisions in Ewing and Andrade , the Ninth Circuit quickly found such an exceedingly rare case in Ramirez.…

399 F.3d 964 Santos L. REYES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jill BROWN, * Warden, Respondent-Appellee. No. 00-57130. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted March 7, 2002. Submission Withdrawn April 2, 2002. Resubmitted April 17, 2003. Filed March 4, 2005. ** Gretchen Fusilier, Carlsbad, CA, for the petitioner-appellant. David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for the respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00608-VAP. Before: PREGERSON, FISHER and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 1 California state prisoner Santos L. Reyes brought this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas action challenging his sentence under California's "Three Strikes" law. Reyes was convicted of perjury for making misrepresentations on a California Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") driver's license application. The perjury conviction was Reyes' third strike. He was sentenced to twenty-six years to life. Reyes contends that his punishment violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The district…