Sally Marie McNeil v. Raymond L. Middleton Bill Lockyer

402 F.3d 920 Sally Marie McNEIL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Raymond L. MIDDLETON; Bill Lockyer, Respondents-Appellees. No. 01-56565. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. March 29, 2005. Charles R. Khoury, Jr., Wilton, NH, for the petitioner-appellant. Warren P. Robinson, Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for the respondent-appellee. On Remand from the United States Supreme Court. D.C. No. CV-99-01490-JM. Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge: 1 We fully outlined the background of this case in our first opinion, 1 and will not repeat all of its shocking details here. Suffice it to say that McNeil took a shotgun and fired it into the midsection of her husband while he was cooking. Not feeling that she had done enough damage, she then reloaded the weapon and shot him in the face. The first shot caused so much damage that his liver was protruding out of his skin; the second blew away much of the lower portion of his face. He died. 2 McNeil, who was, herself, an aggressive and violent person, asserted that she suffered from the effects of Battered Women's Syndrome ("BWS") and that, therefore, she had shotgunned her victim in an act…

Opinion by Judge FERNANDEZ. Dissenting Opinion by Judge PAEZ.

We fully outlined the background of this case in our first opinion, 1 and will not repeat all of its shocking details here. Suffice it to say that McNeil took a shotgun and fired it into the midsection of her husband while he was cooking. Not feeling that she had done enough damage, she then reloaded the weapon and shot him in the face. The first shot caused so much damage that his liver was protruding out of his skin; the second blew away much of the lower portion of his face. He died.

McNeil, who was, herself, an aggressive and violent person, asserted that she suffered from the effects of Battered Women’s Syndrome (“BWS”) and that, therefore, she had shotgunned her victim in an act of perfect self-defense. At the very least, she said, her actions were an instance of imperfect self-defense, which would make her guilty of voluntary manslaughter at worst. Each of those defenses requires that a woman have an actual belief in the need to defend herself. They differ in that perfect self-defense requires that the belief be reasonable, whereas for imperfect self-defense the belief must be unreasonable.

The trial judge…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

In my view, McNeil’s due process right to present a complete defense was violated when the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that the evidence of Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS) 1 could not be considered for the reasonableness of her belief in the need for self-defense. 2 McNeil’s sole defense to the murder charge was that she shot Ray in self-defense. To establish a claim of perfect self-defense, she had to show that her fear of imminent harm was both actual and reasonable. See People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th 1073 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142 , 921 P.2d 1, 6 (1996). To do so, she relied heavily on the BWS evidence. The trial court’s erroneous limiting instruction precluded McNeil from establishing the reasonableness of her belief — a critical element of her defense. Thus, the trial court deprived McNeil of her due process right to “be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1974); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d…