dissenting:

Prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit may now deliberately mislead judgés about matters that are of vital importance to our judicial system. In affirming the denial of Campbell’s habeas corpus petition, the majority ignores the factual record in this case, the prosecutor’s and the defense counsel’s deceptive maneuvering before trial, and Campbell’s Sixth Amendment right to select counsel of his choice.

I.

On the first day of Campbell’s trial, the state trial judge met in-chambers with Campbell’s retained counsel, Maureen McCann (“McCann”), and the Santa Clara County Deputy District Attorney Ralph Dixon (“Dixon”), who was prosecuting Campbell. Campbell was neither present at the in-chambers hearing nor was he informed of it.

The full extent of the in-chambers hearing went as follows:

In the span of less than a few minutes, Dixon (1) excluded Campbell from an in-chambers hearing that violated Campbell’s constitutional rights, (2) deliberately withheld from the trial judge material facts pertaining to McCann’s criminal history, and (3) colluded with McCann to deny Campbell the opportunity to consider retaining other counsel of his choice.

The record reveals several crucial facts concerning McCann’s criminal history that Dixon knew about yet deliberately withheld from the trial judge during the in-chambers hearing. McCann had been arrested for carrying a bag of methamphetamine as she passed through a metal detector facility at the San Martin Criminal Court of Justice in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11377(a). Upon being advised of her Miranda rights, she lied to the deputy sheriffs by telling them that she had found the bag on the .floor. Her previous criminal record revealed that she had been convicted of driving under the influence, that she was on probation, that she violated her probation, and that there was an outstanding bench warrant in the amount of $15,000 against her. Moreover, an assistant Attorney General had told the district attorney’s office that McCann was ineligible for diversion under California Penal Code § 1000(a)(4).because her probation had been revoked; 1 that is, Dixon had erroneously offered McCann diversion.

Dixon had a duty to disclose to the trial judge during the in-chambers hearing all the facts that he knew concerning McCann. 2 The Supreme Court has emphasized “the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.... ” ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (2002); accord ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-l.l(b) (3d. 1993) (“The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an advocate. The prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions.”); id. at 3.1-l(c) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict”); see also Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir.2005) (“The prosecuting attorney[’s] ... obligation is to govern impartially[,] *1175 ... to do justice[,] ... [and] ... to assure that the defendant has a fair and impartial trial”) (quoting Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir.1992) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir.1997) (en bane)).

A prosecutor, like all attorneys, also owes a duty of candor toward a court. In particular, “[i]n an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.” ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(4)(d) (2002) (emphasis added).

Dixon breached his duties as a prosecutor. He allowed the trial judge to assess McCann’s responsibilities to her client without the whole truth being before the court. McCann was arraigned on' the methamphetamine possession charge two days before Campbell’s trial was scheduled to begin,, so Dixon clearly knew of the outstanding charges against McCann. Dixon waited until the first day of trial, however, to “put [something] on the record.” This was calculated and not coincidental. He knew that a further delay in proceedings would less likely be granted by the trial judge on the day of the trial when all parties and witnesses were already present in the courtroom.

Lady Justice may be blind, but she does not wear earplugs. Every judge in the United States, if informed of the true and complete facts, would have inquired into the outstanding charges against McCann, probed Dixon further as to McCann’s eligibility for diversion, and, more importantly, called Campbell into the -chambers to discuss his counsel’s misconduct and to determine whether 1 Campbell wished tó be represented by other counsel at his trial. Dixon’s and McCann’s deceptive maneuvering prevented both the trial'judge from holding an honest and fair hearing and Campbell from becoming informed about his counsel’s criminal history and current legal problems.

II.

The majority does not deny that a due process violation occurred when Campbell was excluded from the in-chambers hearing, but contends that this violation was mere “trial error” subject to harmless error review not, rising to the level of “structural error” as defined by the Supreme Court. 3 The majority fails to recognize that the actual and obvious effect of the due process violation was to deliberately deprive Campbell of his constitutional right to seek other counsel of his choice— an error that is per se prejudicial, structural, and which requires automatic reversal. . '

*1176 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s choice of counsel. 4

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), the Supreme Court noted: “[I]t is hardly necessary to say that the right to counsél being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” See also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 , 75 S.Ct. 1 , 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954) (“[A] defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 , 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (“Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an accused should be respected”). Moreover, in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance of counsel comprehends the right to select counsel of one’s choice. 5 See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21-23 , 103 S.Ct. 1610 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing cases that protect a defendant’s right to choose his own counsel).

The deprivation of the right to select counsel of one’s choice is per se prejudicial. “Obtaining reversal for violation of [the] right [to select counsel of one’s choice] does not require á showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-68 , 104 S.Ct. 1051 , 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). 6 Moreover, Powell makes clear that a de *1177 fendant has a right to “a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” 287 U.S. at 58 , 53 S.Ct. 55 (emphasis added).

Campbell was not just denied the fair opportunity to secure other counsel of his choice by virtue of his exclusion from the hearing, he was denied the fair opportunity to obtain the very facts that would enable him to secure other counsel of his choice. Excluded' entirely from the in-chambers hearing, Campbell did not know of either the pending criminal charges against McCann or the fact that the same district attorney’s office was prosecuting both him and McCann. If Campbell had been present at the hearing and had been told what the record stated about McCann’s criminal history, he would have had the opportunity to consider choosing-different counsel. 7 The fact that the trial judge did hot expressly deprive Campbell of his right to secure counsel of his choice is of no consequence since Campbell’s exclusion from the in-chambers hearing effectively amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation. 8 In this case, the deprivation was particularly harmful because, had Campbell been informed of the relevant facts, he, like any reasonable defendant, would undoubtedly have chosen a more stable and reliable counsel who would not hide her criminal history and legal problems from him.

Paying heed to the Supreme Court’s recognition and protection of the constitutional right to select counsel of one’s choice, this Circuit has consistently held that a deprivation of this right is per se prejudicial. See Releford, 288 F.2d at 301; United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.1986); Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds, Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc); Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 . Other circuits have also held that denial of the right to select counsel of one’s choice may never be deemed harmless. See United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 (1st Cir.1987) (“The right to choose one’s counsel is an end in itself; its deprivation cannot - be [deemed] harmless”); United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1074 (3d Cir.1996) (“[Arbitrary denials of the right to counsel of choice mandate per se reversal”); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 281 (6th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of unreasonable or arbitrary interference with an accused’s right to- counsel of his choice ordinarily mandates reversal without a showing of prejudice”).

The California Court of Appeal’s decision denying Campbell relief, therefore, was contrary to and an unreasonable appli *1178 cation of Supreme Court precedent as demonstrated by Circuit law. 9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (explaining that the state court decision “was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable- application of this Court’s clearly established precedent”).

III.

This case is astonishing. The prosecutor deliberately prevented the trial judge from determining defense counsel’s true criminal history and current legal problems. This in turn prevented the trial judge from probing into whether the prosecutor and defense counsel were being honest with the court. It also prevented Campbell from obtaining basic information that would have enabled him to make an informed decision about whether to allow McCann to continue to represent him at his trial or seek new, unbiased defense counsel. Excluded from the in-chambers hearing, Campbell was unconstitutionally deprived of due process and as a result unconstitutionally denied his liberty and right to select other counsel of his choice. The error was per se prejudicial and structural as defined by the Supreme Court and four Circuits. Campbell’s habeas petition should therefore be granted. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. On March 15, 1996, approximately three weeks after Campbell was convicted, McCann's preliminary hearing was held in Santa Clara County Municipal Court. At the hearing, the deputy district attorney informed the court that, although his office has originally offered McCann diversion, he was revoking the offer because McCann was "not eligible for diversion.” McCann's counsel then explained that McCann had been on probation in San Diego for another offense, and that her probation had been revoked for "possibly failing to finish a drinking and driving program some six years ago.”

. From the transcript, it is of course evident that some off-the-record conversation took place between Dixon, McCann, and the trial judge prior to placing the matter on the record. But this conversation simply could not have revealed all the facts concerning McCann’s criminal history and current legal problems, which are central to the Fifth Amendment due process violation and Sixth Amendment violation of right to counsel of choice at issue in this case. To imply, as the majority does, that the trial judge somehow knew the whole truth concerning McCann and her ineligibility for diversion is to insult the state judge and state judiciary system.

. In Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987); the Supreme Court held that "a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at ány stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” If a defendant is denied his constitutional right to be present during a critical stage of criminal proceedings, Supreme Court precedent requires us to evaluate the nature of the error. Reversal is automatic if the defendant's absence constitutes a "structural error,” that is, an error that permeates "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end[,]” or "affect[s]--the framework within which the trial proceeds ...."Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (19.91). Trial errors,- oil the oth'er hand, are generally errors "[that] occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented....” Id. at 307-08 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 . Trial errprs, unlike structural errors, áre subject to harmléss error analysis.

. All circuits recognize the constitutional right to select counsel of choice. See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C.Cir.1978); United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1205-06 (1st Cir.1994); Lai nfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (3d Cir.1969); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir.1973); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir.1981); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 824-25 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir.1985); Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir.1961); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1501-02 (10th Cir.1988); In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 955-56 (11th Cir.2003).

. The right to choice of counsel applies only to persons who can afford to retain counsel. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 , 109 S.Ct. 2646 , 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989). The record clearly indicates that Campbell retained McCann as counsel.

. The majority makes two errors in its rebuttal to our dissent in footnote 3. First, it erroneously believes that the sole harm that Campbell could have suffered in this case was a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, which requires a showing of adverse effect by McCann’s performance. Under Flanagan , however, the deprivation of one’s right to select counsel of choice is prejudicial per se. 465 U.S. at 267-68 , 104 S.Ct. 1051 . Campbell was deprived of his right to select counsel of his choice as a direct consequence of being excluded from the in-chambers hearing, which is a Fifth Amendment due. process violation separate and distinct from a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest. The majority states that our analysis would apply "anytime a defendant’s attorney had a conflict of interest.” Obviously, it misses the point. Our analysis applies when the state violates the defendant’s constitutional rights by depriving him of material information essential to the exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights, as it did here by engaging in a willful due process violation. The majority appears to see no problem with the State interfering with a defendant's right to select counsel of his choice even though the Supreme Court has made it clear that the client alone can exercise it. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ("It is the defendant ... who must be free ... to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. Personal liberties are not rooted in the *1177 law of averages. The right to defend is personal. . The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction”).

Second, the majority misleadingly' asserts: "McCann was an attorney retained by [Campbell,] and [Campbell] made no request that she be replaced or that another attorney be permitted to substitute for her.” Campbell did not make such a request because neither Dixon nor McCann, revealed the complete facts concerning McCann's criminal- history and current legal problems. How could Campbell have made a request to retain substitute counsel without knowing such vital information about his current counsel?

. "An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 .

. Nor' can it be said that Dixon or McCann were constitutionally permitted to determine for Campbell whether to retain other counsel. See id., 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 .

. Although a state court decision may not be overturned on habeas review merely because the decision conflicts with decisions of any court other than the United States Supreme Court, other authorities may be persuasive for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court law. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1999); see also Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir.2002) (refer-enees to lower court decisions "may be especially helpful when the governing Supreme Court precedent articulates a broad principle that applies to a wide' variety of factual patterns”). Here, Circuit law demonstrates the broad principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Flanagan concerning the per se prejudicial effect of the denial of the right to select counsel of one’s choice.