dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the denial of Strobehn’s insufficient evidence claim. Section 2113(e) increases the minimum penalty for bank robbery from no minimum to ten years imprisonment for certain aggravating conduct — killing or forced accompaniment without consent. The question here is what conduct qualifies as forced accompaniment under § 2113(e) and thereby subjects the defendant to the significantly harsher minimum penalty that the provision mandates. There is little direct authority in the Ninth Circuit. However, the first circuit to address this question, the Tenth Circuit, held that Congress intended for § 2113(e)’s significant sentence enhancement to apply only to bank robbers who engaged in significantly aggravating conduct — as opposed to any forced accompaniment regardless of sub-stantiality or culpability. United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.1973). In addition, Judge Tashima, while a district court judge, decided United States v. Sanchez, 782 F.Supp. 94 (C.D.Cal.1992) (Tashima, J.). He concluded that “kidnapping under § 2113(e) requires asportation of the victim that is not insubstantial” and held that forcibly moving a bank teller from behind her desk toward the bank’s exit did not suffice. Id. at 97. Similarly, I conclude that moving a guard to a place where he can be watched while one robs a bank is so integral a part of the underlying crime that it should not be used for enhancement.

A review of cases discussing § 2113(e) suggests that courts long understood the *1023 forced accompaniment clause of § 2113(e) to encompass only aggravating conduct akin to kidnapping or hostage-taking. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 281 F.2d 230, 232-33 (10th Cir.1960) (“The kidnapping statute, Subsection 2113(e) ... was undoubtedly designed to provide a more severe penalty ... for the bank robber who kidnaps to avoid apprehension for the commission of the offense of robbery....”); Marx, 485 F.2d at 1186 (concluding § 2113(e) incorporates elements of kidnapping “similar to those under the common law and the federal kidnapping statute”); United States v. McGhee, 488 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir.1974) (noting that the necessary elements of a § 2113(e) offense are “(1) the taking of a hostage (2) in the course of committing some other § 2113 offense”); United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir.1982) (“The ‘essential elements’ of subsection (e) are the commission of a robbery and the killing or kidnapping in connection with it.”).

The majority dismisses these numerous references to § 2113(e) as the “killing and kidnapping” statute, asserting that the courts have simply used terms such as “kidnapping” and “taking of a hostage” as short hand for forced accompaniment and implying that § 2113(e) “plainly” applies to any forced accompaniment, no matter how slight. 1 However, the “killing and kidnapping” label is not mere judicial shorthand: subsection (e) was originally codified as 12 U.S.C. § 588c and entitled, “killing or kidnapping as incident to robbery.” 12 U.S.C. § 588c (1940); see also Barkdoll v. United States, 147 F.2d 617 (9th Cir.1945) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 588c); S.Rep.No.537, 73d Cong.2d Sess. (1934) (using the terms “homicide or kidnaping” to describe the statute).

Moreover, the meaning of § 2113(e) is not as “plain” as the majority would have it: as Judge Tashima noted, the statute is actually silent regarding the requisite degree of forced accompaniment. Sanchez, 782 F.Supp. at 96-97 (“ § 2113(e) does not tell us, on its face, what its asportation requirement is.”); see also United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir.1994) (“Section 2113(e) does not expressly set forth how extensive the accompaniment must be to prove this aggravated form of bank robbery.”). Although it may seem simpler to read the word “any” into the language of § 2113(e) and assume that the Legislature intended for the enhancement to apply to “any” forced accompaniment, “[i]t is incorrect to make assumptions on congressional intent from Congress’s silence on the issue.... ” CHW West Bay v. Thompson, 246 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir.2001). Section 2113(e) does not state that it applies to “any” forced accompaniment more plainly than it states that it applies to “substantial” forced accompaniment. Cf. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7 , 119 S.Ct. 966 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (explaining that statutory phrase, “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily *1024 harm,” could describe conditional intent, unconditional intent, or both).; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (contrasting statutes that clearly indicate Congressional intent with statutes that are “silent or ambiguous” with respect to a specific issue).

The majority not only errs by creating “plain meaning” out of silence, it also errs by failing to consider § 2113(e) in context. “Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 , 113 S.Ct. 2050 , 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993); see also Holloway, 526 U.S. at 7 , 119 S.Ct. 966 (“As we have repeatedly stated, the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir.1996) (same). “Context in this regard relates to ‘the design of the statute as a whole and its object and policy.’ ” Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 , 111 S.Ct. 840 , 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991) (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 , 110 S.Ct. 997 , 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990)); see also United States v. Bahe, 201 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir.2000).

Here, consideration of “not only the bare meaning of the critical word or phrase but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme,” Holloway, 526 U.S. at 6 , 119 S.Ct. 966 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), supports the conclusion that Congress intended § 2113(e) to enhance the sentence only in cases involving substantial forced accompaniment.

First, § 2113(e) imposes the same minimum punishment for forced accompaniment without consent as it imposes for homicide, which suggests that “forced accompaniment” must refer to conduct that is comparable in degree of culpability to homicide.

Second, § 2113 creates a scale of increasingly serious crimes and corresponding increasingly severe penalties. See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2005), see also United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir.1974) (“We are of the opinion that subsection (d) ... and subsection (e) insofar as it deals with homicide or kidnaping occurring in committing [bank robbery] each prescribes a more severe punishment for the substantive offense defined elsewhere in section 2113 ....”); Clark, 281 F.2d at 233 (finding that § 2113(e) was intended “to create a separate, distinct and more serious offense for which an additional and more severe penalty was authorized”). Specifically, subsections (a) and (b) of § 2113 establish the crime of bank robbery; under § 2113(a), the penalty for bank robbery by “force and violence” or “intimidation” is a fine and/or imprisonment up to twenty years. 2 Subsection (d) enhances the sentence for bank robbery aggravated by assault, endangerment of a life, or use of a dangerous weapon, increasing the maximum prison sentence to twenty-five years (but leaving the minimum prison sentence at zero). Subsection (e) further enhances the sentence for bank robbery aggravated by killing or forced accompaniment, increasing the minimum prison sentence from zero to ten years, and authorizing the death penalty if death results. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2005).

*1025 The fact that subsection (e) prescribes a substantially more severe punishment for bank robbery than subsection (d) is evidence that Congress intended for subsection (e) to reach conduct substantially more egregious than that which is reached by subsection (d). Cf. Thompson, 82 F.3d at 853 (concluding that offense of using firearm equipped with silencer during and in relation to drug trafficking crime required active employment of such a firearm because “Congress could not have intended to impose a five-year penalty only if a drug trafficker actively employed a firearm, but mandate a 20-year sentence if that same defendant happened to own a compatible silencer that played no role in the predicate crime”).

The legislative history and purpose of § 2113(e) confirms what is evident from reading the provision in context. See Small v. United States, — U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 1756-58 , 161 L.Ed.2d 651 (2005) (construing statute based on language, context, history, and purpose). As the Tenth Circuit concluded, “the legislative history [of § 2113(e) ] suggests it was enacted to combat the multitude of murders and kidnappings occurring during attempts by bank robbers to flee the scene of the crime.” Marx, 485 F.2d at 1186 .

For example, the House adopted the following description of the bank robbery statute:

H.R.Rep. No.1461, 73d Cong.2d Sess. (1934) (quoting statement of Attorney General to the Committee on the Judiciary) (emphasis added); see also S.Rep.No.537, 73d Cong.2d Sess. (1934) (quoting similar language from a Department of Justice memorandum).

If any doubt remains that Congress had only substantial forced accompaniment in mind when it created the “killing and kidnapping” provision, examination of the statute’s original language should eliminate it: § 2113(e) originally authorized the death penalty for bank robbery involving forced accompaniment without consent— even in cases where the forced accompaniment did not cause the death of a victim. See 12 U.S.C. § 588c (1940) (“Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section ... kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten years, or by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct.”); see also H.R.Rep. No.1461, 73d Cong.2d Sess. (1934) (“If murder or kidnaping be committed in connection therewith the penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 years to life, or death if the jury shall so direct in the verdict.” (emphasis added)). 3 The fact that the original version of § 2113(e) authorized the most severe penalty for bank robbery involving forced accompaniment, and essentially equated forced accompaniment with killing, confirms that Congress intended § 2113(e) to reach only forced accompaniment that significantly increases the culpability of the underlying crime, i.e., conduct akin to kidnapping or hostage-taking. Conversely, Congress could not have intended to *1026 authorize such a severe penalty enhancement for insubstantial asportation or forced movement inherent to the underlying crime. 4

It is true that other circuits have construed § 2113(e) to broadly encompass any forced accompaniment. Maj. Op. at 1020 - 1021 (citing United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 239 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277 (7th Cir.1995); and United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111 (4th Cir.2004)). However, these courts, like the majority, interpreted § 2113(e) acontextually and without the requisite inquiry into Congressional intent.

The majority also cites United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.1994); however, it is worth noting that the Reed court neither found the meaning of § 2113(e) to be plain nor held that § 2113(e) applies to any forced accompaniment. Rather, the Fifth Circuit explained that

26 F.3d at 527-28 . I agree. I part ways with the Fifth Circuit only where it holds that forced movement across a bank’s threshold is per se “accompaniment” under § 2113(e).

Drawing such a bright line between movement within a bank and movement across a bank’s threshold is not only arbitrary, but also risks both underbreadth and overbreadth. On the one hand, this threshold-crossing test reaches Strobehn’s conduct, despite the fact that there is little meaningful distinction between forcing a security guard to move inside a bank and forcing a security guard to move 15 feet within a bank. On the other hand, the test excludes some truly aggravating conduct, such as that at issue in United States v. Bauer: in that case, the bank robber actually took hostages in an escape attempt, but he never left the bank with them because the police presence outside was overwhelming. 956 F.2d at 241-42 .

For these reasons, Judge Tashima’s approach, which weighs duration, distance, and increase in danger to the victim, makes more sense. Sanchez, 782 F.Supp. at 97 (“The substantiality of the asportation, although there can be no bright line, should be measured by duration, distance and any change in environment tending to increase the danger to which the victim is exposed, other than any danger inherent in the underlying offense.”). This approach captures truly aggravating forced accompaniment — -whether the robber crosses the bank’s threshold or not — but avoids the danger of turning nearly every bank robbery that involves some movement orchestrated by the robber into the most egre *1027 gious (and most harshly punished) form of aggravated bank robbery.

Under the Sanchez approach, the forced accompaniment committed by Strobehn is not sufficiently substantial to support a conviction under § 2113(e). Strobehn forced the guard to move inside the bank and lie down on the floor, that is, to move into a position from which he could be more easily watched. Strobehn did not take the guard hostage, use him as a shield, or threaten the guard’s life in order to coerce others. Thus, the asportation was relatively short in duration and distance, and, more importantly, it did not tend to increase the danger to which the guard was exposed beyond that inherent in the underlying offense. Here, as in Sanchez , “there was significant danger to the victim ... by the presence of the [weapon], but that danger was present by virtue of the [underlying] § 2113(d) offense, assault by the use of a dangerous weapon, and not by reason of any trivial movement over a distance of 15 feet.” Id. at 96; see also Marx, 485 F.2d at 1186 (finding insufficient asportation where the defendants caught the bank manager victim outside his home and forced him to go inside as well as forced the victim and his family to move from room to room).

The only construction of § 2113(e) that is consistent with Congressional intent, as evinced by the statute’s language, context, history, and purpose, is one that requires substantial forced accompaniment. Because Strobehn was also convicted under § 2113(d) for endangering the life of another by the use of a dangerous weapon in the course of a bank robbery, the district court was already authorized by Congress to give Strobehn a significantly enhanced prison sentence. Like forcing a teller to move to another station or a bank customer to lie down on the floor, forcing the guard to move inside and lie down on the bank floor was an integral part of the underlying crime. This forced movement did not significantly aggravate the underlying crime of armed bank robbery. Stro-behn should not have been subject to the more severe penalty mandated by § 2113(e) on the basis of that conduct alone.

. I realize that the majority now notes in response to my dissent that it does not decide "whether less substantial movement would suffice in a different case.” Maj. Op. at 1020 n. 1. Perhaps, then, it would be more accurate for me to say that the majority suggests that § 2113(e) " 'plainly' applies to any forced accompaniment, or at least that which is more than slight." However, the "plain language” of § 2113(e) does not say "more than slight forced accompaniment” or "more than de minimus forced accompaniment” just as it does not say "any forced accompaniment” or "substantial forced accompaniment.” In other words — by acknowledging that the scope of § 2113(e) must be determined, the majority proves my point: The scope of § 2113(e) is ambiguous, and we must determine whether Congress intended to reach "any,” "more than de minimus," or "substantial” forced accompaniment. For the reasons stated herein, I am persuaded that Congress intended to reach only substantial forced accompaniment.

. Subsection (a) addresses bank robbery "by force and violence, or by intimidation” while subsection (b) addresses bank robbery without force. Subsection (c) establishes criminal liability for any person who "receives, possesses, conceals,” etc. any thing of value obtained in the course of a bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 .

. Congress amended § 2113(e) in 1994 by striking "or punished by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct” and inserting "or if death results shall be punished by death or life imprisonment”. Pub.L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat 1796.

. Even if one is not completely persuaded by the evidence that Congress intended for § 2113(e) to apply only to substantial forced accompaniment, the rule of lenity weighs in favor of the narrower construction: we must "not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 , 100 S.Ct. 2247 , 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)); see also United States v. Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir.2003).