United States v. Willie Russell, Jr., A/K/A Wild Bill
Opinion
Opinion
436 F.3d 1086 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie RUSSELL, Jr., a/k/a Wild Bill, Defendant-Appellant. No. 04-10681. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted November 15, 2005. Filed January 30, 2006. Quin Denvir, Federal Defender, Sacramento, CA, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant. William S. Wong, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, argued the cause for the appellee. McGregor W. Scott, United States Attorney, was on the brief. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-04-00054-LKK. Before: O'SCANNLAIN, THOMAS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge. 1 This case requires us to consider whether the emergency doctrine or implied consent can support a warrantless search of a home on suspicion that a 9-1-1 caller or lurking predator was inside. 2 * On Saturday, December 23, 2003, Willie Russell, Jr., placed two calls to the Sacramento Sheriff's Office (SSO) 9-1-1 dispatcher. In the first emergency call, Russell identified himself as "Gregory Hines," and explained to the operator that a…
Lead Opinion
O'Scannlain, J.
This case requires us to consider whether the emergency doctrine or implied consent can support a warrantless search of a home on suspicion that a 9-1-1 caller or lurking predator was inside.
I
On Saturday, December 23, 2003, Willie Russell, Jr., placed two calls to the Sacramento Sheriffs Office (SSO) 9-1-1 dispatcher. In the first emergency call, Russell identified himself as “Gregory Hines,” and explained to the operator that a gun went off and hit him in the foot, that he was wounded and in pain, and that he wanted the dispatcher to call an ambulance. The transcript of the first call shows that the Fire Dispatcher and the SSO Dispatcher were confused as to whether the caller had been shot, or had shot himself. After Russell’s call was disconnected, the SSO Dispatcher said to the Fire Dispatcher “[the caller] didn’t really confirm that he shot himself. He just said a ‘gun went off.’ ” Each patrol car contained a mounted computer system and monitor, known as a “Mobile Data Terminal,” which allows field officers to receive *1088 information pertinent to their calls through a “Computer Aided Dispatch,” or CAD, which updates text provided by 9-1-1 dispatchers on screens in the…
Concurrence in Part
Thomas, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that an Ameline remand is appropriate in this case. However, I respectfully disagree that the emergency doctrine justified a warrantless search.
The emergency doctrine is a very limited and specific exception to the require *1094 ment that a search warrant be obtained before searching a private residence. “[Pjhysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 , 92 S.Ct. 2125 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). For that reason, “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Id. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371 . As the Supreme Court noted in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978):
Id. at 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).
We have defined two “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement: exigency and emergency. United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th…