Brian A. Buckley v. C.A. Terhune, Director of the California Department of Corrections

441 F.3d 688 Brian A. BUCKLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.A. TERHUNE, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellant. No. 03-55045. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted September 27, 2005. Filed March 17, 2006. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Allen Bloom, San Diego, CA, for the petitioner-appellee. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General; Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Noah P. Hill, Deputy Attorney General; Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. J. Spencer Letts, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-02435-JSL. Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, STEPHEN REINHARDT, ALEX KOZINSKI, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, KIM McLANE WARDLAW, RAYMOND C. FISHER, RICHARD A. PAEZ, MARSHA S. BERZON, RICHARD C. TALLMAN, JAY S. BYBEE, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. REINHARDT, Circuit Judge. 1 The law regarding plea agreements entered into in state court is well-established. They must be construed in accordance with state law.…

The law regarding plea agreements entered into in state court is well-established. They must be construed in accordance with state law. In California, plea agreements are construed in the same manner as all other contracts. In this case, however, the California courts failed to do so and, as a result, Brian Buckley might have remained in prison for life instead of for the fifteen years for which he bargained. We are required to ensure that his constitutional rights are not so violated, and that the bargain he entered into with the state is honored.

*691 The state appeals the district court’s order granting Buckley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directing that he be released from prison because he had already served the full fifteen years. The district court ruled that the state court’s finding that Buckley “well knew” that his sentence for second degree murder was fifteen years to life was both contrary to clearly established federal law in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and an unreasonable determination of the facts in violation of § 2254(d)(2). In accordance with the district court’s order, Buckley has now been released. We affirm the judgment of the district…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The majority notes the standard for relief set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , but then substitutes its factual findings for those of the state court. Although the majority professes to grant relief under § 2254(d)(1), holding that the state court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, my reading of its opinion is that it actually, and incorrectly, concludes that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2).

The majority’s perspective rests on two premises. First, it asserts that it was established federal law in 1999, that the construction and interpretation of plea agreements were matters of state law and that in California a plea agreement was interpreted according to the same rules as other contracts. Second, the majority concludes that under California law, the uncertainty in the plea agreement requires that the agreement be construed against the state.

I agree with the majority that the construction and interpretation of plea agreements are matters of state law, that in…