ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND AMENDED OPINION AND AMENDED DISSENT

ORDER

The Opinion filed December 27, 2005, and appearing at 432 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005), is hereby amended, as follows:

1. On slip opinion page 16708, and appearing at 432 F.3d at 1014 , the heading “a. Equitable Tolling ” and the following five paragraphs are deleted and the following heading and paragraphs substituted:

a. Equitable Exception

An individual plaintiff must first file a timely EEOC complaint against the allegedly discriminatory party before bringing an ADA suit in federal court. See EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th *1054 Cir.1994). Because California is a “deferral” state, the claim must be filed within 300 days of the claimed event of discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (2003). The filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit, but is a requirement subject to equitable doctrines such as waiver and tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 , 102 S.Ct. 1127 , 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982).

An equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement is available when an EEOC representative misleads the plaintiff concerning his claim. See Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 901-02 (9th Cir.2001). Such relief may be granted to a plaintiff who:

Id. at 902 .

While Josephs’ EEOC claim was not filed within 300 days of his termination, these factors all favor the application of an equitable exception to the EEOC claim. Josephs diligently pursed his claim by going to the EEOC office shortly after his termination. He was pro se at the time and was misled by the EEOC representative, Holmes, who told Josephs that he needed to retain counsel before filing a claim. Following the advice of Holmes, Josephs retained counsel, but by the time the EEOC responded to counsel’s inquiries, the time for filing the claim had expired.

PacBell argues that Josephs’ affidavit, which describes his dealings with the EEOC, is a “self-serving” statement that cannot form the basis for an equitable exception. We rejected an identical argument in Rodriguez: “self-serving affidavits are cognizable ... so long as they state facts based on personal knowledge and are not too conclusory.” Id.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding an equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement for Josephs’ EEOC complaint.

2. On slip opinion page 16712-13, and appearing at 432 F.3d at 1016-17 , the paragraph beginning with “PacBell’s final argument” is deleted and the following paragraphs substituted:

PacB ell’s final argument challenges the jury’s finding that Josephs was qualified for the service technician position. Pac-Bell argues that Josephs’ past violent acts made him unqualified for the position, while the dissent asserts that, in assessing his qualifications, the jury had no opportunity to consider Josephs’ potential dangerousness to PacBell customers. As a preliminary matter, we note that the ADA allows an employer to adopt a job qualification standard that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the work place. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (b) (2005); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r) (2005); see also, Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1258-59 (9th Cir.2001). Therefore, unquestionably, PacBell properly required that its service technicians be safe in customers’ homes. PacBell does not complain on appeal that it was prevented from presenting whatever evidence it deemed relevant on the subject of Josephs’ qualifications, including its perception that he might be a danger to customers. It is a factual question for the jury whether PacBell’s perception was unfounded. See Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1443-44 (9th Cir.1996) (issue of fact for jury whether an employee’s dangerousness could be foreseen). The issue for us to decide is only whether the jury’s *1055 finding that Josephs was, in fact, not dangerous, is supported by the record.

As detailed above, Question 3 of the special verdict form asked: “Was plaintiff a qualified individual who could satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the Service Technician position?” The jury answered “Yes.” When answering Question 3 affirmatively, the jury knew that customer contact, in customers’ homes, was an important and integral function of the Service Technician position; trustworthiness in that context was a basic qualification for the job. Before making its determination that Josephs was qualified, the jury was instructed that an employer may take into account a past history of violence in making employment-related hiring decisions.

Josephs did not come to work for Pac-Bell until about 16 years after his violent act, about 15 years after his plea of not guilty by reasons of insanity, and about 12 years after his release from a mental institution. The jury knew that, before being hired by PacBell, Josephs worked successfully for Cox Communications for a decade; as a Repair Service Technician for Cox, he entered thousands of customers’ homes without incident. The jury knew that Josephs performed his job duties well at PacBell, too. The jury heard Maches’ testimony that Josephs was performing well on the job and that Maches considered Josephs a potential asset to PacBell. When the jury found that Josephs was “qualified” and that he satisfied all “job-related requirements,” it necessarily found that he could be trusted in customers’ homes and was presently mentally stable, not dangerous.

The jury also heard evidence that Pac-Bell was willing to assess present dangerousness objectively when the employee was not mentally ill or perceived to be so. For example, the jury heard evidence that PacBell had reinstated one service technician who had a felony domestic violence conviction.

It is undisputed that, if a person ivere in fact untrustworthy or dangerous in customers’ homes, for whatever reason, the person would not be qualified. The jury simply found, based on the evidence, the Josephs was, in fact, safe and qualified, and that PacBell’s fears were objectively unreasonable and based on a discriminatory, incorrect assumption. 5

3. On slip opinion pages 16714-15, and appearing at 432 F.3d at 1018 , the three consecutive paragraphs beginning with “PacBell first argues” are deleted and the following substituted:

PacBell first argues that the district court “gave only the first part of the mixed motive instruction, imposing liability if plaintiffs ‘regarded as’ disability was ‘a motivating factor,’ without including the second part — in effect defendant’s affirmative defense [that it would have terminated plaintiff for other reasons anyway].” 7 PacBell asserts that these instructions violate Supreme Court precedent in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 , 124 S.Ct. 513 , 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003).

*1056 In Price Waterhouse , the Supreme Court set forth the “respective burdens of proof of a defendant and plaintiff in a suit under Title VII when it has been shown that an employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.” Id. at 232 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the statute required the plaintiff to show “but-for causation” for the employment decision, holding that the plaintiff could meet her burden of proof by simply showing that the employer “relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.” Id. at 242 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . The defendant then had an affirmative defense if it could prove that “even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person.” Id. Thus, “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.” Id. at 244-45 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 (footnote omitted).

Here, while the jury instructions included the term “motivating factor,” that term, as defined in the instructions, required Josephs to show “but-for” causation. The jury was specifically told that “a motivating factor” was “something that moves the will and induces action.” In addition, the jury was instructed that Josephs had to prove that PacBell would not have made the same decision but for his “regarded as” disability. Therefore, Josephs had a heavier burden of proof than that required by Price Waterhouse . Moreover, in rendering a verdict for Josephs, the jury necessarily decided that PacBell would not have refused to reinstate Josephs for other reasons.

The amended Opinion will be filed concurrently with this Order.

With the Opinion as amended, Judges Leavy and Graber have voted to deny the Petition for Rehearing, Judge Graber has voted to deny the Petition for Rehearing En Banc, and Judge Leavy so recommends. Judge Callahan has voted to grant the Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc.

The full court has been advised of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc and no Judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35.

The Petition for Rehearing and the Petition for Rehearing En Banc are denied.

No further petitions for rehearing or for rehearing en banc will be entertained by this court.

OPINION

In this appeal we must resolve issues arising from the employment discrimination action brought against Pacific Bell Telephone Company (PacBell) by a former service technician, Joshua Liam Josephs. After the jury rendered a verdict for Josephs on his claim alleging that PacBell’s decision to deny him reinstatement violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (ADA), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (FEHA), the district court entered judgment against PacBell. PacBell now appeals on grounds that the district court erred in failing to grant it judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. PacBell also contends that the district court made two erroneous evidentiary rulings and two errors in jury instructions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

In late 1997, Josephs applied for a service technician position with PacBell. Ser *1057 vice technicians perform unsupervised, in-home telephone installation or repair. Josephs had been employed for ten years in a similar position with Cox Communications. Josephs checked “NO” in answer to PacBell’s employment application question, “Have you ever been convicted of, or are you awaiting trial for a felony or misdemeanor?” He was hired for the position in January 1998.

Under California Penal Code § 11105(c)(9), PacBell is authorized to obtain the detailed criminal history of employees who will have unsupervised access to customers’ homes. After Josephs had been working for approximately three months, PacBell obtained his criminal history. Following some initial internal confusion as to the contents of the report, PacBell determined that Josephs had been arrested in 1982 for attempted murder and was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and that Josephs had been convicted in 1985 for a 1982 misdemeanor battery on a police officer.

PacBell suspended Josephs pending further investigation. It confirmed the charge of attempted murder, the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the 1985 misdemeanor conviction. PacBell also learned that Josephs had been committed to and had spent two and one-half years in a California state mental hospital between 1982 and 1985, then spent six months in a board-and-care mental health facility, was released from parole on July 30,1986, and had changed his name following his release.

Josephs’ immediate supervisor at Pac-Bell, Steve Maches, testified at trial that during the suspension he had recommended Josephs be restored to his position because Josephs was performing well and would probably be an asset to PacBell. However, Maches also testified that his supervisor, Robert Shive, told him that Shive wanted to eliminate the possibility of having someone in the business that had an “emotional dysfunction” that might cause “this type of behavior.” Ultimately, PacBell notified Josephs on April 23, 1998, that he was discharged “due to fraudulent entries on your application, in that you attempted to withhold information concerning his [sic] past” and that “this was a willful attempt, and a direct violation of [PacBell’s] Code of Conduct, which is not tolerated by long term employees as well as newly hired ones.”

Josephs filed a grievance with PacBell seeking reinstatement of his employment. PacBell’s collective bargaining agreement with the Service Technician’s union provided for a three-step grievance process. Linda Sexton, the union representative, testified at trial that at Step I, she was told that the reason for Josephs’ termination was his failure to disclose his misdemeanor conviction and name change. She testified that during Step II, Jeff Smith, general manager for the San Diego labor force, expressed concerns about employing someone with Josephs’ “background” to work in people’s homes because he might “go off’ on a customer. Sexton suggested that Josephs be given a different job at PacBell, such as a splicer, which didn’t involve customer contact. Smith responded by stating “people can still walk by,” and that “under the advisement of legal, ... they were not going to bring someone like that back ... they had an image to uphold.” Sexton asked Smith whether Josephs could have his misdemeanor conviction expunged and be reinstated, as had happened with other PacBell employees. Smith did not answer.

Josephs’ misdemeanor battery conviction was expunged a month before the Step III grievance proceeding. Sexton testified that she told Augie Cruciotti, a PacBell vice-president attending the Step III proceeding, of the expungement and *1058 argued that Josephs should be treated similarly to an employee who had been reinstated after his conviction was expunged. Cruciotti distinguished Josephs’ situation, stating several times that, unlike the other employee, Josephs had spent time in a “mental ward,” and that PacBell could not afford to have people out there who had been released from a mental institution. After the final Step III meeting, on November 23, 1998, Cruciotti denied reinstatement with no opportunity to reapply-

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On November 30, 1998, Josephs went to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) office and completed paperwork to file a charge of discrimination. He was told by an EEOC employee, Ron Holmes, to have his attorney contact the EEOC after he retained counsel. Holmes did not file a charge of discrimination on behalf of Josephs nor did he refer Josephs’ case to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). After Josephs retained counsel in February 1999, counsel unsuccessfully attempted to contact Holmes. In April 1999, counsel was informed by the EEOC’s Raul Green that Holmes had retired without processing Josephs’ paperwork, but that his complaint would be considered filed as of November 30, 1998. Josephs filed a complaint with DFEH on April 22,1999.

The complaint filed with the EEOC describes Josephs’ April 23rd termination, but not the grievance process. However, Josephs’ supporting affidavit, also filed with the EEOC, describes PacBell’s refusal to reinstate him. The complaint filed with DFEH alleges that Josephs was “terminated” because of a mental disability but does not discuss PacBell’s refusal to reinstate him. Both the DFEH and EEOC issued Josephs right-to-sue notices without further investigation.

DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Josephs then brought this action claiming unlawful termination of employment and unlawful refusal to reinstate in violation of the ADA and FEHA based on allegations that PacBell both terminated and refused to reinstate him because they regarded him as mentally disabled. At trial, Josephs introduced, over the objection of PacBell, evidence of the statements made by Smith and Cruciotti during his grievance proceedings and evidence of PacBell’s treatment of three other employees who, like Josephs, had been terminated for failure to disclose prior criminal convictions on their employment applications but, unlike Josephs, had been reinstated or offered a conditional reinstatement. One employee had a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, one had a petty theft conviction, and one had a felony domestic violence battery conviction.

Josephs’ testimony at trial detailed his mental health problems leading up to the attempted murder and commitment to the state mental hospital, his treatment and recovery, and his employment with Cox Communications and PacBell. Cross-examination of Josephs focused on whether his mental health problems were caused by illegal drug use and whether he had intentionally lied on his PacBell application. Josephs also introduced his autobiography into evidence, which had been written during his stay in the state mental hospital and described his childhood and mental illness. Josephs had provided PacBell employees a copy of the autobiography during the grievance proceedings.

PacBell’s in-house lawyer, Karen Haub-rich, testified at trial that she believed that “somebody who has attempted to kill another individual should not be in a service technician position.” While she testified that she had discussed this belief *1059 with Smith as she advised him during the Step II grievance process, she did not discuss with him whether Josephs, in particular, should be employed in a position with unsupervised access to customers’ homes. Haubrich testified that she and Smith had discussed the fact that Josephs was properly terminated for failure to reveal the conviction or his name change on his employment application. According to Haubrich’s testimony, when she advised Cruciotti during the Step III grievance process, their discussions focused primarily on Josephs’ lack of honesty in his application.

On cross-examination, Haubrich admitted looking up and discussing with various PacBell employees news coverage of Josephs’ 1985 release from the state mental hospital. This material included newspaper reports, introduced at trial, that Josephs had been under psychiatric care and counseling at the hospital and had been a “mentally disordered offender.”

As framed by Josephs and PacBell in closing arguments, the determinative issue before the jury was whether PacBell refused to reinstate Josephs because it regarded him as having 8899 a mental illness that might result in future acts of violence or because of the violent acts he had previously committed.

The jury was instructed that to render a verdict for Josephs on his claim for discrimination in the reinstatement process, it had to affirmatively answer four questions:

1. Did Pacific Bell regard plaintiff as having a mental disorder at the time of his termination or non-reinstatement?

2. Did Pacific Bell regard plaintiff as having a long-term mental disorder which substantially limited his ability to work in a broad range of jobs?

3. Was plaintiff a qualified individual who could satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the Service Technician position?

5. Did Pacific Bell refuse to agree to reinstate plaintiff in the grievance settlement process because of his regarded as disability? 1

The district court further instructed the jury that “[a]n employer may take into account a past history of violence in making employment-related hiring decisions.” The district court also gave two mixed motive jury instructions:

PacBell objected to the mixed-motive instruction as given, arguing that it should be followed by an instruction that “even if you find regarded as disability was a motivating factor, the employer will not be liable for the termination if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated Plaintiff for other reasons anyway.”

*1060 During its deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of the phrase “because of’ in question 4, “Did Pacific Bell discharge plaintiff because of his regarded as disability?” 2 The jury stated: “We are struggling to determine if ‘because of is to be interpreted as ‘the sole reason’ or is it possible to be combined with other factors as we reach our decision of ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ ” The district court referred the jury to Jury Instruction No. 27, stating that “the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs ‘regarded as’ disability was a motivating factor in the discharge — a factor that moves the will and induces and determines the action, even though other matters may have contributed to the taking of the action.”

The jury determined by special verdict that PacBell’s termination of Josephs was nondiscriminatory. However, the jury determined that PacBell refused to reinstate Josephs because it regarded him as mentally disabled in violation of the ADA. The jury awarded Josephs compensatory damages. On April 30, 2003, PacBell moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. The district court denied the motions, and PacBell timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law/New Trial

PacBell contends that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) a claim for discriminatory refusal to reinstate is not separately actionable under the ADA or FEHA; (2) Josephs had not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to his reinstatement claim; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s findings that Josephs’ “condition” was covered by the ADA, that this condition limited a major life activity, and that Josephs was qualified for the position of service technician.

1. Claim for Discriminatory Refusal to Reinstate

PacBell argues that, under Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir.1975), a plea by an employee to be reinstated simply “seeks to redress the original termination” and is, therefore, not separately actionable. This is an issue of law that we review de novo. Harper v. U.S. Seafoods, 278 F.3d 971 , 973 (9th Cir. 2002).

Collins is distinguishable from the facts of Josephs’ claim because “new elements of unfairness, not existing at the time of the original violation, attached to denial of re-employment.” Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554, 561-62 (9th Cir.1977). Here, Josephs asserted and the jury found that PacBell’s denial of reinstatement was based on just such a “new element of unfairness,” the perception that he was mentally ill. While Inda involved a denial of reemployment, rather than a failure to reinstate, its holding is not limited to a particular employment action.

Therefore, we join the First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and expressly recognize discriminatory failure to reinstate as a separately actionable claim. See EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Dep’t, 45 F.3d 80 (4th Cir.1995); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Hall’s Motor Transit Co., 789 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.1986); Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, 660 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.1981).

*1061 2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

PacBell argues that Josephs did not exhaust the administrative remedies for his claim for refusal to reinstate because (1) equitable tolling is not applicable to Josephs’ EEOC claim and (2) Josephs’ DFEH charge, which was timely filed within a year of his dismissal, 3 and his EEOC claim both failed to mention refusal to reinstate. This court reviews for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to apply equitable tolling. See Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). Whether a plaintiff has exhausted required administrative remedies is a question of law, reviewed de novo. See Bankston v. White, 345 F.3d 768, 770 (9th Cir.2003).

a. Equitable Exception

An individual plaintiff must first file a timely EEOC complaint against the allegedly discriminatory party before bringing an ADA suit in federal court. See EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994). Because California is a “deferral” state, the claim must be filed within 300 days of the claimed event of discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2003e-5(e) (2003). The filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit, but is a requirement subject to equitable doctrines such as waiver and tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 , 102 S.Ct. 1127 , 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982).

An equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement is available when an EEOC representative misleads the plaintiff concerning his claim. See Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 901-02 (9th Cir.2001). Such relief may be granted to a plaintiff who:

Id. at 902 .

While Josephs’ EEOC claim was not filed within 300 days of his termination, these factors all favor the application of an equitable exception to the EEOC claim. Josephs diligently pursed his claim by going to the EEOC office shortly after his termination. He was pro se at the time and was misled by the EEOC representative, Holmes, who told Josephs that he needed to retain counsel before filing a claim. Following the advice of Holmes, Josephs retained counsel, but by the time the EEOC responded to counsel’s inquiries, the time for filing the claim had expired.

PacBell argues that Josephs’ affidavit, which describes his dealings with the EEOC, is a “self-serving” statement that cannot form the basis for an equitable exception. We rejected an identical argument in Rodriguez : “self-serving affidavits are cognizable ... so long as they state facts based on personal knowledge and are not too conclusory.” Id.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding an equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement for Josephs’ EEOC complaint.

b. Exhaustion of Reinstatement Claim

We construe charges filed before the EEOC and the DFEH liberally. See Stache v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & *1062 Allied Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1231 , 1233 (9th Cir.1988). “Subject matter jurisdiction extends over all allegations of discrimination that either ‘fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d at 899 ).

In Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam), we held that a wrongful termination claim was encompassed in a failure-to-reinstate charge, stating that the termination is “unquestionably like or reasonably related to” the allegations of discrimination in the refusal to reinstate charge. 4 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Here, Josephs’ refusal-to-reinstate claim is similarly “unquestionably” related to his termination claim. The same employer allegedly refused to reinstate Josephs for the same discriminatory reason that allegedly caused his termination. Any administrative investigation of his termination claim would have necessarily encompassed the grievance proceeding. Thus, Josephs exhausted his claim for discriminatory refusal to reinstate.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Judgment

PacBell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings that Josephs’ “condition” was covered by the ADA, that his condition limited a major life activity, and that Josephs was qualified for the position of service technician.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. See White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir.2002), amended by 335 F.3d 833 (9th Cir.2003). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party- — here, Josephs, — and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict. See Pa-vao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under the ADA an employee is considered disabled if he is regarded by his employer as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) & (C). An individual falls within this definition if his employer “mistakenly believes that a person has a[n] ... impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 , 119 S.Ct. 2139 , 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999).

The term “mental impairment” is not defined in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 . ADA regulations however, recognize that “mental impairments” are included within the term “disability,” and indirectly define this phrase .to include “[a]ny mental or physiological disorder, such as ... emotional or mental illnesses.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (g)(2) & (h)(2) (2005).

Here, Josephs claimed that PacBell regarded him as suffering from a mental illness that might result in future acts of violence. While it is true, as PacBell argues, that the California court’s determination of legal insanity does not necessarily mean that Josephs suffered from a mental impairment covered by the ADA, *1063 the jury considered more than Josephs’ criminal record and court documents. It heard evidence that PacBell employees considered Josephs unemployable because he had spent time in a “mental ward” and might “go off’ on a customer. It considered newspaper reports that PacBell reviewed and discussed during the grievance proceedings, which included statements that Josephs was a “mentally disordered offender” who had been under psychiatric care. The jury read Josephs’ autobiography, as had PacBell employees, which detailed his mental instability before his stay in the mental hospital. Thus, the jury had ample evidence to support its finding that PacBell regarded Josephs as having a mental impairment covered by the ADA.

The jury found that PacBell regarded Josephs’ mental disorder as substantially limiting his ability to work in a broad range of jobs. Under the ADA, when the “major life activity” that is “substantially limit[ed]” is working, the employee must be regarded as unable to work in a “class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1680.2 (j)(3)(i). The jury heard evidence that PacBell considered Josephs unfit for any job with the company. Maches testified that his supervisor told him the company wanted to “eliminate the possibility” of employing someone such as Josephs. When the union representative proposed that Josephs be offered a position that did not involve unsupervised access to customers’ homes, PacBell rejected the suggestion because “people can still walk by.” This evidence amply supports the jury’s finding that Pac-Bell viewed Josephs as having a mental disability that “substantially limited” him in the “major life activity” of working.

PacBell’s final argument challenges the jury’s finding that Josephs was qualified for the service technician position. PacBell argues that Josephs’ past violent acts made him unqualified for the position, while the dissent asserts that, in assessing his qualifications, the jury had no opportunity to consider Josephs’ potential dangerousness to PacBell customers. As a preliminary matter, we note that the ADA allows an employer to adopt a job qualification standard that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the work place. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (b) (2005); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r) (2005); see also, Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1258-59 (9th Cir.2001). Therefore, unquestionably, PacBell properly required that its service technicians be safe in customers’ homes. PacBell does not complain on appeal that it was prevented from presenting whatever evidence it deemed relevant on the subject of Josephs’ qualifications, including its perception that he might be a danger to customers. It is a factual question for the jury whether Pac-Bell’s perception was unfounded. See Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1443-44 (9th Cir.1996) (issue of fact for jury whether an employee’s dangerousness could be foreseen). The issue for us to decide is only whether the jury’s finding that Josephs was, in fact, not dangerous, is supported by the record.

As detailed above, Question 3 of the special verdict form asked: “Was plaintiff a qualified individual who could satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the Service Technician position?” The jury answered ‘Tes.” When answering Question 3 affirmatively, the jury knew that customer contact, in customers’ homes, was an important and integral function of the Service Technician position; trustworthiness in that context was a basic qualification for the job. Before making its determination that Josephs was qualified, the jury was instructed that an employer may take into *1064 account a past history of violence in making employment-related hiring decisions.

Josephs did not come to work for Pac-Bell until about 16 years after his violent act, about 15 years after his plea of not guilty by reasons of insanity, and about 12 years after his release from a mental institution. The jury knew that, before being hired by PacBell, Josephs worked successfully for Cox Communications for a decade; as a Repair Service Technician for Cox, he entered thousands of customers’ homes without incident. The jury knew that Josephs performed his job duties well at PacBell, too. The jury heard Maches’ testimony that Josephs was performing well on the job and that Maches considered Josephs a potential asset to PacBell. When the jury found that Josephs was “qualified” and that he satisfied all “job-related requirements,” it necessarily found that he could be trusted in customers’ homes and was presently mentally stable, not dangerous.

The jury also heard evidence that Pac-Bell was willing to assess present dangerousness objectively when the employee was not mentally ill or perceived to be so. For example, the jury heard evidence that PacBell had reinstated one service technician who had a felony domestic violence conviction.

It is undisputed that, if a person were in fact untrustworthy or dangerous in customers’ homes, for whatever reason, the person would not be qualified. The jury simply found, based on the evidence, the Josephs was, in fact, safe and qualified, and that PacBell’s fears were objectively unreasonable and based on a discriminatory, incorrect assumption. 5

B. Evidentiary Rulings

PacBell challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. We review “evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and will not reverse absent some prejudice.” Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338 , 1342 (9th Cir.1987). PacBell first argues that the district court erred when it admitted into evidence statements made during Josephs’ grievance proceeding, asserting that this ruling violated Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and federal labor policy.

Because the purpose of Rule 408 is to encourage the compromise and settlement of existing disputes, and the grievance proceeding did not concern Josephs’ not-yet-filed discrimination claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the statements made by PacBell employees. 6 See Cassino 817 F.2d at 1343.

PacBell also contends that the district court should not have admitted *1065 evidence of three other employees’ grievance settlements because these employees’ circumstances were not “nearly identical” to Josephs’ situation. In a discrimination case, a showing that the employer treated “similarly situated” employees more favorably than the plaintiff is probative of the employer’s discriminatory motivation. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2003). “[Individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.” Id. Each of the three employees at issue in this appeal meets this standard. Like Josephs, each (1) was a service technician, (2) failed to reveal prior criminal conviction on the employment application, (3) was terminated, and (4) participated in the grievance process. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence their employment history and grievance settlements. See id.

C. Jury Instructions

PacBell argues that the jury instructions were erroneous in two respects. “In evaluating jury instructions, this court considers the charge as a whole to determine whether it is misleading or misstates the law ... and will not reverse a judgment because of an erroneous instruction if the instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues.” Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1344.

PacBell first argues that the district court “gave only the first part of the mixed motive instruction, imposing liability if plaintiffs ‘regarded as’ disability was ‘a motivating factor,’ without including the second part — in effect defendant’s affirmative defense [that it would have terminated plaintiff for other reasons anyway].” 7 PacBell asserts that these instructions violate Supreme Court precedent in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 , 124 S.Ct. 513 , 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003).

In Price Waterhouse , the Supreme Court set forth the “respective burdens of proof of a defendant and plaintiff in a suit under Title VII when it has been shown that an employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.” Id. at 232 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the statute required the plaintiff to show “but-for causation” for the employment decision, holding that the plaintiff could meet her burden of proof by simply showing that the employer “relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.” Id. at 242 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . The defendant then had an affirmative defense if it could prove that “even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person.” Id. Thus, “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,' the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.” Id. at 244-45 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 (footnote omitted).

Here, while the jury instructions included the term “motivating factor,” that term, as defined in the instructions, required Josephs to show “but-for” causation. The jury was specifically told that “a motivating factor” was “something that moves the will and induces action.” In addition, the jury was instructed that Josephs had to prove that PacBell would not have made the same decision but for his “regarded as” disability. Therefore, Josephs had a *1066 heavier burden of proof than that required by Price Waterhouse . Moreover, in rendering a verdict for Josephs, the jury necessarily decided that PacBell would not have refused to reinstate Josephs for other reasons.

Second, PacBell argues that the district court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 31, because it led the jury to think that the sample of three other employees had statistical value. This instruction provided:

The evidence that Josephs introduced regarding the three other employees was relevant to his claim. Instruction No. 31 properly told the jury to weigh its proba-tiveness considering the size of the group. Thus, it was not error to give the instruction.

AFFIRMED.

. PacBell also argues that employers are entitled to protect themselves against potential liability from a negligent hiring claim if an employee commits a violent act against a customer. Requiring employers to rely on facts rather than stereotypes does not undermine employers' ability to hire only fully qualified people.

. We recently decided that “the ADA causation standard is a motivating factor standard.” Head v. Glacier N.W., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir.2005).

. Question 4 related solely to the discharge claim.

. The same phrase occurred in question 5, "Did Pacific Bell refuse to agree to reinstate plaintiff in the grievance settlement process because of his regarded as disability?”

. DFEH complaints must be filed within one year of the alleged discriminatory action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(d).

. Although Couveau involved an FEHA claim, the Ninth Circuit applied Title VII law in reaching its result and explained that, "[b]e-cause California law under the FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII, federal cases are instructive.” 218 F.3d at 1082 n. 4.

. PacBell also argues that employers are entitled to protect themselves against potential liability from a negligent hiring claim if an employee commits a violent act against a customer. Requiring employers to rely on facts rather than stereotypes does not undermine employers' ability to hire only fully qualified people.

. The one Ninth Circuit case PacBell cites in support of its federal labor policy argument, Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.1988), stands only for the proposition that statements made in grievance proceedings may not be used as a basis for a state tort claim.

. We recently decided that "the ADA causation standard is a motivating factor standard.” Head v. Glacier N.W., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir.2005).