United States v. Frank Miranda-Guerena

Good Law
445 F.3d 1233·2006 WL 1072179·2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10275
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApril 25, 200605-10198California4,414 words

Opinion

Opinion

445 F.3d 1233 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank MIRANDA-GUERENA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 05-10198. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted February 16, 2006. Filed April 25, 2006. Robert L. Murray, Tucson, AZ, for the defendant-appellant. Robert L. Miskell, Assistant United States Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for the plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00485-JMR/BPV. Before: ALARCÓN and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and HOLLAND, * Senior District Judge. ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge: 1 Frank Miranda-Guerena appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea for violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(A), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. Mr. Miranda-Guerena contends that the traffic stop that precipitated the government's search and seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic code violation had occurred; and that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion that a drug trafficking crime had…

Lead Opinion

Alarcon, J.

Frank Miranda-Guerena appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea for violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(A), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. Mr. Miranda-Guerena contends that the traffic stop that precipitated the government’s search and seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic code violation had occurred; and that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion that a drug trafficking crime had occurred. We affirm because we conclude that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred.

I

Acting on information received from a patrol officer that Mr. Miranda-Guerena was involved in the sale of cocaine from his home, Officer Michael Hammarstrom and other officers from the Tucson Police Department began surveillance of Mr. Miranda-Guerena and his co-inhabitant, Rosie Howerton. During three days of surveillance, the officers witnessed a number of short duration visits — visitors coming to Mr. Miranda-Guerena’s house, and Mr. Miranda-Guerena or Ms. Howerton visiting other locations. Based on…

Concurring Opinion

McKEOWN, J.

concurring:

I write separately to underscore that federal law, not Arizona law, is determinative of the admissibility of evidence in this case. The majority dedicates substantial time explaining why the traffic stop was permissible under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3883(B), and why retroactive application of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492 , 73 P.3d 623 (2003), does not offend due process. Maj. Op. at 1235-1237. Neither question bears on our Fourth Amendment analysis.

Although Miranda-Guerena’s argument focuses on state law, the issue before us is not whether the stop violated Arizona law. We have long held that “evidence seized in compliance with federal law is admissible without regard to state law.” United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir.1987). This principle holds true even where the evidence was obtained in violation of state law. United States v. Cornier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir.2000) (“The general rule, therefore, is that evidence will only be excluded in federal court when it violates federal protections, such as those contained in the Fourth Amendment, and not in cases where it is tainted solely under state…

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