Armando Navarro-Lopez v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Armando Navarro-Lopez petitions for review of a final order of removal, arguing that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred in summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) determination that Navarro-Lopez’s conviction under California Penal Code § 32 for accessory after the fact was a conviction involving a crime of moral turpitude. Based on this conviction, the BIA concluded that Navarro-Lopez was inadmissible and ineligible for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction, and we deny the petition for review.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Navarro-Lopez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in June 1984. On August 9, 1999, Navarro-Lopez pleaded guilty to a violation of CaLPenal Code § 32, accessory after the fact, and was sentenced to 270 days in jail and three years probation. In February 2001, Navarro-Lopez traveled to Tijuana, Mexico. When he tried to re-enter the United States, he was denied entry and detained. Thereafter the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) filed an amended Notice to Appear (NTA) charging that he was inadmissible because he did not have valid entry documents under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (7)(A)(i)(I) and for having…

dissenting:

The majority’s decision represents an unwarranted expansion of the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude and contravenes this circuit’s precedent. The majority holds that a conviction under California Penal Code § 32 for accessory after the fact is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, even though one could be convicted under that statute for acts as sympathetic as providing food or shelter to one’s own child if you know the child has committed even the most minor felony. I therefore dissent.

Moral turpitude has been defined by this circuit as an “act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards.” Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.1993); see also id. (further defining moral turpitude as conduct “so basically offensive to American ethics and accepted moral standards”) (citations omitted). The BIA has defined a crime involving moral turpitude as “[a]n act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society ... [where the] fundamental inquiry [is]: Does the crime ... in its nature imply personal depravity or baseness upon the part of its perpetrator?”. Matter…

455 F.3d 1055 Armando NAVARRO-LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 04-70345. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted April 4, 2006. Filed July 31, 2006. James R. Patterson, Law Office of Lilia S. Velasquez, San Diego, CA, for the petitioner. Saul Greenstein and Daniel E. Goldman, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency No. Alp-gsh-hof. Before: PREGERSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges, and BEISTLINE, * District Judge. LEAVY, Circuit Judge: 1 Armando Navarro-Lopez petitions for review of a final order of removal, arguing that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred in summarily affirming the immigration judge's (IJ) determination that Navarro-Lopez's conviction under California Penal Code § 32 for accessory after the fact was a conviction involving a crime of moral turpitude. Based on this conviction, the BIA concluded that Navarro-Lopez was inadmissible and ineligible for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction, and we deny the petition for review. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 2 Navarro-Lopez is a native…