Brian Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms Attorney General of the State of California

Caution
461 F.3d 1123·2006 WL 2506393·2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22506
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAugust 31, 200605-16455California20,724 words

Opinion

Opinion

461 F.3d 1123 Brian SASS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PRISON TERMS; Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellees. No. 05-16455. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted March 16, 2006. Filed August 31, 2006. COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Margaret Littlefield and Michael Satris, Law Offices of Michael Satris, Bolinas, CA, for the petitioner-appellant. Julie L. Garland, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for the respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-00835-MCE. Before ALFRED T. GOODWIN, STEPHEN REINHARDT, and MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, Circuit Judges. GOODWIN, Circuit Judge. 1 California state prisoner Brian Sass appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Sass argues that the California Board of Prison Terms' decisions, in 1999 and 2000, denying him parole violated his due process rights. 2 We hold that California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061 , 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783

lead Opinion

Goodwin, J.

California state prisoner Brian Sass appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Sass argues that the California Board of Prison Terms’ decisions, in 1999 and 2000, denying him parole violated his due process rights.

We hold that California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061 , 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 (2005). However, the state court decisions upholding Sass’ parole denials were not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. For this reason, we affirm.

I. 1

In 1988, Sass was convicted of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, hit and run death, causing injury while driving under the influence, and felony drunk driving. He was sentenced to fifteen years to life with the possibility of parole. The California Board of Prison Terms (“the Board”) held Sass’ initial parole consideration hearing on November 25, 1996, and found him unsuitable for parole.

On March 25, 1999, the Board held a subsequent parole consideration hearing, and found Sass unsuitable for parole. The Board…

dissent Opinion

Reinhardt, J.

dissenting:

I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s refusal to grant relief to a person whose continued incarceration “runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation,” Maj. Op. at 1129 (quoting Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis added)) — a person who is currently entitled to relief under any rational application of the law. The majority offers no reasoned explanation for this refusal, no doubt because its decision to deny relief finds no support in either law or logic.

Before I explain why the majority’s decision is erroneous, it may be helpful if I set forth the nature of Brian Sass’s offense and briefly identify the rules governing the California Parole Board’s authority to *1130 grant or deny eligibility for parole in such cases. Sass was convicted of second degree murder as the result of a death he caused while driving under the influence of alcohol in July of 1987, and he was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. 1 After years of extensive and successful participation in alcohol rehabilitation programs, his prior state of active alcoholism is now as “cured” as such…

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