Kathy Carson v. Billings Police Department David Ward Larry Reinlasoder Seth Weston Mike Scheino

470 F.3d 889 Kathy CARSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BILLINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT; David Ward; Larry Reinlasoder; Seth Weston; Mike Scheino, Defendants-Appellees. No. 04-35438. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Submitted January 10, 2006. * Filed December 7, 2006. Timothy C. Kelly (briefed), Kelly Law Office, Emigrant, MT, for the appellant. Vicki L. McDonald (briefed), Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, P.C., Billings, MT, for the appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana; Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-00130-JDS. Before: KLEINFELD and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and RAFEEDIE, ** District Judge. KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge. 1 This is an appeal from an attorney's fees award. I. Facts 2 The dispute arises out of a sex discrimination claim by Kathy Carson against the Billings, Montana Police department and several individuals. She prevailed, in state and federal tribunals. After a six day hearing, a state administrative law judge found in her favor, and ordered relief, which was increased on appeal. After the agency's final decision was rendered, Carson filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, which the…

This is an appeal from an attorney’s fees award.

I. Facts

The dispute arises out of a sex discrimination claim by Kathy Carson against the Billings, Montana Police department and several individuals. She prevailed, in state and federal tribunals. After a six day hearing, a state administrative law judge found in her favor, and ordered relief, which was increased on appeal. After the agency’s final decision was rendered, Carson filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, which the parties settled except for attorneys’ fees. The district court initially denied attorneys’ fees on the ground that Carson was not a “prevailing party” in the federal case, but we reversed and remanded for determination of an appropriate fee *891 award. 1 The case now comes back on Carson’s attorney’s appeal, claiming that the fee award was inadequate.

II. Analysis

Appellant sought $122,857.12 in attorneys’ fees and costs, and was awarded $85,992.94. Appellant makes two arguments, that the district court abused its discretion in calculating and explaining the hourly rate it used in the lodestar calculation, and in striking some hours as not reasonably spent on the case.

A. Lodestar

The district court…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in part and dissent in part.

I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing 21.5 hours. To that extent, I concur. 1

But I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court sufficiently explained its determination of the hourly rate, and from its conclusion that there was no evidence of any other applicable rate. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 refers only to “reasonable” fees. Reasonableness means the prevailing market rate in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the market rate varies greatly depending on skill, experience, and reputation; where the requested rate is in line with the rates for similar services by comparably skilled, experienced, and reputable attorneys, it “is normally deemed to be reasonable.” Id. at 895 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 n. 11 .

The district court, in two sentences, made this conclusory comment as to how it arrived at the hourly rate of $150 per hour: in March 2003 “courts” in the district had awarded Plaintiffs counsel that amount in some other unnamed case or…