United States v. Gunner Lawson Crapser

472 F.3d 1141 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gunner Lawson CRAPSER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 05-30456. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued July 26, 2006. Resubmitted January 3, 2007. Filed January 10, 2007. Nancy Bergeson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for the defendant-appellant. Frank Noonan, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, OR, for the plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-03-00487-BR. Before: GOODWIN, REINHARDT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges. GRABER, Circuit Judge: 1 Defendant Gunner Lawson Crapser appeals his conviction, upon a guilty plea, of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm because the initial encounter between Defendant and the police was consensual or, alternatively, was supported by reasonable suspicion, and because his consent to search was voluntary. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The district court made extensive findings of fact, none of which is clearly…

Defendant Gunner Lawson Crapser appeals his conviction, upon a guilty plea, of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm be *1143 cause the initial encounter between Defendant and the police was consensual or, alternatively, was supported by reasonable suspicion, and because his consent to search was voluntary.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The district court made extensive findings of fact, none of which is clearly erroneous and all of which are supported by evidence in the record. We therefore paraphrase the court’s findings here.

In July 2003, Multnomah County Sheriffs Deputy Todd Shanks stopped a vehicle driven by William Barrett. In the course of the stop, he found a pressure-cooker in the trunk. Shanks suspected that the pressure-cooker had been used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Barrett told Deputy Shanks that the pressure-cooker belonged to “Gunner Crapser,” who was staying at an EconoLodge Motel in Gresham, Oregon, in a room registered to a white, female dancer named Summer Twilligear.

Shanks also learned that there was an outstanding…

dissenting.

The majority opinion further weakens our Fourth Amendment protections— whatever is left of them. Specifically, I disagree, first, with the majority’s holding that Crapser’s initial contact with police was consensual. Our holdings in United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir.2004) and Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir.1994) require a contrary result. I likewise disagree with the majority’s alternative holding that, if a seizure occurred, the officers possessed the requisite suspicion necessary to interrogate Crapser about his potential involvement in drug activity. None of the factors relied upon by the majority to find reasonable suspicion is sufficient to do so, either alone or in the aggregate. Finally, because Crapser was illegally seized, his consent to *1150 the search of the room was invalid, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. Because of those conclusions, I would continue to reserve judgment on whether, even if reasonable suspicion exists, a Terry stop may occur under the circumstances present here. See Washington, 387 F.3d at 1067-68 .

I. Crapser was seized when he exited the motel room.

“It is well settled that ‘[t]he…