Candelario Garza v. James Yates

introduction of propensity evidence would violate due process because it was

propensity evidence. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). Alberni

v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2006), therefore correctly held that there is no

clearly established law that the admission of propensity evidence per se violates

due process. See id. at 866-67. The Court has not, however, left open the question

of whether the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence could violate due process.

Although it has not held that the admission of a particular piece of evidence did, in

fact, violate due process, the Court has stated that due process entitles a defendant

to a trial that is fundamentally fair, and has applied this standard in holding that the admission at trial of particular prejudicial evidence did not violate due process.

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75; Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).

Thus, as we held in Alberni, “The Supreme Court has established a general

principle that evidence that ‘is so fundamentally unfair that its admission violates

fundamental conceptions of justice’ may violate due process.” 458 F.3d at 864

(quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at…

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Candelario Garza appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his jury conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, dissuading a witness, and making criminal threats. Garza argues that the state trial court violated his federal due process rights and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair by admitting his former girlfriend’s testimony about pri- or conduct as propensity evidence.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), we may grant a habeas petition only if the state court’s decision was “forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)). A legal principle is “clearly established” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) if “it is embodied in a holding of [the Supreme] Court.” Thaler v. Haynes, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1171 , 1173, 175 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2010) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 , 127 S.Ct. 649 , 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006)).

Although the Supreme Court has said the writ should issue “when constitutional errors have rendered the trial…

concurring.

I concur in the memorandum disposition. I write separately to express my view that Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.2009) was wrongly decided, and merits reconsideration en banc at a future date. It is not true, as Holley held, that the introduction of “overtly prejudicial” evidence at trial could never be found to violate “clearly established federal law” because the Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Id. at 1101 .

The Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether the introduction of propensity evidence would violate due process because it was propensity evidence. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 , 75 n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir.2006), therefore correctly held that there is no clearly established law that the admission of propensity evidence per se violates due process. See id. at 866-67 . The Court has not, however, left open the question of whether the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence could violate due process.…