Peter Eriksen v. Ronal Serpas
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Peter and Mary Eriksen (“Appellants” or “the Eriksens”) appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal based on the applicable statute of limitations. Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir.2008). See Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.2006) (“Though we review de novo the district court’s determinations with respect to the statute of limitations, we review for abuse of discretion its conclusions regarding the applicability of equitable tolling.”). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to amend. Lipton v. PathoGenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the action because the Eriksens filed it well after the applicable three-year statute of limitations period had run. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991) (“[T]he appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2).”).