Crosby

concurring and dissenting:

First lawyer: “His sentence is imprisonment. Twenty-five years to life.”

Second lawyer: “That’s pretty standard.”

First lawyer: “It depends on the crime. Crosby’s crime was failing to let the state know of his change of address. The maximum penalty for this offense by itself is three years.”

Second lawyer: “So he was a recidivist. He had already committed two serious felonies. This was his third strike. Naturally, the penalty is sharper.”

First lawyer: “The penalty has been enormously enlarged. The key to constitutional sentencing is proportionality. The sentence imposed on Crosby is out of all proportion to his failure to report his change of address. Violent crimes such as robbery and voluntary manslaughter draw lesser punishment. Even rape, the most brutal of sex crimes, would not by itself draw this kind of penalty. How can it be that an offense which in itself is passive, which in itself harms no one, will justify incarceration up to the end of Crosby’s life?”

This hypothetical conversation assumes that governing law on the subject was established by the United States Supreme Court, notably in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77…

Opinion by Judge MILAN D. SMITH, JR.; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge NOONAN.

OPINION

Courtney Crosby appeals the district court’s denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises three claims on appeal. First, Crosby challenges the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was valid. Second, he claims that the California court erred in finding that the trial court acted within its discretion to deny his subsequent attempt to withdraw the jury trial waiver. Finally, Crosby contends that the California court erred in finding that his sentence of 26 years to life under California’s Three Strikes Law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Because we conclude that these holdings of the California Court of Appeal were neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, we affirm the district court’s denial of Crosby’s habeas petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 5, 1999, Sacramento police responded to a call for disturbing the peace at the Ethan Terrace Apartments in Sacramento County.…

Before: JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., M. MARGARET McKEOWN, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge MILAN D. SMITH, JR.; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge NOONAN.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Courtney Crosby appeals the district court's denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises three claims on appeal. First, Crosby challenges the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was valid. Second, he claims that the California court erred in finding that the trial court acted within its discretion to deny his subsequent attempt to withdraw the jury trial waiver. Finally, Crosby contends that the California court erred in finding that his sentence of 26 years to life under California's Three Strikes Law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Because we conclude that these holdings of the California Court of Appeal were neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, we affirm the district court's denial of Crosby's habeas petition.

On July 5, 1999, Sacramento police responded to a call for…