MEMORANDUM

We affirm the judgment revoking William Moore’s supervised release and the sentence the district court imposed upon revocation.

1. Moore’s admission to the sale and possession of controlled substances charges at his admit or deny hearing was non-hearsay evidence of his supervised release violation, therefore we need not determine whether the summary in the violation petition violated his confrontation rights. See United States v. Verduzco, 330 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (9th Cir.2003); United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.1999).

2. The violation petition gave Moore sufficient notice of the alleged violation of supervised release. The petition notified Moore that the alleged new law violation— possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute — violated the terms of his supervised release. See United States v. Havier, 155 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir.1998).

3. The district court did not commit procedural error by failing to apply the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) retroactively. The FSA does not operate retroactively to reduce the underlying offense from a Class A to a Class B felony. See United States v. Baptist, 646 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam). The district court properly considered the advisory policy statements amended by the FSA and then rejected them. See United States v. Tadeo, 222 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir.2000).

4. The district court did not commit procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence. The record shows that the district court properly discussed and addressed the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e). See United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir.2009).

5. Finally, we cannot conclude that the 54-month sentence, which was within the recommended Guidelines range, was substantively unreasonable on this record. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.