22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T444,MEMORANDUM California state prisoner Rodney Lamont Dowd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust, and for clear error its factual deter minations. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,1117 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice because Dowd failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules). Dowd’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. Dowd’s motion to expedite for good cause, filed April 11, 2012, is denied as moot. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T47b,

MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Rodney Lamont Dowd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust, and for clear error its factual deter minations. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,1117 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice because Dowd failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules).

Dowd’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Dowd’s motion to expedite for good cause, filed April 11, 2012, is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.