Mario Contreras v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. We reverse and remand. Because the parties are familiar with the background of the case, we need not recount it here.

I

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court described the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” as consisting of three criteria:

Id. at 560-61 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; some alterations in the original).

In this case, the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims concerning limitation of the notice of recall to certain states because they had failed to establish injury-in-fact. When Toyota made the repair available, free of charge, in both recall and non-recall states, Toyota effectively eliminated any distinction between the plaintiffs and vehicle owners in recall states. Plaintiffs do not allege that Toyota’s repair was ineffective. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish injury-in-fact with regard to Toyota’s response to the defect, and they lack…