MEMORANDUM

Jarek Molski and Disability Rights Enforcement, Education Services (“DREES”), collectively “Plaintiffs,” again appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for attorney’s fees and costs in their action against Conrad’s La Canada Restaurant (“Defendant”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 , (“ADA”) and the California Disabled Persons Act, California Civil Code §§ 54-55.2 (“CDPA”). Previously, the district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees, and this court remanded the case back to the district court to provide reasons for its decision. See Molski v. Conrad’s La Canada Rest., No. 07-55336, 2009 WL 166931 (9th Cir. Jan.14, 2009). On remand, the district court provided an explanation for its decision, and Plaintiffs again appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

A district court’s decision to deny a motion for attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Hensley v. Ecker- hart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.2002). A “prevailing plaintiff under the ADA should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has explained that courts should “evaluate whether special circumstances exist by asking whether (1) allowing attorney’s fees would further the purposes of [the statute,] and (2) whether the balance of equities favors or disfavors the denial of fees.” Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees. The district court identified and applied the correct legal standard when it determined that awarding attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs would disrupt the balance of the equities in the case. The explanation the court provided, in determining that an award of attorney’s fees in this case would be inequitable, was not illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc). Specifically, the district court based its conclusion on Plaintiffs’ poor conduct demonstrated through litigation tactics and requests for excessive fees, Plaintiffs’ minimal success in the litigation, and the unjust hardship Defendants would experience.

In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for litigation costs. The district court identified and applied the appropriate legal standard to award litigation costs when it explained that the question of awarding litigation costs follows the attorney’s fees inquiry. See Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.2001); Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572 , 593 (9th Cir.2000). In its discretion, the district court determined that awarding costs would be inappropriate for the same reasons that awarding attorney’s fees would be inequitable. The district court also noted that Defendant’s good faith efforts to remedy the problem and Defendant’s limited financial resources were equities that tipped in favor of not awarding costs.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.