22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4dd,MEMORANDUM Nathaniel Hosea appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel in his employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for an abuse of discretion, Johnson v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 27 F.3d 415, 417 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), and we affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hosea’s motion for appointment of counsel because Hosea failed to establish that he satisfied all three factors for appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). See id. at 416-17 (listing factors for court to consider and affirming denial of motion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination action). Hosea’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. Hosea’s letter requesting counsel is construed as a motion for appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1) and, so construed, is denied. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.2009) (setting forth “exceptional circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T514,

MEMORANDUM

Nathaniel Hosea appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel in his employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for an abuse of discretion, Johnson v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 27 F.3d 415, 417 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hosea’s motion for appointment of counsel because Hosea failed to establish that he satisfied all three factors for appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). See id. at 416-17 (listing factors for court to consider and affirming denial of motion to appoint counsel in employment discrimination action).

Hosea’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Hosea’s letter requesting counsel is construed as a motion for appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1) and, so construed, is denied. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.2009) (setting forth “exceptional circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.