United States v. Marc Turner

Opinion by Judge McKEOWN; Dissent by Judge M. SMITH.

OPINION

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (the “Adam Walsh Act” or the “Act”) sets up a process for civil commitment of “sexually dangerous persons.” This appeal raises the question of whether a civil detention under the Act constitutes a term of imprisonment that both precludes and tolls the commencement of a supervised release term of a sex offender who has completed his incarceration for a criminal conviction.

Following the expiration of his criminal sentence, Marc Christopher Turner was detained under the Adam Walsh Act’s stay-of-release provision, which automatically stays release until completion of protective procedures under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (a). Under normal circumstances, Turner’s term of supervised release would have commenced upon release from imprisonment. In any event, the supervised release term is tolled only “during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction....” 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e). Though Turner received no hearing during the entire four and a half year stay period and was detained only pursuant to a civil statute, the government would have us hold…

dissenting:

The majority holds that supervised release may begin and end before a person is released from prison. Because the Supreme Court has squarely held otherwise, and the majority’s conclusion defies both common sense and the reasoning of binding precedent, I respectfully dissent. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57 , 120 S.Ct. 1114 , 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) (“Supervised release does not run while an individual remains in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.”) (emphasis added).

As an initial matter, the majority misconstrues the issue here. The question is not, as the majority contends, whether a term of supervised release was tolled. The issue is whether a term of supervised release began when an individual was not free to leave a prison. I would hold that binding authority dictates that supervised release cannot begin until one is physically released from prison.

The commencement and tolling provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e) are distinct. They “work in different ways” and contain different statutory requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e); Tobey v. United States, 794 F.Supp.2d 594, 600 (D.Md.2011). Unlike the tolling provision, the commencement provision does…

BACKGROUND

Turner pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of § 2252(a)(2). He was sentenced to 46 months in prison and a 36-month term of supervised release. Turner was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina (“FCI Butner”). Upon completion of his prison sentence, Turner was released. 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory citations are to Title 18 of the United States Code. 8884 UNITED STATES v. TURNER Three years later, Turner admitted that he had violated con- ditions of his supervised release, and on June 29, 2007, the district court sentenced him to eight months in prison and a 22-month term of supervised release. Turner again served his prison sentence at FCI Butner. Due to good time credits, his prison sentence expired on September 7, 2007.

Prison records confirm Turner’s good time credit release at noon on September 7, 2007. Two minutes later, he was admit- ted for “Adam Walsh Act Review.” On that same day, the government filed a “Certification of a Sexually Dangerous Person” against Turner in the United States District…