Tio Sessoms v. D Runnels

Good Law
691 F.3d 1054·2012 WL 3517600·2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17206
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAugust 16, 201208-17790California16,793 words

Opinion

Opinion

I. Facts and Procedural History

On October 20, 1999, Sessoms and two others burglarized Edward Sheriff’s home. During the burglary, one of Ses- soms’s accomplices choked and repeatedly stabbed Sheriff.

Sessoms then fled from California to Oklahoma. There, at his father’s urging, Sessoms surrendered to Oklahoma police on November 15, 1999. His father advised him to ask for a lawyer before talking to the police. Sessoms was in custody for four days before being interrogated. On November 19 or 20, two police officers, Detectives Woods and Keller, flew from California to Oklahoma to question Sessoms at the county jail where he was being held.

The entire interrogation was videotaped. The video shows Sessoms sitting alone, talking to himself and quietly saying, “I’m not a criminal, but I got [inaudible]. They didn’t tell me if I have a lawyer. I know I want to talk to a lawyer.”2 When the detectives entered the room, the following exchange took place:

Det. Woods: . . . Tio, I’m Dick.

Sessoms: How you doing, all right. You already know me.

Det. Woods: You say . . .

Det. Keller: Tio, Pat Keller.

Det. Woods: You say Tio or…

Lead Opinion

Fletcher, J.

Opinion by Judge B. FLETCHER; Concurrence by Judge FISHER; Dissent by Judge MURGUIA.

OPINION

with whom SCHROEDER, WARDLAW, FISHER, PAEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, join in full:

Tio Sessoms, a nineteen-year-old black man, sat alone in an eight-by-ten foot interrogation room. Five days earlier, on the advice of his father, Sessoms had turned himself in to the local police. Before doing so, Sessoms’s father told his son: you must ask for a lawyer before talking to the police.

Sessoms followed his father’s advice. When the two police officers entered the interrogation room, Sessoms sat slouched in his chair. He looked up and they exchanged brief pleasantries. Forty seconds after the officers entered the room and before they read Sessoms his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the following exchange occurred:

*1056 Instead of immediately ceasing the interrogation, the officers persevered and convinced Sessoms that the only way to tell his side of the story was to speak to them without an attorney. Eventually, Sessoms agreed to talk and made incriminating statements.

We hold that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably…

Concurring Opinion

Fisher, J.

with whom B. FLETCHER, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, join, concurring:

I fully concur in the majority opinion. I also conclude, contrary to the dissent, that even if it were reasonable to apply the more stringent standard of Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied that standard. For the reasons stated in the majority opinion, the only reasonable conclusion was that Sessoms’ statements, taken together, unambiguously conveyed his desire to have counsel present.

Dissenting Opinion

Murguia, J.

with whom KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The majority invalidates a conviction on the ground that the state court reached a decision that was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. According to the majority, the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), to the pre-waiver context. But the majority eschews the high level of deference we owe a state court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . A federal habeas court may not grant relief unless no reasonable jurist could agree with the state court’s determination. See Harrington v. Richter, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). On the record before us, a reasonable jurist could conclude not only that the Davis standard applies to p:re-Miranda statements, but also that Sessoms’s request was ambiguous and equivocal. I would, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment denying relief.

*1065 I

Before the police read him his Miranda rights, Sessoms said,…

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