Price v. Stevedoring Services of America, Inc.

Good Law
697 F.3d 820·2012 WL 3799775·2013 A.M.C. 380·2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18568
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitSeptember 4, 201208-71719California26,901 words

Opinion

Opinion

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Scheme

The Longshore Act is a “ ‘comprehensive scheme’ ” to pro- vide compensation for the disability or death of employees resulting from injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1354 (2012) (quoting Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 294 (1995)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). Although the Department of Labor is charged with adminis- tering the Act, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 45 (1989); 33 U.S.C. §§ 902, 939, the statute pro- vides for a “split-function regime,” in which duties are divided between two “sub-agencies,” Ingalls Shipbldg. v. Dir., OWCP, 519 U.S. 248, 268 (1997). “By statute and by regulation, the adjudicative and enforcement/litigation func- tions of the Department of Labor with respect to the LHWCA are divided between the ALJ[ ]s [Administrative Law Judges] and the Benefits Review Board on the one hand, and the Director on the other.” Id. at 269 (internal citations omitted); see also Dir., OWCP v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 125 (1995). 1 Section 1961 delineates the interest payable on federal…

Lead Opinion

Berzon, J.

Opinion by Judge BERZON; Dissent by Judge O’SCANNLAIN.

OPINION

We consider whether a claimant under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA,” “Longshore Act,” or “Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., (1) is entitled to the maximum compensation rate from the fiscal year in which he becomes disabled or from the fiscal year in which he receives a formal compensation award; (2) receives interest on past due compensation at the rate defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 instead of the rate set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6621 ; 1 and, (3) if interest is to be awarded at the § 1961 rate, whether it should be simple or compound. In the course of resolving these issues, we also consider the proper level of deference that should be accorded to the litigating position of the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“Director”).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Scheme

The Longshore Act is a “‘comprehensive scheme’ ” to provide compensation for the disability or death of employees resulting from injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1350, 1354 , 182 L.Ed.2d 341 (2012) (quoting Metro. Stevedore Co.…

Dissenting Opinion

O'Scannlain, J.

dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the Director’s litigating position before this court is not entitled to Chevron deference and that the proper rate of interest on past-due compensation awards under the Long-shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) is the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a). That said, I cannot join the majority’s discussion of these issues because, in my view, it treats several matters that are unnecessary to the outcome of this case and thus should be left for another day. See, e.g., Op. at 831-32 n. 7 (discussing whether litigating positions taken in agency adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference); Op. at 832-33 (discussing whether the position of the Benefits Review Board is entitled to deference).

More specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Pro *844 grams is not entitled to deference with respect to the method of computing interest and, therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion to the contrary.

I

In applying the LHWCA, the Director has long taken the position that interest on past-due compensation awards should be computed…

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