MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Marco Lopez appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . Mr. Lopez argues that the state trial court violated his federal due process rights to a fair trial by failing to instruct the jury properly. Specifically, he asserts that to establish felony-murder under California law, the prosecution must prove that the killing and the underlying felony were part of one “continuous transaction.” Because the parties are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it here. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 . We affirm the district court.

I

We review the district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus de novo and its findings for clear error. Hurles v. Ryan, 650 F.3d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir.2011). In reviewing California state court decisions, this Court must apply the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) to any petition filed after April 24, 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ; see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 , 123 S.Ct. 1398 , 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 , 117 S.Ct. 2059 , 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Here, Lopez filed Ms habeas petition on March 14, 2008, so it is subject to AEDPA. Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant relief if the state-court decision:

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).

Lopez raised a federal constitutional claim in his appeal before the Califorma Court of Appeal. In its twelve-page decision denying his appeal, the court did not address his federal-law claim. The Cali-forma Supreme Court summarily denied Lopez’s petition for review, which raised the same federal constitutional issues. The issue was therefore adequately exhausted. We need not decide whether to apply de novo review because the state courts did not squarely address the federal issue, or the AEDPA’s more deferential review, as we would affirm the district court’s decision under either standard.

II

Mr. Lopez’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by improperly instructing the jury on the elements of felony-murder as defined by California law. Mr. Lopez contends the trial court erred by failing to adopt a proposed instruction regarding the “one continuous transaction” rule because one “continuous transaction is an essential element of felony murder in California.” (App. Br. at 13.) Neither the California Supreme Court nor the Califorma Court of Appeal has so held.

Under California Penal Code section 189, murder that is “committed in perpetration of’ certain enumerated felonies, including robbery and burglary, is murder in the first degree. The Califorma Supreme Court has invoked the “‘one continuous transaction’ analysis” as a standard for the sufficiency of evidence to support a felony-murder instruction or conviction. People v. Sakarias, 22 Cal.4th 596, 624 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 (2000). Rather than establishing “one continuous transaction” as an element of felony-murder, however, California courts adopted the analysis for guidance on appellate review regarding the contours of “in perpetration of’ — specifically, whether substantial evidence exists to demonstrate a sufficient connection between a killing and an underlying felony. See id; People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal.4th 187, 207-08 , 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 (2004) (stating that the continuous-transaction doctrine was “not intended to relieve the wrongdoer from any probable consequence of his act by placing a limitation upon the res gestae which is unreasonable or unnatural,]” but rather to “define[] the duration of felony-murder liability, which may extend beyond the termination of the felony itself’) (emphasis omitted). Thus, that a felony and homicide are “one continuous transaction” is a sufficient condition to satisfy the statutory requirement of “in perpetration of,” but not a necessary one.

The trial court properly relied on the language in California Penal Code section 189 in instructing the jury that the elements of felony murder are “1. A human being was killed. 2. The killing was unlawful. 3. The killing ... occurred during the commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary.” (RT at 3960.) The trial court further instructed the jury:

(RT at 3070, 3079 (emphases added).) These CALJIC instructions properly instructed the jury regarding the relationship between the underlying felony and the homicide and also informed the jury of its responsibility to find all the elements of felony-murder.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.