United States v. Kenia Munguia

Good Law
704 F.3d 596·2012 WL 5937544·2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 24294
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNovember 27, 201210-50253California9,417 words

Opinion

Opinion

I. Background

Pseudoephedrine is a common ingredient in many over- the-counter cold medications, including Sudafed, Claritin-D, and similar cold-and-allergy medications. Pseudoephedrine is a methamphetamine precursor. To combat the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine, federal law limits the quantity of pseudoephedrine that retailers can sell to individual consumers, as well as the quantity that individual consumers can purchase. Under the Combating Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, retailers can sell UNITED STATES V . MUNGUIA

only 3.6 grams of pseudoephedrine per day to any particular individual. 21 U.S.C. § 830(d)(1). An individual can purchase only nine grams in a thirty-day period. § 844(a). A box of over-the-counter cold medication typically contains 2.4 grams of pseudoephedrine.

To ensure compliance with federal and state law, many retailers contract with MethCheck, a privately managed database that tracks the purchase of drugs containing pseudoephedrine. Retailers using MethCheck require that purchasers of drugs containing pseudoephedrine provide identification and an electronic signature at the time of purchase. MethCheck records…

Lead Opinion

Fletcher, J.

Opinion by Judge FLETCHER; Concurrence by Judge BREYER.

OPINION

After a jury trial, Appellant Kenia Munguia was convicted of conspiring to possess and of possessing pseudoephed-rine, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (c)(2). The key question at trial was whether Munguia knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the drugs she purchased were being used to manufacture methamphetamine. Munguia appeals her conviction. She contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in refusing a requested jury instruction specifying that “reasonable cause to believe” must be evaluated from her perspective, based on her knowledge and sophistication. The instruction given by the district court provided that “reasonable cause to believe” should be evaluated from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person rather than from the perspective of Munguia. We hold that the district court erred in refusing Munguia’s requested instruction and that the error was not harmless.

I. Background

Pseudoephedrine is a common ingredient in many over-the-counter cold medications, including Sudafed,…

Concurring Opinion

Breyer, J.

concurring:

District courts serve as gatekeepers responsible for admitting relevant evidence, except where the probative value of that evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. While the Court today has correctly stated the standard for what it means to have a “reasonable cause to believe” under § 841(c)(2), the gatekeeper function remains unchanged. Accordingly, defendants do not have carte blanche to introduce scienter evidence of marginal probative value that tends to “induc[e] decision on a purely emotional basis” or run afoul of the familiar Rule 403 factors. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 & advisory committee’s note.

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