Rex Chappell v. R. Mandeville
Opinion
Opinion
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rex Chappell was a prisoner in California State Prison, Sacramento when his fianceé, Philissa Richard, came to visit him on April 28, 2002. When Richard entered the prison facilities she was wearing a ponytail hairpiece; the next day the hairpiece was discovered in a trash can near the visiting room. Prison officials then searched the entire visiting area and found spandex undergarments in the women’s bathroom. Both the hairpiece and the undergarments tested positive for cocaine residue. Richard admitted that the hairpiece was hers, but an investigation did not conclude whether the undergarments also belonged to Richard. A background check revealed that Richard had a long history of felony offenses, including numerous drug offenses.
Prison staff conducted a search of Chappell and his prison cell, during which they notified Chappell that they believed that someone had introduced drugs through a hairpiece. The officials discovered three unlabelled bottles of what appeared to be eye drops in Chappell’s cell. The liquid in the bottles tested positive for methamphetamine.
CHAPPELL V . MANDEVILLE
On April 30, 2002, Chappell was…
Lead Opinion
Bybee, J.
Opinion by Judge BYBEE; Concurrence by Judge GRAHAM; Partial Dissent by Judge BERZON.
OPINION
Plaintiff Rex Chappell brought a § 1983 case against various officials from California State Prison, Sacramento, alleging constitutional violations relating to his six-day placement on contraband watch. The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion on some of the claims, but denied summary judgment with respect to Chappell’s Eighth Amendment and due process claims against defendants R. Mandeville and T. Rosario. Mandeville and Rosario appealed. We hold that both Mandeville and Rosario are entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time Chappell was on contraband watch did not clearly establish that their actions were unconstitutional. We therefore reverse.
*1055 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rex Chappell was a prisoner in California State Prison, Sacramento when his fianceé, Philissa Richard, came to visit him on April 28, 2002. When Richard entered the prison facilities she was wearing a ponytail hairpiece; the next day the hairpiece was discovered in a trash can near the visiting room. Prison officials then searched the…
Concurring Opinion
Graham, J.
concurring:
I join the panel’s opinion with the exception of Section III.B.2. I write separately because I disagree with my colleagues’ interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), in the context of their analysis of Chappell’s due process claim based on a state-created liberty interest.
I believe that subjecting Chappell to contraband watch did not violate his rights under the Due Process Clause. The due process analysis should end there because Chappell has identified no state statute or regulation which limits the discretion of prison officials to subject him to this kind of temporary investigatory confinement. In the absence of such a state statute or regulation, there can be no state-created liberty interest.
My colleagues apparently believe that Sandin changed this requirement and that post-Sandin any change in conditions of confinement which imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” may give rise to a violation of a state-created liberty interest. I fail to understand how it could be said that a state has “created” a liberty interest by imposing harsher conditions of confinement. In…
Dissenting Opinion
Berzon, J.
dissenting in part:
I join Part III.B of the majority opinion, as I agree that Defendants Mandeville and Rosario are entitled to qualified immunity on the due process issues. In my view, however, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Chappell’s Eighth Amendment claim. As I would affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity with respect to the Eighth Amendment issue, I respectfully dissent from Part III.A of the majority opinion.
I
Our jurisdiction over this collateral order appeal of the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is limited to questions of law. See Ortiz v. Jordan, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 884, 891 , 178 L.Ed.2d 703 (2011); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.2011). We do not concern ourselves with whether the “pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial,” but instead examine the “purely legal issue whether the facts alleged ... support a claim of clearly established law.” Alston, 663 F.3d at…