22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T539,MEMORANDUM Ronald Shea, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) action arising from the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) initial processing of a patent application. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Chamberlin v. Isen, 779 F.2d 522, 523 (9th Cir.1985), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Shea’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the United States is immune from liability under the “discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a); see also Chamberlin, 779 F.2d at 523-26 (holding that FTCA’s discretionary function exception shields the United States from tort liability for USPTO employees’ processing and examination of patent applications in light of “the overall scheme providing for discretionary examination of patent applications” and “the public policy implications of patent examining”). Contrary to Shea’s contentions, 35 U.S.C. § 132 (a) does not warrant a different conclusion. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131 , 132(a); Chamberlin, 779 F.2d at 524-25 . AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T566,

MEMORANDUM

Ronald Shea, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) action arising from the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) initial processing of a patent application. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Chamberlin v. Isen, 779 F.2d 522, 523 (9th Cir.1985), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Shea’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the United States is immune from liability under the “discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a); see also Chamberlin, 779 F.2d at 523-26 (holding that FTCA’s discretionary function exception shields the United States from tort liability for USPTO employees’ processing and examination of patent applications in light of “the overall scheme providing for discretionary examination of patent applications” and “the public policy implications of patent examining”). Contrary to Shea’s contentions, 35 U.S.C. § 132 (a) does not warrant a different conclusion. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131 , 132(a); Chamberlin, 779 F.2d at 524-25 .

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.