MEMORANDUM

Rene Arias-Robles appeals his sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 . He contends that the district court erred by imposing a 16-level increase under the sentencing guidelines for a prior conviction that was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), and by imposing a sentence that was substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

Arias-Robles cannot challenge his prior conviction in this proceeding because he was represented by counsel at the time. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994); see also United States v. Oseguera-Madrigal, 700 F.3d 1196 , 1199 n. 4 (9th Cir.2012). Moreover, the record does not support Arias-Robles’s contention that his former counsel failed to advise him before he pled guilty in the Texas case that deportation was a certain — as opposed to possible— consequence of that plea.

The district court did not err in enhancing Arias-Robles’s sentence based on the Texas conviction. At the time of Arias-Robles’s sentencing in this case, the Texas conviction was final. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 , 123 S.Ct. 1072 , 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003). His postconviction motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is considered a collateral proceeding. See id. at 524-25 , 123 S.Ct. 1072 .

The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range. See United States v. Vasquez-Cruz, 692 F.3d 1001, 1009 (9th Cir.2012).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.